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1 Introduction 
1.1 Class voting: the democratic class struggle 
Almost without exception, surveys conducted in various Western industrialized 
nations after the Second World War established the importance of people's social 
positions - in particular class, religion and ethnicity - in determining party choice. 
Indeed, in all Western industrialized democracies, class has turned out to be one 
of the prime determinants of voting behaviour (Rose 1974; Franklin et al. 1992). 
In this study we focus on the relationship between class and voting behaviour in 
Western industrialized countries over the last decades. A central feature of this 
relationship is that people from the lower classes are more likely to vote for left-
wing parties than are people from other classes. These left-wing parties prefer 
social change in the direction of greater equality between citizens, for example 
with respect to their labour contracts and income, whereas right-wing parties are 
against such changes (Lipset 1960). Thus, through their electoral behaviour, 
members of both the lower and the higher classes have the chance to further their 
interests. Members of the lower class will strive for the improvement of their 
labour contract and income, sometimes at the expense of the higher classes. 
Members of the higher classes will try to preserve the status quo, or even try to 
improve their own position. Thus, elections can - in terms of Anderson & 
Davidson (1943), Lipset (I960) and Korpi (1983) - be regarded as the platform of 
"the democratic class struggle". Or, as Przeworski and Spraque (1986) suggested, 
instead of fighting the class struggle on the barricades with real bricks, during 
elections manual class labourers can throw voting ballots as "paper stones" at the 
ruling classes. 
Although in every Western democracy people in lower class positions vote 
more often for left-wing parties than do people from higher class positions, the 
strength of the relationship between class and voting behaviour has been shown to 
vary across countries. The Scandinavian countries and Britain, for example, have 
had relatively high levels of class voting during the past decades, whereas in the 
United States and Canada the class/vote relationship has been fairly weak. In 
Norway, for example, in 1949, 83 per cent of the manual workers voted for a 
left-wing political party, compared with 34 per cent of nonmanual workers 
(Sainsbury 1990). The corresponding difference for the United States in 1952 was 
much smaller: 48 per cent of the manual workers against 31 per cent of the 
nonmanual workers had a left-wing party preference (Abramson et al. 1990). 
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In addition, there is evidence of a decline in the levels of class voting in most 
countries in the postwar period. The same countries form a telling example. In 
Norway, by 1990, the percentage of manual workers voting for a left-wing 
political party had dropped to 54 per cent, while the figures for nonmanual 
workers had risen to 43 per cent (Sainsbury 1990). A similar pattern was true of 
the United States where, in 1990, 30 per cent of manual workers had a preference 
for a left-wing political party against 31 per cent of nonmanual workers (Abram-
son et al. 1990). Thus, in both countries the voting behaviour of manual and 
nonmanual workers became more similar between the points in time considered. 
This study focuses on the relationship between class and voting behaviour in 
Western industrialized countries. In doing so, we follow a long line of studies that 
have examined this relationship, but we endeavour to improve on these by 
addressing more precise questions, applying detailed class measures, employing 
advanced methods of data analyses, and analysing data from many countries and 
over a long period. The aim of this study is threefold. The first aim is to describe 
the levels of class voting in the various Western industrialized countries in the 
postwar period. Many scholars have already examined differences in the levels of 
class voting across countries and the declines in the levels of class voting within 
countries (Kemp 1978; Andeweg 1982; Korpi 1983; Lipset 1983; Franklin 1985b; 
Dalton 1988; Inglehart 1990). However, the descriptive studies that have appeared 
so far, do not use current methods of analyses and measurement procedures, nor 
are they based on data from many countries and from long periods simultaneous-
The second aim of this study is to test specific explanations for between-
country and over-time variation in levels of class voting. Various explanations for 
differing levels of class voting have been suggested. In this study we focus on 
three of the most influential arguments. The first argument suggests that various 
social and political characteristics of a country's population, such as individual 
income differences and extent of religious heterogeneity, affect the level of class 
voting in a country. The second explanation suggests that changes in the voting 
behaviour of the manual and/or nonmanual class, and thus in class-based voting, 
are due to the changing composition of these classes, while the third concerns the 
effects of intergenerational class mobility in a country on that country's level of 
class voting. All three explanations have not so far been tested, using current 
research techniques and measurement procedures on a large amount of high 
quality data. 
The third aim of this study is to test micro-level assumptions that are implicit 
in the macro-level explanations discussed above. For example, the explanation 
linking differences in class mobility patterns of countries to differences in levels 
of class voting in these countries, assumes a relationship between class mobility 
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and individual voting behaviour. In this study we pay specific attention to this 
individual-level assumption. 
1.2 Review of the literature on stratification and politics 
The importance of class-based voting as a topic of investigation, and the rel-
evance of the three aims of the present study, can best be illuminated by review-
ing the literature on the relationship between social stratification and politics. 
Such a review will show the progress in this research area, but it will also 
identify the areas in which progress still has to be made. 
We present the literature on the relationship between social stratification and 
politics, by dividing the history of this research area into three generations. These 
generations are comparable to those in which the history of comparative intergen-
erational social stratification and mobility research is commonly divided (Feather-
man et al. 1974; Kurz & Muller 1987; Ganzeboom et al. 1991; Ultee 1993). The 
three generations can be distinguished by the following criteria: (a) the articula-
tion of research problems (b) the content of major hypotheses (c) measurement 
procedures (d) data collection and (e) methods of data analysis. We are aware that 
the three generations are not truly separated in time. Nevertheless it remains 
informative to review the history of this research area by contemplating these 
generations in developmental perspective. Doing this, the progress in measure-
ment procedures and methods of data analysis might seem somewhat more 
influential than progress on research problems and hypotheses. This view how-
ever, as will be made clear in the next sections, is mistaken. The developments of 
new measurement procedures and methods of analysis have indeed offered 
opportunities to answer old substantive questions more adequately and to address 
new, more precise questions. 
The main contribution to the first generation in this research area was made in 
the decades just after the Second World War. This generation can be character-
ized by the attention given to a broad range of research problems concerning the 
relationship between class and voting behaviour. The research problems were 
addressed by examining cross-tabulations based upon a limited number of datasets 
and using simple class measures. The second generation started in the 1960s and 
had as its main contribution the advancement of individual-level studies. These 
were characterized by the analysis of survey data and by the application of linear 
regression techniques. The third generation emerged around a decade ago, and can 
be seen as dealing with more precise research questions than those formulated in 
earlier generations. In addition, its extensive use of detailed and standardized 
class measures, large scale comparable datasets from many countries, and non-
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linear research techniques marks this generation out from its predecessors. This 
third generation is very promising, but since it is still in its infancy it has yet to 
live up to these expectations. 
In this section the three generations identified above will be discussed in more 
detail. During this discussion, it will become clear that on the topic of stratifica-
tion and politics questions emerge with respect to at least three related areas. 
First, there are the descriptive questions concerning levels of class voting in 
Western industrialized countries over the postwar period. Second, questions arise 
as to how we can explain between-country and over-time variations in class 
voting. Third, there is the challenge of accounting for the effects of class and 
intergenerational class mobility on individual voting behaviour. Each of these 
areas will be examined in turn. 
1.2.1 First generation 
Studies on the relationship between social stratification and politics have been 
carried out since long before the Second World War. However, most of these 
classic studies were based on impressionistic data (Sombart 1976 [1906]; Sorokin 
1959 [1927]) or on aggregated ecological data (Tingsten 1937; Siegfried 1913). 
The first research contributions on stratification and politics based on national 
representative surveys of the electorate appeared in the United States only after 
1950 (Campbell et al. 1960). These were followed by studies based on surveys of 
countries in Western-Europe and other Western industrialized countries (Den Uyl 
1951; Valen & Katz 1967; Alford 1963; MacRae 1967; Butler & Stokes 1974). 
Such studies were characterized by the fact that they dealt with a large variety of 
research problems. In the first place, they tested empirically the claim of earlier 
studies that in most countries a relationship existed between people's social 
position and their voting behaviour. When it became clear that this claim was 
supported, descriptive questions about the strength of this relationship and about 
its variation over-time and across countries were asked. In addition, hypotheses 
were suggested concerning the explanations of over-time and between-country 
variation in class voting. In general, however, the formulations were - especially 
relative to the hypotheses advanced by the third generation - imprecise. This was 
partly due to the state of theorizing at that time, but also to the relatively crude 
measurement procedures and the simple methods of data analysis that were used 
in this period. The studies from the first generation of survey research on 
stratification and politics were characterized by a dependence on cross-tabulations, 
and by simple examination of percentages in these tables. 
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Descriptions of class voting 
The first generation of research on stratification and politics began by asking 
whether a relationship existed between an individual's social and economic 
position and his voting behaviour. Consequently, many monographs and articles 
published in the 1950s and 1960s on this topic include tables that cross-classify 
income, education, or occupation against voting behaviour (Svalastoga 1979; 
Lipset & Zetterberg 1956). For all countries examined these studies showed that 
people in lower social positions are more likely to vote for left-wing political 
parties than people in higher classes. 
Since studies were conducted in various countries, it became possible to make 
cross-country comparisons of the strengths of links between people's class 
position and their voting behaviour. However, making such comparisons of 
separate studies of different countries was often problematic. For example, in 
some studies personal income was used as a measure of people's social and 
economic position, whereas in others education or occupation was used. More-
over, even when researchers used the same type of measure, classifications often 
varied from the very detailed to the very crude. Thus, Lipset (1960) in one of the 
first studies to display class voting tables integrating data from different countries 
(Britain, France and Italy) did not present a single standardized measure of levels 
of class voting. Similarly, the international comparative studies by Rose & Urwin 
(1969) and by Rose (1974) brought together tables on the influence of people's 
social position in many countries, but without a standardized measure of class 
voting. 
Alford (1963, 1967) made the first major attempt at a truly comparable cross-
national analysis. He presented data from four Anglo-American countries (Austra-
lia, Britain, Canada, and the United States), while using a measure of people's 
social and economic position that was comparable cross-nationally and over-time. 
In order to get such a measure he collapsed various occupations or classes into a 
dichotomous manual/nonmanual class distinction. The manual class comprised 
semi- and unskilled workers both in industry and in agriculture, while the 
nonmanual class included large proprietors, petty bourgeoisie and farmers, and 
also professionals, administrators, managers, and routine nonmanual employees. 
Members of the manual and nonmanual classes were found to differ with respect 
to their labour contract, income, and prestige, with nonmanual classes generally in 
a better position than the manual. This manual/nonmanual class distinction 
became the standard measurement procedure in cross-national or trend studies of 
the first generation. All studies showed that people from the manual class were 
more likely to vote for left-wing parties than were people from the nonmanual 
class. There seem to have been two reasons why class, and not income or 
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education became the prime tool for comparative and over-time research. The first 
is that a person's class is a better discriminator of his political interests and his 
voting behaviour then any of the other measures. The second reason is that 
information about respondent's class is more often comparable than information 
on respondent's income or education in the available survey data. 
Alford also proposed an index to measure the strength of the relationship 
between class and voting behaviour in a country for cross-national and over-time 
analyses. Although various alternative measures for the level of class voting in a 
country were suggested (see e.g., Campbell et al. 1960), the index proposed by 
Alford (1962) became the standard in studies on this topic. The so-called "Alford 
index" is obtained by taking for a two by two table cross-classifying class 
(manual/nonmanual) by party voted for (left-wing/right-wing), the difference 
between the percentage of manual workers that voted for left-wing political 
parties on the one hand and the percentage of nonmanual workers that voted for 
these parties on the other. 
Applying this index, Alford investigated the levels of class voting in Australia, 
Britain, Canada and the United States (Alford 1963, 1967). After his study, it 
took some years before more cross-national studies on the relationship between 
class and voting behaviour appeared that use standardized measures of the 
strength of that relationship. Indeed, only since the 1970s have researchers 
presented comparable data, class schemes, and measures on class voting on a 
dozen of countries (Books & Reynolds 1975). Lenski (1970: 362) and Lijphart 
(1971: 162) presented data for a considerable number of Western industrialized 
countries surveyed around the 1960s. A decade later, Korpi (1983: 35) presented 
data showing differences across eighteen countries in the 1970s. Recently, Lane & 
Ersson (1991: 94) corroborated this finding for sixteen countries during the 
1980s. All these first generation studies, showed that substantial differences 
between countries in their levels of class voting existed in the postwar period, 
with the Scandinavian countries and Britain having the highest levels of class 
voting, and the United States and Canada the lowest. 
In addition to cross-national analyses, first generation studies also examined 
trends in the levels of class voting within countries. Alford's (1963: 103) pioneer-
ing study examined trends in class voting in four Anglo-American democracies in 
the period between 1936 and 1962. Later this study was updated and extended to 
other countries and other periods (Abramson et al. 1990; Franklin 1985a, 1985b; 
Baker et al. 1981; Stephens 1981; Sainsbury 1987). Lipset (1983: 505) presented 
trend data for four countries in the period 1948-1980 and Inglehart (1990: 260) 
updated these data for five countries over the period 1947-1988. In addition, Lane 
and Ersson (1991: 94) compared the levels of class voting in the 1950/60s with 
that in the 1970/80s for eleven countries. In general, these studies provided 
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evidence of a downward trend in class voting in all Western democratic countries. 
This was trae even for the United States, a country with a traditionally low level 
of class voting (Abramson et al. 1990). 
Explanations of variations in class voting 
When the results of the descriptive studies of the first generation indicated that 
cross-country differences in levels of class voting existed and that trends 
occurred, various explanations of these differences were suggested. We will 
discuss two of these explanations. 
First of all, variations in the levels of class voting were explained with refer-
ence to variations in the social and political characteristics of countries. A review 
of this literature yields a long list of concrete hypotheses accounting for a 
country's level of class voting at a certain point in time. Explanatory factors 
include income differences among the inhabitants of a society (Alford 1963), the 
religious and ethnic heterogeneity of a society's population (Lipset & Rokkan 
1967; Lijphart 1979), the mean standard of living of a nation's citizens (Kerr et 
al. 1960), the percentage of workers that are members of labour unions (Korpi 
1983), and the politization of class issues in a nation (Alford 1963). Explanations 
based on social and political characteristics were, however, weakly - that is by 
using bivariate analyses - empirically tested in studies of the first generation. 
Limits on comparable data available in this first generation, both on class voting 
and on the various explanatory variables, did not allow for strong tests. For this 
reason, most studies came up with only tentative conclusions. 
A second explanation prominent in the first generation for variations in class 
voting among countries, invokes effects of varying intergenerational class 
mobility patterns. This explanation was already touched upon by Sombart (1976 
[1906]) when he maintained that the class struggle in the United States would be 
stronger were that country to have the same intergenerational mobility pattern as 
Britain or Germany. Lipset & Zetterberg (1956), Campbell and his colleagues 
(1960), Alford (1963), and Lenski (1966) also examined the effect of class 
mobility. They suggested as a general hypothesis that the more mobility there is 
in a society, the lower the level of class voting is. When this hypothesis was 
tested, however, the received wisdom in mobility research was that the overall 
pattern of class mobility appears to be much the same in the industrial societies 
of various Western nations (Lipset & Bendix 1959; see also Lipset & Zetterberg 
1956). On this basis, explanations implying that class-based voting differed in 
strength between countries because the mobility patterns differed between these 
countries had to be rejected. 
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Effects of class mobility on individual voting behaviour 
The attention given to the effect of a country's mobility pattern on that country's 
level of class voting by scholars of the first generation was fed by the results 
from analyses at the individual-level. Particular attention was given to the effects 
of an individual's class mobility on that individual's voting behaviour (Lipset & 
Zetterberg 1956; Valen & Katz 1967; Campbell et al. 1960; Lipset 1960; Lop-
reato 1967; Hazelrigg & Lopreato 1972; Stacey 1966). 
In doing so, some first generation scholars compared the voting behaviour of 
intergenerationally mobile class members with that of immobile class members 
(Andeweg 1982; Herz 1986). This strategy, however, did not offer possibilities to 
answer questions on the relative effects of people's origin and destination class on 
their voting behaviour (see: De Graaf & Ultee 1990). Other scholars did examine 
percentage figures from cross-tabulations of respondents' origin and destination 
classes by their voting behaviour. Lipset & Zetterberg (1956: 427-443) analysed 
these figures for West Germany, Finland and the United States, while Lipset & 
Bendix (1959: 66-72) examined the patterns in Norway and Sweden. In all of 
these countries except the United States, upwardly mobile persons tended to be 
more leftist than was the case for those who belonged to the middle class since 
childhood. Conversely, in the United States, people who had moved upwards 
from the blue collar to the middle class turned out to be more conservative than 
those belonging to the middle class since birth. These findings for the United 
States, and similar findings in other (nonrepresentative) surveys (Lopreato 1967), 
provoked a long debate in the literature as to whether the so-called "overconform-
ity" (Thompson 1971a) or "overidentification" hypothesis (Lopreato 1967) was 
correct (Thompson 1971a, 1971b; Âberg 1979; Barber 1970). The conclusion of 
this debate was that such findings were simply due to peculiarities in the datasets. 
In the aftermath of this debate the generally accepted position was that for both 
the upwardly and downwardly mobile, political loyalties and attitudes tend to 
change in the directions appropriate to their new status, resulting in political 
behaviour that is in between that of their old status and that of their new status 
(Barber 1970: 36). The expression "between" is vague. However - as we will 
see - scholars of the second and third generations have formulated more precise 
hypotheses on the effects of individual class mobility on voting behaviour. 
The first generation also produced hypotheses on the so-called "contextual" 
effects of intergenerational class mobility. When scholars stated macro-level 
hypotheses like "the higher the level of class mobility in a country, the lower the 
level of class voting", it was often unclear how that macro-hypothesis was 
deduced from micro-level assumptions. The most direct way was to assume a 
composition effect. Such an effect presupposes that countries differ in the relative 
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number of mobile and immobile class members, and moreover that the mobile 
and immobile differ in voting behaviour. In addition, contextual effects of class 
mobility were assumed. According to these contextual effects, immobile persons 
were held to change their political behaviour because of the mobility they see in 
others. Thus, if a stable manual worker in a certain country sees more of his class 
members becoming upwardly mobile, and if a stable nonmanual worker sees class 
members becoming downwardly mobile, then stable workers will be less likely to 
show their typical voting behaviour. Consequently, the level of class voting in 
that country will be lower (Lipset 1960; Campbell et al. 1960; Janowitz 1970; see 
also: Turner 1992). Although an interesting proposition, this contextual hypothesis 
was not tested by empirical research in the first generation. 
1.2.2 Second generation 
Studies from the second generation of research on social stratification and politics 
are characterized by the use of linear regression techniques. These were intro-
duced into the social sciences around 1960 and their main effect was that the 
questions asked became more precise. Despite the possibilities of such techniques, 
the second generation made only a small contribution to research on the relation-
ship between class and voting behaviour. Instead, political science research during 
this period was characterized by a focus on "social-psychological" explanations of 
individual voting behaviour, while "sociological" explanations received less 
attention. The aim was to increase the amount of variance in voting behaviour 
explained by adding variables to the equation, rather than to explain the strength 
of the relationship between class and voting behaviour. Furthermore, in social 
stratification research generally, questions about the political consequences of 
stratification and mobility were given low priority. Nevertheless, where they were 
studied, the analyses were more sophisticated than those of the first generation, 
and linear regression or path models replaced simple analyses of cross-tabulations. 
Descriptions of class voting 
The new regression techniques offered a better possibility of analysing the effects 
of class, while controlling for the effects of other factors, than tabular analyses. 
Most of the relevant second generation studies showed that class - even when 
controlling for other factors like religion and education - had a substantial effect 
on voting behaviour, in the sense that lower classes were more apt to vote for a 
left-wing political party than were higher classes (McAllister & Kelley 1982; 
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Franklin 1985a, 1985b). Scholars of this generation also used path models to get 
a better insight into the influence of people's origin class and their current class 
on their voting behaviour (Knoke 1973; Kelley & McAllister 1985; Van Deth & 
Geurts 1989). 
However, only a small number of studies in the second generation dealt with 
describing differences between countries or trends within countries in levels of 
class voting (Kemp 1978). One exception, published in 1992, was the study by 
Franklin and his colleagues on electoral change in twenty countries. In this study 
linear regression models on voting behaviour (left/right) were estimated for all 
countries, including as explanatory variables social characteristics such as class 
(manual/nonmanual), religion and value orientations. However, because the 
operationalization of variables was not always comparable between countries, and 
since for the different countries different variables were included in the analyses, 
no conclusions about cross-country differences in the effects of class on voting 
behaviour could be drawn (see: Nieuwbeerta & Ultee 1993). Furthermore, because 
for each of the countries only three datasets were analysed (one for the 1960s, 
one for the 1970s, and one for the 1980s), conclusions on trends could only be 
drawn tentatively. 
Explanations of variation in class voting 
Curiously, although the second generation paid hardly any attention to the 
description of levels of class voting in Western industrialized countries in the 
postwar period, they did advance many explanations for trends in these levels. 
These explanations differed from those given in the first generation, when 
variations in class voting were predominantly deduced from a class perspective 
and from interest theories. Researchers working in the second generation followed 
the idea that "classes are dying" and suggested that other factors were becoming 
important determinants of individual voting behaviour. They claimed that, when 
the composition of societies differed with respect to these other factors, this might 
explain variation in class voting. An example of such thinking is Inglehart's 
theory on value change (Inglehart 1977, 1990; Inglehart & Rabier 1986). Ingle-
hart assumed that due to increasing wealth after the Second World War, more and 
more people could be characterized as post-materialist. For post-materialists new 
issues, like protection of the environment, rather than the old class issues, would 
become important for their voting behaviour. In addition, the theory assumed that 
new cohorts would have more people with a post-materialistic value orientation 
than would older cohorts. In this way, a process of generational replacement 
could explain a decline in class voting in post-industrial societies. The concept of 
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generational replacement is also prominent in other studies (Dalton et al. 1984; 
Franklin et al. 1992). These explanations of variations in the levels of class voting 
have only been tested indirectly. Few attempts have also been made to directly 
test the macro-explanations for differences between countries. 
Effects of class mobility on individual voting behaviour 
The main contribution of the second generation was at the micro-level. In the first 
generation it was unclear whether hypotheses on the effects of mobility referred 
to the effect of a person's origin class plus the effect of a person's destination 
class, or to an effect of mobility per se, net of the effects of origin and destina-
tion class. In the second generation questions were rephrased into specific 
questions on effects of mobility per se on voting behaviour, and questions on the 
relative effects of people's origin and destination class on their voting behaviour. 
Furthermore, when examining the effects of class mobility on individual voting 
behaviour, studies in the first generation examined percentage figures in cross-
tabulations. Doing so, it is difficult to detect whether the voting behaviour of the 
mobile is closer to that of their destination class than to that of their origin class. 
Furthermore, it is difficult to examine whether mobility effects per se have an 
impact on people's voting behaviour. To be able to investigate this adequately, it 
is necessary to distinguish whether, in addition to the additive effects of people's 
origin and destination class, there also is a separate interaction effect of upward 
or downward mobility. Scholars from the second generation started to utilize 
formal models including such interaction effects (Knoke 1973; Jackman 1972a; 
Turner 1992). First, formalized models were used that were originally developed 
by Duncan to determine the effects of mobility on fertility (Duncan 1966: 91; 
Blau and Duncan 1967: 128-40, 361-99). In these models voting behaviour was 
the variable to be explained, while origin, destination and a term for interaction 
between origin and destination were explanatory variables. The main conclusion 
of studies in the second generation was that the voting behaviour of the mobile 
and immobile can best be explained by the combined effects of their origin and 
destination class. That is, no mobility effect per se is necessary to explain the 
voting behaviour of mobile class members. 
1.2.3 Third generation 
The study of voting behaviour in Britain by Heath and his colleagues in 1985 can 
be regarded as the first major contribution to the third generation of research on 
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stratification and politics. In general, research of this ongoing third generation 
focuses on social stratification and mobility. Researchers recognized the applic-
ability of measurement procedures and analysis techniques common in mobility 
research, to questions on the relationship between class and voting behaviour. 
Thus, they began to employ these tools in research into this area. The use of a 
detailed cross-nationally comparable class scheme, the application of (log-)odds-
ratios, and the application of nonlinear techniques characterize studies of the third 
generation of research on class and voting behaviour, and distinguish them from 
studies in the two earlier generations. As a result, these later studies dealt with 
new or more specific questions. Furthermore, they continue to generate better 
answers to old research questions. Consequently, the research of the third 
generation again covers a wide range, addressing descriptive questions on levels 
of class voting, suggesting new explanations, and investigating the effects of class 
mobility on individual voting behaviour. 
Descriptions of class voting 
Studies from the first generation identified substantial differences in class voting 
between countries and showed that a significant decline in class voting had 
occurred in many countries. When examining this between-country and over-time 
variation, the Alford index was applied. However, scholars of the third generation 
argued that measures of the strength of a relationship between two categorical 
variables - like class and voting behaviour - should be independent of variation in 
the distributions of these variables. Since variation in Alford indices might be due 
to their sensitivity to variation in the general popularity of political parties, third 
generation researchers proposed a measure of class voting unaffected by these 
changes (Heath et al. 198S). Specifically, they argued that the focus should not be 
on absolute levels of class voting, but on the so-called "relative" class voting, 
measured by odds-ratios or by log-odds-ratios (Heath et al. 1985; Thomsen 1987). 
These measures have in this context an advantage over other measures - like the 
Alford index - in that they measure the strength of the relationship between class 
and vote, independent of the general popularity of political parties. 
Scholars of the third generation have also claimed that, with respect to mea-
surement procedures, a more detailed internationally comparable class scheme 
was preferable to the manual/nonmanual class dichotomy. They have argued that 
the manual/nonmanual distinction hides variations in the compositions of the 
manual and nonmanual classes, and therefore obscures results when describing the 
relationship between class and voting behaviour. To overcome this problem, they 
introduced a class scheme - originally used in mobility research - that is compar-
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able cross-nationally and over-time. This scheme was developed by Erikson, 
Goldthorpe & Portocarrero (1979), and by Erikson & Goldthorpe (1992). Since 
then this so-called "EGP" class scheme has frequently been used, first in mobility 
studies, and subsequently in studies on the relationship between class and voting 
behaviour (Evans et al. 1991). The advantage of this categorical class scheme 
over prestige or status measures of people's social position in a society when 
predicting peoples voting behaviour, is that using the latter measures the voting 
behaviour of farmers and other self-employed can not well be predicted. 
Studies of the third generation of research on stratification and politics, not 
only borrowed measurement conventions from mobility research, but also 
techniques of data analysis. In mobility research, specific log-linear models were 
developed to describe patterns of association in a cross-classifying table, and to 
test whether differences exist between tables in the strength of the associations 
(Hauser 1978; Erikson & Goldthorpe 1992). These models and the odds-ratios on 
which they are based were introduced into research on the class/vote relationship 
by Heath et al. (1985). The application of such techniques is a central characteris-
tic of studies of the third generation. 
As suggested, the use of detailed standardized class schemes and techniques 
built on log-odds-ratios to describe levels of class voting of countries, is a quite 
recent innovation. The first studies were done by Heath et al. (1985, 1991), 
Weakliem (1989), and Evans et al. (1991), describing trends in class voting in 
Britain. The analyses in these studies investigated linear trends in the log-odds-
ratios. In subsequent analyses proportional trends were examined, by using the so-
called "uniform difference" models (Xie 1992; Erikson & Goldthorpe 1992). Hout 
et al. (1994) used these models to do analyses for the United States, Goldthorpe 
(1994) and Heath et al. (1995) for Britain, while Weakliem & Heath (1994b) 
applied this technique to an investigation of two extra countries. However, so far 
no trend analyses have been done for other countries, and no other cross-national 
comparisons have been made on relative levels of class voting. 
Exphnations of class voting 
The main explanation of variations in class voting that has typically been 
forwarded in studies of the third generation, is one closely connected to the 
availability of a detailed class scheme in these studies. Recent research has 
suggested that variations in class voting can be explained by variations in the 
composition of the classes. The class structures of the countries show significant 
differences. In addition, the class structures have changed substantially over the 
last decades. It is therefore argued that the explanations for varying class voting 
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given by the second generation might be premature. For example, Heath et al. 
(1995) and Hout et al. (1994) have claimed that when taking into account detailed 
class schemes, and measures of relative class voting, no trends in class voting can 
be found for example in Britain or in the United States. Their claim is that 
variations in class voting, when measured by manual/nonmanual class distinction 
is due to changes in the composition of the manual and nonmanual classes. Thus, 
variations in class voting detected, when a manual/nonmanual class distinction has 
been applied could (to some extent) be an artefact of that dichotomous class 
scheme (Heath et al. 1985; Evans et al. 1991; Hout et al. 1994). That is, the 
decline in class voting can be caused by changes in the composition of the 
manual and nonmanual class and not by changes in the voting behaviour of the 
sub-classes of the manual and nonmanual class. This composition explanation, 
however, has not been tested by comparing trends in class voting with the 
manual/nonmanual class scheme and trends with a more detailed class scheme so 
far. It is therefore worthwhile to test such an explanation in this study. 
Another explanation that figures in studies in the third generation invokes 
intergenerational class mobility. When scholars of the first generation tested the 
mobility explanation, i.e. the hypothesis that varying mobility patterns across 
countries were to some extent responsible for variations in class voting among 
these countries, they had to reject this hypothesis because they relied on findings 
showing the same patterns of class mobility in industrialized countries. However, 
later analyses on the same data (Miller 1960; Jones 1969; Hazelrigg 1974) did 
show differences in the mobility patterns of countries. Furthermore, third gener-
ation studies on intergenerational mobility patterns (Erikson & Goldthorpe 1992) 
showed that substantial differences between countries in their absolute mobility 
patterns existed. It therefore is again worthwhile to address the question: to what 
extent are differences in the pattern of mobility responsible for variations in 
relative class voting? To date, this question has only tentatively been addressed in 
studies of the third generation (De Graaf & Ultee 1987, 1990; De Graaf & 
Nieuwbeerta 1995), but third generation methods and measurement procedures 
make it possible to investigate it further. 
Effects of class mobility on individual voting behaviour 
The third generation has so far made major contributions to investigations of the 
effects of class mobility on individual voting behaviour, an area which was 
inadequately studied during the second generation. Hope (1971) and Sobel (1981) 
revealed that the parametrization of the linear models typically used in the second 
generation did not follow the central sociological idea that it is the stable or 
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immobile members who define the norms, values and behaviour patterns of a 
class (De Graaf & Ultee 1987, 1990; Clifford & Heath 1993: 3). The importance 
of taking the various types of immobile persons as the reference had already been 
suggested by Sorokin (1959 [1927]: 509-10), who argued that "If we want to 
know the characteristic attitudes of a farmer, we do not go to a man who has 
been a farmer for a few months, but go to a farmer who is a farmer for life". 
Even better, we would argue, go to a farmer who has been born and bred a 
farmer. Hope (1971) and Sobel (1981) showed that simple additive models 
confuse the effects of people's destination class with those of mobility per se. 
Both came up with substantively more appropriate parametrizations. Hope's so-
called "diamond model", that was applied by Thornbum (1979) among others in 
analyses of the effects of class mobility on voting behaviour, was shown not to be 
the appropriate parametrization (Sobel 1981), but Sobel's (1981, 1985) so-called 
"diagonal mobility" model (a specific type of non-linear regression model) was. 
This diagonal mobility model provided a means of assessing the relative import-
ance of two identically categorized variables (e.g., origin and destination class) 
for a dependent variable, as well as an estimate of the effect of any combination 
of categories. Using such a technique it became possible to assess whether 
mobility per se has consequences above and beyond the additive effects of origins 
and destinations, as claimed in a number of early theoretical arguments (e.g., 
Janowitz 1970; Lipset 1960). These models also enabled a distinction to be made 
between the effects of upward and downward mobility. For these reasons, it is 
now generally recognized that diagonal mobility models are the most appropriate 
for analysing the effects of class mobility on voting behaviour (Heath et al. 1991: 
99). 
De Graaf & Ultee (1987, 1990), analysing data for the Netherlands, were the 
first to apply these models to data on mobility and voting behaviour. Since then 
other scholars have also used these models. Weakliem (1992), for example, 
analysed data from five countries, Clifford & Heath (1993) data from Britain, and 
Breen & Whelan (1994) data from Ireland. Studies investigating the effects of 
intergenerational class mobility on individual voting behaviour using the diagonal 
models applied to data from other countries and longer periods, are an obvious 
next step in the third generation. 
1.3 Research questions in this study 
Our review of the literature on stratification and politics has shown that signifi-
cant progress has been made with respect to the precision of research problems, 
hypotheses, measurement procedures, data collections and methods of data analy-
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Table 1.1. Characteristics of studies describing variations in class voting 
Questions 
Class 
Measurement 
Techniques 
Data 
Examples of 
descriptive 
studies 
First generation 
(...-1970s) 
Are there differences between 
countries in absolute class voting? 
and: 
Are there trends in absolute class 
voting within countries? 
Manual/nonmanual classes 
Crosstabulations 
Alford index: percentage 
differences 
Eyeballing 
Limited number of countries, short 
period 
Alford (1963), Lenski (1970). 
Lipset (1983), Korpi (1983) 
Second generation 
(1960s- ...) 
Are there differences between 
countries in absolute class voting? 
and: 
Are there trends in absolute class 
voting within countries? 
Manual/nonmanual classes, 
more detailed class schemes 
Crosstabulations, 
linear regression 
Long term trends in single 
countries; 
Differences between countries in 
single period 
Kemp (1978), 
Franklin et al. (1992) 
sis. However, the review has also shown that some relevant questions remain 
understudied, or have to date only been addressed using inadequate measures, 
data, or methods. In this study we aim to improve on the existing literature by 
addressing relevant questions and by using up-to-date and appropriate research 
designs. The specific research questions that are addressed in the present study 
are introduced below. 
1.3.1 Descriptions of class voting 
Descriptive studies on the relationship between class and voting behaviour have 
developed significantly over-time. The main developments in studies of Western 
industrialized countries are summarized in Table 1.1. In studies of the first 
generation, the descriptive questions addressed focused on levels of absolute class 
voting, using simple cross-tabulations predominantly based on manual/nonmanual-
class schemes. Testing whether differences between countries in class voting 
existed or whether trends had occurred in the levels of class voting, was limited 
to "eyeballing" the obtained measures of class voting for the different countries or 
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Table 1.1. (Continued) 
Third generation 
(1980s-...) 
This study 
Are there differences between coun- To what extent did the level of relative class voting 
tries in relative class voting? and: differ across countries? and: 
Are there trends in relative class To what extent was there a decline in the levels of 
voting within countries? relative class voting in these countries? 
Standardized, detailed class 
schemes (EGP classes) 
(log-)odds-ratios 
loglinear models 
So far: trends in single countries 
1. Manual/nonmanual classes 
2. EGP classes 
1. Linear regression, log-odds-ratio 
(Thomsen index) 
2. Loglinear models, log-odds-ratio 
(kappa index, parameters loglinear models) 
1. 324 cross-tabulations, from 20 countries, 
1945-1990 
2. 113 datasets from 16 countries, 1956-1990 
Heath et al. (1985, 1991, 1995), 1. Chapter 3 
Goldthorpe (1994), Hout et al. 2. Chapter 6 
(1994), Weakliem & Heath (1994b) 
periods. In the second generation only a few studies dealt with descriptive 
questions. Subsequently, developments in methods of data analysis, and new 
measurement procedures enabled scholars of the third generation to rephrase the 
central research questions. Instead of focusing on the absolute levels of class 
voting, they formulated questions on the levels of relative class voting. To 
describe relative levels of class voting detailed standardized cross-nationally 
comparable class measures were used. In addition, techniques especially designed 
to deal with measures of relative class voting (i.e. log-linear methods) were used 
to test whether significant between-country differences and over-time variation 
existed. Third generation scholars argue that, although differences and trends in 
absolute class voting might exist, it is not clear whether differences and trends in 
relative class voting exist. Furthermore, they argue that descriptive studies using a 
detailed class scheme might yield different results from studies applying a simple 
manual/nonmanual class scheme. In their research the hypothesis of no change in 
levels of class voting has survived. However, the third generation has resulted in 
only a limited number of studies dealing with trends. In fact, the only studies 
done (Heath et al. 1995; Hout et al. 1994) focused on trends in Britain, France 
and the United States. Thus, so far no studies describing and comparing the 
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relative levels of class voting in other countries have been done. The present 
study aims to fill this gap by addressing two descriptive research questions about 
levels of relative class voting: 
To what extent did levels of relative class voting differ across democratic 
industrialized countries in the postwar period?', and: 
To what extent was there a decline in levels of relative class voting in these 
countries over that period? 
These questions are addressed in two separate chapters. We first use the tradi-
tional manual/nonmanual class scheme. This enables us to analyse an unprece-
dentedly large set of data from twenty countries over the period 1945-1990. 
Subsequently, we address the descriptive questions using a detailed class scheme, 
analysing data for sixteen countries over the period 1956-1990. In these analyses 
we use log-linear techniques and a detailed class scheme, comparable cross-
nationally and over-time (i.e. the EGP scheme). In this way, the present study 
aims to improve on studies of the first and the third generation. In addition, a 
comparison of the results of these two chapters gives an indication of the extent 
to which class composition effects explain differences in manual/nonmanual class 
voting. 
1.3.2 Explanations of variations in class voting 
Over the three generations many explanations have been suggested for between-
country and over-time variations in the strength of the relationship between class 
and voting behaviour. The main characteristics of these studies are presented in 
Table 1.2. In studies of the first generation, the most prominent explanations were 
based on variations in the social and political characteristics of countries. How-
ever, to test such explanations first generation scholars could not rely on a large 
amount of data that could be compared cross-nationally and over-time (Alford 
1963). For second generation studies this problem was less urgent, but even then 
tests of such hypotheses involved only a limited number of countries (Kerr 1990), 
or a few points in time (Korpi 1983; Lane & Ersson 1991; Franklin et al. 1992). 
Therefore, in studies of the second generation it was only possible to calculate 
bivariate correlations. Thus, this presented a challenge for studies of the third 
generation. Here many data and appropriate multivariate techniques became 
available. Despite this, so far only tentative attempts have been made to test the 
various explanations in third generation studies (Evans et al. 1991; Heath et al. 
1991). 
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Ibis provides an opportunity to address more comprehensively the following 
question in this study: 
To what extent can differences across democratic industrialized countries and 
changes within these countries in levels of relative class voting be explained by 
differences between these countries and changes within these countries in their 
social and political characteristics? 
When addressing this question, we build on theories and results of studies of the 
three generations, but make progress in various ways. First, we directly correlate 
country characteristics with levels of class voting, where most earlier studies 
predominantly linked these variables on impressionistic data (Alford 1963; Lipset 
1960; Franklin et al. 1992). Second, in answering the explanatory questions in 
this study we present analyses of data for a considerable number of countries and 
over numerous points in time. In this way it goes beyond earlier studies involving 
a limited number of countries and few points in time. This allows for multivariate 
analyses, and lessens the chance of not accepting hypotheses when in reality these 
hypotheses hold. Third, we use measures of relative level of class voting (odds-
ratios) instead of the measures of absolute level of class voting that are character-
istic of the first generation. Fourth, country-level hypotheses are deduced from 
theories based on individual voting behaviour. There are two reasons to choose 
individual-level theories. First, country-level hypotheses found in the literature 
seem to be unconnected, and it seems useful to attempt to incorporate these in a 
more general theory. A second reason is that the link between country characteris-
tics and the level of class voting in a country is often seen by researchers as 
simple and straightforward. However, a closer look at their arguments reveals that 
this is not the case. To derive hypotheses that link country characteristics with a 
country's level of class voting, several assumptions have to be made at the 
individual level about the relationship between a person's class and his voting 
behaviour. Furthermore, various assumptions have to be made that link the micro-
with the macro-level. 
The second explanation dealt with in the present study has been suggested by, 
among others, Heath et al. (1991), Hout et al. (1993) and Goldthorpe (1994). 
These scholars posit that in industrialized countries declines in the levels of class 
voting, when measured by a manual/nonmanual class distinction, can - at least to 
some extent - be explained by changes in the composition of these two classes. 
During the last decades the class structure has undergone substantial 
changes.Among these have been changes in the composition of the manual and 
the nonmanual classes. Within the nonmanual class sizeable changes have occur-
red in the size of its various sub-classes: farmers, large proprietors, petty bour-
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Table 1.2. Characteristics of studies explaining variations in class voting 
Questions 
Explanations/ 
Hypotheses 
Questions: on 
effects of 
mobility on 
class voting 
Class 
Measurement 
First generation 
(...-1970s) 
Does country A, that has a higher 
level of class voting than country 
B, have a higher or lower score 
on country characteristic X than 
country B? 
1. Social and political 
characteristics of countries 
3. Mobility explanation 
To what extent would the level of 
class voting in the USA be differ-
ent from that in Germany, if these 
countries had the same mobility 
pattern. 
Manual/nonmanual classes 
Second generation 
(1960s-...) 
Is there a bivariate correlation 
between country characteristics 
and countries levels of class 
voting? 
Value orientations 
Is there a relationship between the 
percentage of intergenerationally 
mobile persons in a country and 
the level of class voting in a 
country? 
Manual/nonmanual classes. 
more detailed class schemes 
Techniques Comparing cross-tabulations Crosstabulations/ linear regression 
Data Small number of countries and 
years 
More countries and years 
Examples of 1. Lipset & Bendix (1959), Alford 
explanatory (1963), Lipset & Rokkan (1967) 
studies 3. Sombart (1976 [1906]), Lipset 
& Zetterberg (1956), 
AJford (1963), Lenski (1966) 
Inglehart (1977, 1990), 
Franklin et al. (1992) 
geoisie, service class workers (professionals, administrators and managers), and 
routine nonmanual workers. In recent years many countries have seen the service 
class grow substantially relative to the other nonmanual sub-classes. In addition, 
within the manual class a significant change has occurred in the relative size of 
the skilled, and unskilled manual groups and the agricultural labourers. While the 
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Table 1.2. (Continued) 
Third generation 
(1980s-...) 
This study 
Is there a correlation between 
characteristics of countries and their 
levels of class voting, when 
controlling for other country 
characteristics? 
Macro-micro-macro explanations: 
2. composition explanation 
3. mobility explanation 
To what extent can differences in 
class voting between countries be 
explained by differences in mobility 
patterns between the countries? 
To what extent can differences across countries and 
changes within countries in class voting be 
explained by variation in these countries' 
1. social and political characteristics, 
2. class composition, and 
3. mobility patterns? 
1. Social and political characteristics 
2. Class composition explanation 
3. Mobility explanation 
To what extent can differences in class voting 
between countries be explained by differences in 
mobility patterns between the countries? 
Standardized, detailed class 
schemes (EGP classes) 
Log-linear models / 
counterfactual analyses 
So far: single countries 
2. Heath et al. (1991), 
Evans et al. (1991) 
3. De Graaf & Ultee (1990) 
1. Manual/nonmanual classes 
2. EGP classes 
3. EGP classes 
1. Multi-level models 
2. Counterfactual analyses / linear regression 
3. Counterfactual analyses / non-linear regression 
1. Aggregated country dataset: 
324 cross-tabulations from 20 countries, 
1945-1990 
2. Individual dataset: 
113 surveys from 16 countries, 1956-1990 
3. Individual dataset: 
113 surveys from 16 countries, 1956-1990 
1. Chapter 4 
2. Chapter 5 
3. Chapter 9 
relative percentage of skilled workers has grown, the percentage of unskilled 
workers has diminished. These changes in the composition of the manual and 
nonmanual classes may account for declining levels of class voting, as measured 
by the manual/nonmanual distinction. For example, members of the service class 
tend to be more left-wing than some other nonmanual sub-classes, like the petty 
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bourgeoisie and farmers. Consequently, a relative growth of the service class 
would cause the nonmanual class to become more left-wing, and the level of class 
voting in a country to decline. This could happen without any of the sub-classes 
changing their political behaviour. 
The class composition explanation has been supported by some empirical 
evidence. For example, Heath et al. (1991), using the manual/nonmanual class 
distinction, have identified a decline in class voting in Britain over the period 
1964-1987. Applying a more detailed class scheme, they found only trendless 
fluctuation in the level of class voting. Similarly, using a detailed class 
categorization, Hout et al. (1994) found no systematic trend in the level of class 
voting for the United States in the period 1948-1992. 
In this study we first test whether changes in the composition of the classes 
offer an explanation for the decline in manual/nonmanual class voting within a 
sizeable number of industrialized countries. We then test whether the class 
composition explanation can be extended, by hypothesizing that differences in the 
(manual/nonmanual) class voting across countries can be explained by differences 
in the composition of the manual class and the nonmanual class across these 
countries. In this way, the following research question is addressed: 
To what extent can differences across democratic industrialized countries and 
changes within these countries in levels of relative class voting, when measured 
by the manual/nonmanual class distinction, be explained by differences between 
these countries and changes within these countries in the composition of the 
manual class and nonmanual class? 
A third explanation we focus on in this study concerns the macro-level effects 
of intergenerational class mobility on class voting. Intergenerational class mobility 
occurs when people become members of a class that is different from the class 
their parents belonged to. Countries differ substantially in their patterns of 
intergenerational class mobility (Erikson & Goldthorpe 1992). Several scholars 
have suggested that differences between countries and developments within 
countries in the amount of intergenerational class mobility might help to explain 
cross-national and over-time variation in levels of class voting (Campbell & Kahn 
1952; Dahrendorf 1959; Alford 1963; Abramson 1972; Lipset 1960; De Graaf & 
Ultee 1987). In the first generation such hypotheses were tested by comparing the 
percentage of mobile people in countries with the absolute level of class voting in 
these countries. In the second generation this macro-level explanation was no 
longer part of the research agenda. The techniques and measurement procedures, 
and the large amount of high quality data that are available in the third gener-
ation, however, offer a good possibility to test this explanation thoroughly. To 
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this end, in our study we answer the following questions: 
To what extent can differences across democratic industrialized countries in 
levels of relative class voting be explained by cross-country differences in 
patterns of intergenerational class mobility?, and: 
To what extent can changes over-time in levels of relative class voting within 
democratic industrialized countries be explained by changes within these 
countries in patterns of intergenerational class mobility? 
1.3.3 Effects of class mobility on individual voting behaviour 
To address the question on the macro-effects of class mobility in a country on 
class voting in that country, we pay attention to the effects of intergenerational 
class mobility on individual voting behaviour. The link between class mobility 
and class voting is often regarded as a direct one, i.e. the level of intergenera-
tional class mobility is assumed to influence the level of class voting directly at 
the country-level. For example, Alford (1963: 118) hypothesized that the higher 
the number of intergenerationally mobile persons in a country, the lower that 
country's level of class voting. However, as De Graaf & Ultee (1990) have 
shown, it is by no means straightforward to deduce predictions about the extent to 
which a country's level of intergenerational class mobility has an effect on the 
level of class voting in that country. Auxiliary assumptions at the individual-level 
are required. These individual-level assumptions concern the effects of class 
mobility on the voting behaviour of both intergenerationally mobile and immobile 
class members. 
Research on the effects of mobility on individual voting behaviour has a long 
history. As can be seen in Table 1.3, where the main characteristics of three 
generations of studies on this topic are summarized, it started by looking at 
simple cross-tabulations, cross-classifying the voting behaviour of persons by their 
origin and their destination classes. The central question addressed in these 
studies was: do intergenerationally stable members vote differently from mobile 
class members? The analyses were, typically for the first generation, done on 
relatively small datasets. This has the drawback that only a small number of 
intergenerationally mobile persons were analysed. A central hypothesis of this 
first generation was that - both upwardly and downwardly - mobile class mem-
bers have voting behaviour that fall in between those of their origin and destina-
tion classes. In the second generation of research on class and voting behaviour 
the questions could be formulated more specifically. The question then was 
whether mobile people's voting behaviour is closer to their origin than to their 
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Table 1.3. Characteristics of studies examining the effects of class mobility on 
individual voting behaviour 
First generation 
(...-1970s) 
Second generation 
(1960s-...) 
Questions Do intergenerationally stable 
and mobile class members 
differ in voting behaviour? 
Are there contextual effects of 
class mobility? 
What are the (relative) effects of 
respondent's class and father's class on 
voting behaviour? 
Hypotheses Overconformity hypothesis (for Weak economic hypothesis, 
upwardly mobile), "in between" Status hypothesis 
hypothesis 
Class 
Measurement 
Techniques 
Data 
Examples of 
studies on 
this topic 
Manual/nonmanual classes 
Examining figures in 
cross-tabulations 
Limited number of surveys 
with limited number of cases 
Lipset & Bendix (1959), 
Barber (1970), Lopreato 
(1967), Lipset (1960), 
Janowitz (1970) 
Manual/nonmanual classes, 
more detailed class schemes 
Anova / linear regression 
Surveys from single countries 
Abramson & Books (1971), Knoke 
(1973), Thorbum (1979), Turner (1992) 
destination class. This question was answered by applying linear regression 
techniques. However, as became obvious in the third generation, these techniques 
are inappropriate to answer this question. In the third generation adequate models 
to deal with such a question began to be developed and applied. These models 
enabled the provision of answers to the research question from the second gener-
ation, and also offered the possibility of answering the question of to what extent 
the upwardly mobile are relatively closer to their origin class than are the 
downwardly mobile, and to what extent older persons are closer to their destina-
tion class than are young mobile. In this study we use the methods of the third 
generation to address the following question: 
What are the effects of individual intergenerational class mobility on the voting 
behaviour of intergenerationally mobile people? 
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Table 1.3. (Continued) 
Third generation 
(1980s-...) 
This study 
Is the voting behaviour of 
mobile persons closer to that of 
their destination class than to 
that of their origin class? 
Status maximization hypothesis, 
Weak, and strong economic 
hypothesis, Acculturation 
hypothesis 
Standardized, detailed class 
schemes (EGP classes) 
Diagonal mobility models 
Survey from limited number of 
countries 
De Graaf & Ultee (1987, 1990) 
Clifford & Heath (1993), Weak-
Hem (1992), De Graaf et al. 
(1995), Breen & Whelan (1994) 
1. Is the voting behaviour of mobile persons closer to 
that of their destination class than to that of their 
origin class? 
2. Do stable class members in countries with low rates 
of mobility differ in voting behaviour from stable 
members in countries with high rates of mobility? 
1. Status maximization hypothesis; Weak, and strong 
economic hypothesis; Acculturation hypothesis 
2. Effects of rates of inflow and outflow mobility 
EGP classes 
EGP classes 
1. Diagonal mobility models 
2. Multi-level models 
1. 113 surveys from 16 countries, 1956-1990 
2. 113 surveys from 16 countries, 1956-1990 
1. Chapter 7 
2. Chapter 8 
However, as already argued in studies of the first generation, it is not only mobile 
people who are affected by class mobility. Those who are immobile, i.e. those 
with no change in their class position with respect to that of their parents, can be 
expected to be influenced by the extent of class mobility in their environment 
(Blau & Duncan 1967: 440; Abramson & Books 1971; Thorbum 1979; De Graaf 
& Ultee 1987). It might be that the rates of mobility in a person's social context 
have an effect on that person's voting behaviour. For example, it has been 
suggested that the more upwardly mobile there are in a society, the less likely the 
stable manual class workers are to vote for left-wing political parties. This 
hypothesis has been raised several times, especially in the first generation. 
However, to test this contextual hypothesis it is necessary to have data from many 
"contexts". In early studies, such data were lacking. In this study we investigate 
the contextual effects of class mobility on voting behaviour, focusing on the 
effects on the voting behaviour of the immobile class members, leaving the 
effects on the mobile class members aside. Thus, we address the following re-
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Figure 1.1. Macro-micro-macro link dealt with in this study, and organization of 
this study (Numbers of Chapters are given between brackets) 
SOCIETAL LEVEL 
Social and political с 
(Class structures and 
(5.9) 
INDIVIDUAL LEVEL 
Class position and mc 
search question: 
What are the contextual effects of intergenerational class mobility in a country 
on the voting behaviour of intergenerationally immobile persons? 
It should be noted that this study's prime focus is on the explanation of variation 
in levels of class voting. To explain this phenomenon at the country-level, we 
have to pay attention to the explanation of individual voting behaviour. We like 
to stress that our prime interest is not with the explanations of why people vote as 
they do, or with explanations of the variation in individual voting behaviour. 
1.4 Organization of this study 
Having formulated our research questions, the organization of this study -
summarized in Table 1.4 - is as follows. 
After we discuss the data and the operationalizations used in this study to 
answer the research questions in Chapter 2, we address the descriptive research 
questions in Chapter 3. This chapter describes the extent to which levels of class 
voting have differed across democratic industrialized countries during the postwar 
period. In addition, it describes the extent to which a decline in the levels of class 
voting in these countries has occurred during this period. When describing the 
racteristics 
obility patterns) 
(4) 
(8) 
ility experience 
-), Levels of class voting 
(3,6) 
4v 
(5,9) 
-> Voting behaviour 
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levels of class voting, classes are distinguished according to the manual/non-
manual class scheme. 
In Chapter 4 we test a first explanation of variation in class voting between 
countries and over-time. The chapter addresses the macro-level question of to 
what extent differences between democratic industrialized countries and changes 
within these countries in levels of manual/nonmanual class voting can be explai-
ned by variation in the social and political characteristics of these countries. 
In Chapter 5 we test a second explanation for between-country and over-time 
variation in class voting, using the manual/nonmanual class scheme. According to 
this explanation variation in the composition of the manual and the nonmanual 
class to some extent can be held responsible for variation in manual/nonmanual 
class voting. 
Subsequently, in Chapter 6 the levels of class voting in democratic industrial-
ized countries in the postwar period are again described, but now applying the 
EGP class scheme. The answers to the descriptive questions of this chapter allow 
us to revise conclusions on the extent of country differences and changes over the 
course of time, drawn when using the manual/nonmanual class distinction. 
The third explanation for between-country and over-time variation in class 
voting can be found in variation in the patterns of intergenerational class mobility 
in countries. This explanation is tested in Chapter 9. This macro-level explana-
tion, however, presupposes effects of class mobility on the voting behaviour of 
individual class members. 
Therefore, before the macro-level explanation for variation in class voting with 
variation in class mobility is tested, in Chapter 7 we examine the effects of 
individual class mobility on the voting behaviour of intergenerationally mobile 
persons. In addition, in Chapter 8 we investigate the contextual effects of class 
mobility on the voting behaviour of immobile class members. 
In the last chapter, Chapter 10, we summarize and discuss the findings of this 
study, as well as making suggestions for future research. 

2 Data and operationalizations 
2.1 Scope of analysis 
To address the research questions of this study, data from several countries, and 
spanning several decades will be analysed. The first basis for the selection of par-
ticular countries and periods stems directly from our research questions. These 
questions concern changes within countries in the strength of the relationship 
between social class and voting behaviour. Therefore, it is necessary that the 
countries in this study can be considered as having been, over a substantial period 
of time, basically democratic with regard to the criteria of both political rights -
such as the right to participate in free and competitive elections - and civil 
liberties - such as freedom of speech and association (Lijphart 1984: 37). Based 
on these criteria, Lijphart (1994: 2) has argued that, of all the countries that were 
registered at the United Nations in 1980, twenty seven can be defined as such 
durable democratic countries.1 
Another, more practical basis for choosing countries to include in this study 
concerns the availability of relevant and appropriate data. Initially, we intended 
including all twenty seven countries meeting the criteria for democratic govern-
ment postulated by Lijphart. However, for pragmatic reasons we dropped seven of 
them - Costa Rica, Iceland, India, Israel, Japan, Malta and New Zealand - because 
no sufficient data pertaining to these countries were found. Our final set of twenty 
countries included all countries in Western Europe (except Iceland), two countries 
from the continent of North-America (Canada and the United States), and 
Australia. In Table 2.1 all the countries in the final sample are listed. 
Table 2.1 also contains information about the histories of the political situ-
ations in the selected countries. The first column of Table 2.1 gives the first year 
in which ministers were accountable to an elected parliament. The second and 
third column give respectively the years when the universal adult male and 
female franchise were introduced. The figures show that in almost all countries, 
parliamentary accountability of ministers began at the end of the nineteenth 
century. In some countries this was before the institutionalization of the universal 
male franchise. Only in two countries -Denmark and Finland - was the universal 
franchise for women institutionalized at the same time as male franchise. In the 
other countries it was granted some or many years later. 
The period under investigation in this study begins in 1945. This marked not 
only the end of the Second World War, but also the beginning of a long period of 
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Table 2.1. Parliamentary responsibility and universal male and female franchise, 
and national elections in twenty countries 
Australia 
Austria 
Belgium 
Britain 
Canada 
Denmark 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Norway 
Portugal 
Spain 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
United States 
Parliamentary 
Responsibility 
1892 
1918 
1831 
1832 
1867 
1901 
1917 
1875 
1918 
1844 
1923 
1919 
1868 
1848 
1884 
1822 
1976 
1917 
1848 
1789 
Male 
Franchise 
1901 
1907 
1893 
1918 
1917 
1901 
1906 
1848 
1869 
1877 
1918 
1912 
1919 
1917 
1897 
1911 
1869 
1909 
1919 
1870 
Female 
Franchise 
1902 
1918 
1948 
1928 
1918 
1915 
1906 
1944 
1919 
1952 
1918 
1946 
1919 
1919 
1913 
1974 
1976 
1921 
1971 
1920 
Number of 
national 
elections 
1945-90 
19 
14 
15 
13 
15 
19 
13 
14 
11 
7 
14 
11 
10 
14 
12 
7 
5 
14 
11 
23 
Years 
national 
elections 
1945-90 
1946-90 
1945-90 
1946-87 
1945-87 
1945-88 
1945-88 
1945-87 
1945-88 
1949-87 
1974-90 
1948-89 
1946-87 
1945-89 
1946-89 
1945-89 
1975-87 
1977-89 
1948-88 
1947-87 
1946-90 
Sources: Ultee et al. 1992: 273; Mackie & Rose 1991; Lane et al. 1991: 111; Lijphart 1994: 
5-6. 
relative undisturbed democracy for most of the countries examined here. Further-
more, it is only since 1945 that survey data have become available for most 
countries about the relationship between social class, class mobility and voting 
behaviour. The decision to take the year 1990 as the end of the period under 
analysis, was mainly based on practical considerations. Data after 1990 were only 
scarcely available at the time the analyses for this study were being carried out. 
However, the entire period from 1945 until 1990 could not be considered for 
all twenty countries. Portugal, Greece and Spain could only be included after 
these countries became democratic. Furthermore, not every country could be 
included over the total period 1945-1990 in each analysis presented in the next 
chapters. The inevitable data restrictions faced when investigating so many coun-
tries and such a long time period, meant that for some countries, some data for all 
or a part of the time span were unavailable. Thus, each chapter of this study 
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clearly indicates which countries and periods were included in the analyses, and 
which were left out. 
2.2 Data 
In the analyses two kinds of data were employed for the twenty countries under 
investigation in the postwar period. To answer the descriptive research questions 
on levels of class voting, and to address the explanatory question at the country-
level, aggregated country data about the levels of class voting and several social 
and political characteristics of the countries were analysed. To answer the 
explanatory questions concerning the effects of varying class compositions and of 
varying class mobility patterns on the levels of class voting, individual-level data 
were used from national representative surveys of these countries. 
Country Data 
The aggregated country data includes information about the levels of class voting 
as well as on the explanatory factors for each of the twenty Western industrial-
ized countries in each year since the end of the Second World War. These data 
were obtained from two sources: tables published in various articles and books, 
and tables calculated using data from several national representative surveys 
available on tapes (i.e. our individual dataset). 
To obtain measures for the level of class voting, we consulted the literature 
and data archives for pertinent information about the twenty countries during the 
years 1945-1990. If relevant studies had been conducted every year in each 
country and the results of these surveys were still available, this would yield 
twenty by forty six observations. However, as expected, for a majority of country-
year points we were unable to find information about the level of class voting. In 
total for all twenty countries, 324 tables cross-classifying class (manual/nonman-
ual) by party voted for (left-wing/right-wing) were found.2 In Table 2.2 the 
numbers of tables we have for the various countries are given. In Appendix A the 
sources of these class voting tables are listed. On the basis of these data, the 
levels of class voting are described and explained in Chapters 3 and 4 of this 
study. 
To test the explanations of differences between countries and changes within 
countries in the levels of class voting, data were collected from various sources 
on social and political characteristics of the countries under investigation since 
1945. Specifically, data were collected for each year on the following country 
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Table 2.2. Number of class voting tables in aggregated country dataset per 
country and per period 
Australia 
Austria 
Belgium 
Britain 
Canada 
Denmark 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Norway 
Portugal 
Spain 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Un. States 
Total 
1945-1960 
7 
-
-
8 
10 
6 
1 
4 
3 
-
-
1 
-
1 
2 
-
-
3 
-
5 
51 
1961-1970 
3 
1 
1 
4 
2 
3 
1 
3 
4 
-
1 
1 
-
4 
2 
-
-
3 
-
4 
37 
1971-1980 
2 
1 
9 
8 
-
10 
2 
8 
8 
1 
7 
8 
7 
10 
3 
-
1 
3 
3 
8 
99 
1981-1990 
5 
3 
10 
10 
1 
10 
1 
10 
10 
9 
10 
10 
10 
10 
4 
5 
5 
3 
1 
10 
137 
Total 
17 
5 
20 
30 
13 
29 
5 
25 
25 
10 
18 
20 
17 
25 
11 
5 
6 
12 
4 
27 
324 
Range 
1946-90 
1968-89 
1968-90 
1945-90 
1945-84 
1945-90 
1958-87 
1947-90 
1953-90 
1980-89 
1969-90 
1953-90 
1973-90 
1950-90 
1949-90 
1985-89 
1979-89 
1946-88 
1972-87 
1948-90 
1945-90 
characteristics that in earlier studies were assumed to affect class voting and will 
be examined in Chapter 4: the standard of living per capita, the income share of 
the richest twenty per cent of the population, the percentage of intergenerationally 
mobile people, the union density, the level of ethnic-linguistic and religious 
heterogeneity, the prominence of class as a political issue, and the percentage of 
manual workers. Full sources for these predictors are given in Appendix A, as 
well as information about the procedures used to deal with missing values. 
Individual data 
To answer the explanatory questions on the effects of class composition and class 
mobility on levels of class voting, individual-level survey data were used. As 
listed in Table 2.3, these come from 113 datafiles from sixteen out of the twenty 
selected countries. These files are available on tapes. For Greece, Luxembourg, 
Portugal, and Spain no useful tape data were found. Extracts were taken from the 
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Table 2.3. Number of surveys in individual dataset per country and per period 
Australia 
Austria 
Belgium 
Britain 
Canada 
Denmark 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Ireland 
Italy 
Netherlands 
Norway 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
United States 
Total 
1956-1970 
2 
-
-
3 
-
-
-
-
2 
-
6 
16 
1971-1980 
2 
1 
1 
2 
-
5 
2 
1 
11 
-
1 
7 
2 
1 
2 
9 
47 
1981-1990 
6 
3 
-
8 
1 
1 
-
-
6 
2 
1 
7 
4 
1 
-
10 
50 
Total 
10 
4 
1 
13 
1 
6 
2 
1 
19 
2 
3 
15 
7 
2 
2 
25 
113 
Range 
1965-90 
1974-89 
1975 
1964-90 
1984 
1971-81 
1972-75 
1978 
1969-90 
1989-90 
1968-85 
1970-90 
1965-90 
1972-90 
1972-90 
1956-90 
1956-90 
original 113 datafiles and were merged into a single datatile, titled "International 
Stratification, Mobility and Politics File". This file contains standardized informa­
tion about the relevant variables. More detailed information about this file and the 
original datasets is given in a codebook of the file (Nieuwbeerta & Ganzeboom 
1995) and in Appendix В of this study. 
Three criteria governed inclusion of datafiles in this study. First, because the 
research questions concern the levels of class voting in countries, data had to 
come from surveys based on probability samples of a country's population. 
Second, data had to include information about the relevant variables needed for 
addressing the research questions. Thus, social class and voting behaviour of 
respondents were needed, in addition to information about class of parents. The 
third criterion concerned the quality of the data. As a quality control, we checked 
whether the distribution of the voting behaviour variable in our dataset was 
comparable to official elections results. Furthermore, we examined whether there 
were implausible shifts in the class distribution over-time within each country. Of 
the 119 datafiles we started with, six did not meet our criteria and were left out 
of the analyses.3 Consequently we were left with 113 datafiles, and - due to the 
fact that some surveys were held in the same year in the same country - with 103 
different country/year combinations. 
To address the research questions on the effects of class mobility on individual 
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Table 2.4. Left-wing political parties in twenty countries, 1945-1990* 
Australia: Australian Labor Party (0101); Communist Party (0110); Democratic Labor 
Party (0121); Queensland Labor Party (0122); 
Austria: Socialists (0201); Communist Party (0205); Democratic Progressive Party 
(0212); 
Belgium: Belgian Socialist Party (0303); Communist Party (0310); Walloon Wor-
kers' Party (0317); Labour Party (0324); Flemish Socialist Party (0330); 
Britain: Labour Party (2406); Communist Party (2410); Social Democratic and 
Labour Party (2418); Social Democratic Party (2420); 
Canada: Communist Party - Labour Progressive Party (0406); New Democratic 
Party (0408); 
Denmark: Social Democrats (0504); Communist Party (0509); Socialist People's 
Party (0516); Left Socialist Party (0518); 
Finland: Social Democrats (0601); Finnish People's Democratic Union (0613); 
Social Democratic League of Workers and Smallholders (0615); Demo-
cratic Alternative (0622); 
France: Socialist Party (0701); Communist Party (0709); Other Extreme left 
(0718); Unified Socialist Party (0719); Other Left (0727); 
Germany: Social Democrats (0802); Communist Party (0828); Action for Democratic 
Progress (0850); 
Greece: Communist Party of Greece (0904); United Democratic Left (0925); 
Christian Democracy (0933); Communist Party of Greece (0935); Pan -
Hellenic Socialist Movement (0937); Greek Left (0945); 
Ireland: Irish Labour Party (1108); Communists (1109); National Progressive 
Democrats (1118); Workers' Party (1119); Socialist Labour Party (1121); 
Democratic Socialist Party (1123); 
Italy: Socialist Party (1303); Communist Party (1311); Social Democrats (1323); 
United Socialist Party (1331); Manifesto/Party of Proletarian Unity for 
Communism (1332); Proletarian Democracy (1337); 
Luxembourg: Social Democratic Party (1502); Communist Party (1507); Social Demo-
cratic Party (1519); Independent Socialists (1521); 
Netherlands: Communist Party (1710); Labour Party (1723); Pacifist Socialist Party 
(1727); Democratic Socialists '70 (1730); 
Norway: Labour Party (1904); Communist Party (1909); Socialist People's Party 
(1914); 
Portugal: Communist Party (2002); Socialist Party (2004); Democratic Movement 
(2005); Movement of the Socialist Left (2006); Popular Democratic Union 
(2007); Revolutionary Socialist Party (2012); Union of the Socialist and 
Democratic Left (2013); Socialist Unity Party (2015); 
Spain: Socialist Party (2101); Communist Party (2102); Popular Socialist Party 
(2132); Spanish Labour Party (2133); 
Sweden: Social Democrats (2205); Communist Party (2210); 
Switzerland: Social Democrats (2305); Communist Party (2309); Autonomous Socialist 
Party (2317); 
United States: Democratic Party (2501); Socialist Labor Party (2515); Socialist Party 
(2517); Communist Party (2521). 
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voting behaviour, it is necessary to have reliable information about respondents' 
social classes and parents' social classes. In this respect a difficulty arises as to 
how cohabiting or married women are to be assigned to a social class. Most 
survey data available to us do not contain information about these women's own 
occupational and class positions, since they only comprise information about the 
class of the head of household. The apparent assumption is that if women are not 
the head of the household, their own occupational or class position is irrelevant 
for their voting behaviour. Furthermore, only a limited number of surveys contain 
information about the social class of mothers. These restrictions do not allow us 
to include women's and mothers' class positions properly in the analyses. In 
addition, it is theoretically unclear how the social positions of wives and mothers 
should be defined. De Graaf & Heath (1992) have shown that working women 
should not be assigned to social classes solely on the basis of their husbands' 
occupations or solely on the basis of their own occupation. For women and 
mothers, more complex operationalizations are required which take account of the 
interactions between husbands' and wives' occupations. To develop such a 
complex operationalization, however, would go beyond the aim of this study (see 
for a discussion on this topic: S0rensen 1994). Therefore, in this study we restrict 
ourselves to the analysis of men and only investigate the effects of fathers' class 
position on the voting behaviour of male respondents. 
2.3 Operationalizations 
Voting behaviour 
To measure levels of class-based voting, it would be preferable to have data on 
the actual voting behaviour of respondents during specific elections in the 
surveys. However, because voting is confidential in democratic countries, we have 
to rely on indirect measures of voting behaviour. In the surveys employed in this 
study various such indirect measures are used as indicators for respondent's 
voting behaviour. In some surveys respondents were asked to name the political 
party they would vote for if there were a national election tomorrow. In other 
surveys respondents were asked to name the party they voted for at the most 
recent national election. In yet others respondents were asked which political 
party they preferred or identified with. The limitations introduced by such differ-
ent measures of voting behaviour must be fully appreciated. However, various 
analyses using only surveys containing "voting behaviour" measures, and several -
analyses using only surveys containing "political preference" measures, did not 
result in significant different outcomes. Thus, we are confident that using these 
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different measures of voting behaviour in the analyses does not cause major 
problems. Indeed, we know of no study showing that the relationship between 
class and political preference is fundamentally different from that between class 
and respondents' voting behaviour. 
In order to produce a classification of parties voted for that would allow cross-
country comparison, we followed Bartolini & Mair (1990) and Franklin and his 
colleagues (1992), and dichotomized the political parties into left-wing on one 
side and right-wing on the other. This distinction can be seen as the most relevant 
distinction between political parties, when investigating class-based voting. To 
oversimplify, left-wing parties prefer a change in the direction of greater social 
equality, i.e. their policies are in favour of the manual classes, whereas right-wing 
parties are against such changes (Lipset 1960), i.e. their policies are in the 
interests of nonmanual classes. 
In deciding whether a specific party should be included in the left-wing block, 
we followed the criteria given by Bartolini & Mair (1990: 42-43): "As far as our 
criteria for inclusion are concerned, only two general principles have been 
adopted: first, the systematic inclusion of all those socialist parties which are 
members of the Socialist International and of all those communist parties which 
were once members of the Communist Third International; second, the systematic 
exclusion of those recent and wholly new parties which concern themselves 
primarily with the "newpolitics" issues, environmentalism, civil rights, feminism, 
and so on, despite the fact that these parties often locate themselves on the 
ideological left, and occasionally further on the left than the historic class 
parties". Since according to these criteria hardly any left-wing voters would exist 
in the United States, for that country an exception to the criteria was made, and 
the Democratic Party was defined as left-wing party. Table 2.4 presents, for each 
country, a list of the political parties which were classified as left-wing in this 
study. 
To give an impression of the electoral strength of the left-wing parties, Table 
2.5 shows the mean percentages of people who voted for these parties at the 
national elections according to the official election results. Figures are presented 
for each of the twenty selected countries in the periods 1945-1960, 1961-1970, 
1971-1980, and 1981-1990. The percentage of left-wing voters is relatively stable 
over-time within these countries. Differences across countries are more substan-
tial. In some countries the number of left-wing voters exceeds fifty per cent 
(especially in Australia, Norway, Sweden) while in others (Canada, Greece 
(before 1967) and Ireland) it represents less than twenty five per cent of the 
electorate. 
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Table 2.5. Percentage left-wing voters at national elections in twenty countries, 
1945-1990 
Australia 
Austria 
Belgium 
Britain 
Canada 
Denmark 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Norway 
Portugal 
Spain 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
United States 
1945-1960 
51 
47 
40 
47 
14 
46 
48 
43 
33 
9 
10 
40 
41 
36 
52 
-
-
51 
30 
47 
1961-1970 
53 
48 
35 
45 
15 
47 
46 
40 
40 
14 
15 
46 
45 
32 
51 
-
-
52 
28 
52 
1971-1980 
47 
52 
30 
39 
18 
45 
43 
47 
44 
23 
14 
51 
41 
37 
47 
55 
44 
50 
28 
43 
1981-1990 
46 
45 
30 
30 
20 
46 
39 
49 
36 
53 
12 
49 
35 
34 
44 
43 
50 
50 
24 
44 
Sources: Mackie & Rose 1991; Mackie 1991, 1992. 
Social class 
A manual versus nonmanual distinction is traditionally used in research on the 
relationship between social class and voting behaviour. The manual class com-
prises semi- and unskilled workers both in industry and in agriculture who can be 
seen as placing themselves to some degree under the authority and control of 
employers who hire their labour. The nonmanual class includes large proprietors, 
administrators, managers, and routine nonmanual employees. Members of the two 
classes differ with respect to their labour contract and income where nonmanual 
classes are in a better position than the manual. 
In most analyses the manual/nonmanual distinction is used to measure the level 
of class voting. However, to test the class composition and the class mobility 
explanations, a more elaborate class scheme is necessary. This class scheme needs 
to fulfil three requirements. First, it has to distinguish between the most important 
social class positions. Therefore, a distinction between self-employed workers and 
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Table 2.6. Social class scheme: EGP categories 
Title Description 
Nonmanual classes: 
Service class Large proprietors; professionals, administrators and man-
agers; higher-grade technicians; supervisors of nonman-
ual workers.3 
Routine nonmanual class Routine nonmanual employees in administration and 
commerce; sales personnel; other rank-and-file service 
workers. 
Petty bourgeoisie Small proprietors and artisans, with and without 
employees. 
Farmers Farmers, smallholders and other self-employed workers 
in primary production. 
Manual classes: 
Skilled workers Lower-grade technicians; supervisors of manual workers; 
skilled manual workers. 
Nonskilled workers Semi- and unskilled, nonagricultural manual workers. 
Agricultural labourers Agricultural and other workers in primary production. 
employees, as well as a distinction between workers with different levels of skill 
and supervisory positions, should be taken into account. Second, the class scheme 
should be appropriate when testing the· class composition explanation. Thus, the 
dichotomy between the manual and nonmanual classes has to be preserved so that 
relevant changes in the compositions of these classes in industrialized societies 
can be detected. Third, a more sophisticated class scheme should have been 
shown to be effective in analyses of the relationship between social class, class 
mobility and voting behaviour, as well as in comparative analyses of intergenera-
tional class mobility. 
The seven class version of a class scheme originally introduced by Goldthorpe 
for the Oxford Mobility Inquiry (Goldthorpe et al. 1978), and later elaborated by 
Erikson, Goldthorpe and Portocarrero (1979), and Erikson & Goldthorpe (1992: 
38-39), fulfils the requirements outlined. In this scheme, for brevity's sake called 
EGP class scheme, individuals are categorized into a class based on their sector, 
self-employment status, and supervisory status. The derivation of this scheme is 
given in Chapter 3 of this study. The EGP class scheme has been useful in 
comparative studies of intergenerational class mobility (Ganzeboom et al. 1989; 
Erikson & Goldthorpe 1992), and in studies examining the relationship between 
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social class and voting behaviour in Britain (Heath et al. 1985; Evans et al. 1991). 
Nieuwbeerta & De Graaf (1992) have also applied this scheme in their analyses 
of the effects of class mobility on voting behaviour for the Netherlands. 
The seven class version of the EGP class scheme distinguishes between the 
class categories given in Table 2.6. Respondents were coded into the EGP classes 
on the basis of data on their occupation, self-employment and supervisory status. 
Two steps were involved. First, the original occupation codes were recoded into 
the International Standard Classification of Occupation (ISCO) codes (ILO 1969). 
Second, these ISCO codes were translated into EGP-scores through the Ganze-
boom et al. (1989) recoding scheme. 
Manual/nonmanual class voting 
The level of class voting in a country at a certain point in time can be operationa-
lized in various ways. Traditionally, the so-called "Alford index" has been used 
(Alford 1962, 1963). In almost all cross-national and trend studies of the first 
generation of research on stratification and politics this Alford index was applied. 
The index is obtained by taking, for a two by two table cross-classifying class 
(manual/nonmanual) and voting behaviour (left-wing/right-wing), the difference 
between the percentage of manual workers that voted for left-wing political 
parties on the one hand and the percentage of nonmanual workers that voted for 
these parties on the other hand. Thus, if 80 per cent of the manual class vote for 
left-wing parties against 20 per cent of the nonmanual class, the Alford index 
takes the value 60. 
However, the Alford index has several drawbacks. The most important one is 
that it is sensitive to changes in the overall percentage of a population voting for 
parties of a certain type (Korpi 1972; Robertson 1984; Heath et al. 1985). 
Therefore, differences between two Alford indices might not only be due to 
differences in the strength of the relationship between social class and voting 
behaviour, but also to differences in the overall popularity of political parties. 
Recently, scholars of the third generation of research on stratification and 
politics have proposed alternative measures of the class/vote relationship (Heath 
et al. 1985; Thomsen 1987). They suggested using the odds-ratio or the log-odds-
ratio as a measure of the level of class voting. These measures are insensitive to 
changes in the overall popularity of political parties. The odds-ratio for a two by 
two table of class against vote, is the odds for manual workers of voting left-wing 
rather than right-wing divided by the odds for nonmanual workers of doing the 
same. The log-odds-ratio is the natural logarithm of that odds-ratio. This log-
odds-ratio can also be regarded as the log-odds for manual workers of voting for 
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Table 2.7. Hypothetical tables on the relationship between class and voting 
behaviour 
Table A: 
Manual class 
Nonmanual class 
All 
Left-wing 
50 
50% 
Right-wing 
40 
80.0% 
10 
20.0% 
10 
20.0% 
40 
80.0% 
50 
50% 
Alford index = 80.0 - 20.0 = 60.0 
Thomsen index = log ((8O.O/20.0)/(20.0/80.0)) = log(16) = 2.77 
Table B: 
50 
100% 
50 
100% 
100 
100% 
Manual class 
Nonmanual class 
All 
Left-wing 
75 
75% 
Right-wing 
60 
92.3% 
15 
42.9% 
5 
7.7% 
20 
57.1% 
25 
25% 
65 
100% 
35 
100% 
100 
100% 
Alford index = 92.3 - 42.9 = 49.4 
Thomsen index = log ((92.3/7.7)/(42.9/57.1)) = log(16) = 2.77 
a left-wing political party rather than a right-wing party minus the log-odds for 
nonmanual workers of voting in this way.6 If voting behaviour is not dependent 
on class, the odds-ratio has the value of unity and the log-odds-ratio that of zero. 
The higher the odds-ratio and the log-odds-ratio is, the higher the level of class 
voting. Both measures have no upper bound. 
In this study, we use the natural logarithm of the odds-ratio, instead of the odds-
ratio, to measure levels of class voting in a country. One reason is that, if there is 
hardly a relationship between class and vote, a small change in the strength of 
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that relationship results in a small alteration in the odds-ratio. However, if this 
relationship is strong, a small change will result in a large alteration in this 
measure. Or in other words, a decrease in an odds-ratio from say 10 to 9 does not 
equal a decrease from 3 to 2. By using the natural-logarithm of the odds-ratio we 
adjust for these "floor effects". A related reason for choosing the log-odds-ratio 
instead of the odds-ratio, is that in our explanatory analyses it is assumed that 
explanatory variables have a multiplicative effect on the odds-ratios, which be­
comes an additive effect in the log-odds-ratios. This enables us to use standard 
logistic regression techniques to investigate the impact of the explanatory 
variables. As a tribute to the scholar who was one of the first to apply the log-
odds-ratio in research on stratification and politics, we call this log-odds-ratio the 
Thomsen index (Thomsen 1987). 
Since the advantages of the Thomsen index over the Alford index are central in 
debates between scholars from the first and the third generation, we illustrate 
these further by giving an example. For that end we presented Table 2.7 where 
two hypothetical class voting tables are shown.7 In these tables it is assumed that 
the total population is comprised of the manual and the nonmanual classes, and 
that only two types of political parties - left-wing and right-wing - exist. In both 
tables it is assumed that the strength of the relationship between class and voting 
behaviour is the same. The only difference between the two tables is that the 
general popularity of the political parties differs. In Table В left-wing parties are 
(three times) more popular than in Table A, i.e. among both manual and non-
manual class members. Because the strength of the relationship between class and 
voting behaviour is the same, the measure of the level of class voting should take 
the same value in both cases. This is true for the Thomsen index. However, the 
Alford indices differ between the two tables. In Table A the index takes the value 
60.0 and in Table В it is 49.4. Thus, this hypothetical example illustrates the 
sensitivity of the Alford index to changes in the general popularity of the political 
parties, and demonstrates one of the advantages of the Thomsen index. 
However, it should be noted that in practice, for two by two class voting tables 
the advantages of the Thomsen index over the Alford index should not be 
overstated. The arguments given by Goodman (1975: 86), for example, suggest 
that it is only when the distribution of the general popularity of political parties or 
the distribution of social classes is more skewed than 25:75 or 75:25, that the 
Alford and Thomsen indices might yield substantially different conclusions. How­
ever, such distributions are unlikely in our dataset. As we have discussed above, 
it is only in Canada and Ireland that left-wing parties have less than 25 per cent 
of the votes. Furthermore, it is also the case that, in the postwar period, the 
percentage of manual workers has always been between 25 and 75 per cent in 
Western industrialized countries. 
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EGP class voting 
Log-odds-ratios (which we labelled Thomsen indices) are not only useful when 
measuring the level of class voting in a country with a manual/nonmanual class 
scheme. They are also used to measure levels of class voting, when using a more 
detailed class scheme. When doing so, the advantage of the log-odds-ratio over 
the Alford index is more relevant. For example, when measuring the difference in 
voting behaviour between unskilled manual workers and farmers, in most 
countries both the voting and the class distribution are more skewed than 75:25. 
When using the EGP class scheme that distinguishes between seven class 
categories, we need six log-odds-ratios to measure the differences in voting 
behaviour (left/right) between all the classes in a country in a specific year. One 
of the aims of the present study is to investigate differences between countries 
and changes within these countries with respect to class voting. Using six log-
odds-ratios for every year in each country, would create problems of interpreta-
tion. We therefore also use a summary measure of the overall level of class 
voting, called the kappa index, that Hout and his colleagues (1994) have pro-
posed. This kappa index is the standard deviation of the log-odds-ratios measuring 
the difference in voting behaviour between the detailed classes. This index reports 
a single standardized score which reflects the level of class voting for a particular 
country in a particular year or period, and provides a uniform metric for making 
cross-national and over-time inferences. However, a drawback of this measure is 
that it does not take into account that in some classes there are more respondents 
than in others, and thus some log-odds-ratios are more robust than others. 
Therefore, we also use another way of measuring the level of class voting, when 
using the EGP class scheme. Using this method we examine parameters that 
result from specially designed loglinear models. These so-called "uniform 
difference" models, developed by Erikson & Goldthorpe (1992) and Xie (1992), 
provide a single parameter as measure of the level of EGP class voting for a 
country in a specific year. The models are fully equipped to examine the relation-
ship between class and voting behaviour net of changes in the sizes of the classes 
and the popularity of the parties. Furthermore, these models are not influenced by 
there being different numbers of respondents in the classes of any dataset. We 
will pay more attention to this way of measuring levels of EGP class voting in 
Chapter 6. 
3 Description of Manual/Nonmanual 
Class Voting 
3.1 Introduction1 
From the start of research on stratification and politics, studies have been concerned 
with the relationship between social class and voting behaviour. As discussed in 
Chapter 1, the first generation of studies on this topic were characterized by the use 
of a dichotomous manual/nonmanual class scheme. In addition, the focus was on the 
absolute levels of class voting, using the Alford index as a measure of the strength 
of the relationship between class and voting behaviour in a country. These first 
generation studies showed that in all Western democratic countries, members of the 
manual classes were more likely to vote for left-wing political parties than were 
members of nonmanual classes. They also revealed that the strength of the link 
between class and voting behaviour was different from country to country (Korpi 
1983: 35; Lane & Ersson 1991: 94), and that declines in class voting occurred in 
most countries in the postwar period (Lipset 1983; Clark et al. 1993: 312). 
Despite the weight of evidence on between-country and over-time variation in 
class voting, studies of the third generation have recently cast doubts on such 
assertions (Heath et al. 1985; Hout et al. 1993). Third generation scholars argue that 
the class scheme used in the studies of the first generation was - and remains - too 
crude to take relevant developments in the class structure in these countries into 
account. Furthermore, and for this chapter more importantly, they claim that the 
traditionally used measure of class voting, i.e. the Alford index, is sensitive to 
variation in the general popularity of political parties. Therefore, they argue, one 
should focus on levels of relative class voting instead of absolute class voting, and 
measure this by means of odds-ratios, or log-odds-ratios instead of Alford indices. 
When examining relative class voting using log-odds-ratios (Thomsen indices) 
different results might be obtained from those obtained in investigations of absolute 
class voting. 
It is against this background that we raise the following descriptive research 
questions: To what extent did the levels of relative manual/nonmanual class voting 
differ across democratic industrialized countries in the postwar period?, and: To 
what extent was there a decline in the levels of relative manual/nonmanual class 
voting in these countries over that period? 
We answer these questions using two different datasets. First, we analyse the 
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aggregated country data on levels of class voting in twenty countries in the period 
1945-1990. Subsequently, we describe the levels of manual/nonmanual class voting 
by analysing the data from our individual dataset. This dataset contains data from 
113 surveys from sixteen countries over the period 1956 until 1990. The analysis on 
the individual dataset offers the possibility to compare the results of this chapter with 
results from later chapters that also use this individual dataset. Furthermore, the 
individual dataset has the advantage that we were fully responsible for the 
dichotomization of voting behaviour into left-wing and right-wing and of classes into 
the manual and nonmanual. 
In the next sections we address the descriptive research questions. In Section 2 we 
examine the extent to which the levels of class voting differ between countries, and 
in Section 3 the extent to which there was a decline in class voting in these 
countries. After having answered the descriptive questions in this chapter, we pay 
some attention in Section 4 to the question of what the results of our analysis would 
have been if we had focused on the levels of absolute class voting, i.e. when using 
the Alford index, and how these differ from the results when using the Thomsen 
index. 
3.2 Differences between countries 
Among the studies of the first generation are cross-national comparative analyses of 
levels of class voting. These studies focused on the level of absolute class voting in 
a country. Since Alford suggested an index to measure that level, this "Alford index" 
has become the standard measure in cross-national comparative studies. Using this 
index, Alford (1963) - in his comparison of four Anglo-American democracies 
during 1945-1962 - provided the first evidence of differences in class voting among 
Western industrialized nations. About a decade later, Lenski (1970: 362) and Lijphart 
(1971: 162) came up with a similar conclusion for a larger number of Western 
industrialized countries surveyed around 1960. Korpi (1983: 35) showed differences 
in Alford indices across eighteen countries in the 1970s, and Lane & Ersson (1991: 
94) displayed a similar finding for sixteen countries during the 1980s. 
In this chapter, as noted, our primary focus is not on the levels of absolute class 
voting. We instead focus on the differences between countries in the levels of 
relative class voting, i.e. measured by the Thomsen index. To describe the levels of 
relative class voting we start using data from our aggregated country dataset, that 
contains 324 tables cross-classifying class (manual/nonmanual) by party choice (left-
wing/right-wing) for twenty countries in the period 1945-1990. On the basis of these 
cross-tabulations we calculated Thomsen indices as measures for the level of relative 
class voting in the countries in the various years. These Thomsen indices are present-
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Table 3.1. Levels of class voting (measured by Thomsen index) in twenty countries, 
1945-1990 (aggregated country dataset) 
Australia 
Austria 
Belgium 
Britain 
Canada 
Denmark 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Norway 
Portugal 
Spain 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
United States 
Mean 
Std. deviation 
1945-1960 
1.38 
-
-
1.64 
0.30 
1.82 
2.17 
1.01 
1.55 
-
-
1.13 
-
0.61 
2.39 
-
-
2.26 
-
0.67 
1.41 
0.66 
1961-1970 
1.22 
1.12 
1.21 
1.67 
0.31 
2.33 
2.24 
0.76 
1.06 
-
0.88 
0.66 
-
0.65 
1.38 
-
-
1.73 
-
0.36 
1.17 
0.59 
1971-1980 
1.16 
1.28 
0.87 
1.07 
-
1.18 
1.60 
0.72 
0.61 
0.53 
0.77 
0.73 
1.10 
0.94 
1.43 
-
0.75 
1.57 
0.82 
0.46 
0.98 
0.33 
1981-1990 
0.80 
0.76 
0.80 
0.90 
0.27 
0.97 
1.52 
0.48 
0.55 
0.47 
0.70 
0.53 
0.86 
0.68 
0.84 
0.62 
0.63 
1.36 
0.80 
0.34 
0.74 
0.30 
ed in the graphs of Figure 3.1. Second, in order to be able to compare the results in 
this chapter with results from subsequent chapters, we carried out our descriptive 
analyses on data from the individual dataset. On the basis of this dataset we 
constructed class voting cross-tabulations, and also computed Thomsen indices of the 
various years in the various countries. 
As a next step, to summarize the data and in order not to be too dependent on 
single cross-tabulations and thus open to the influence of peculiarities in the data, we 
calculated the mean value of the Thomsen indices of each country in each of the 
following four time periods: 1945-1960, 1961-1970, 1971-1980 and 1981-1990. The 
mean values on the basis of our aggregated dataset are presented in Table 3.1 and 
those from our individual dataset in Table 3.2. Since we have no data, except for the 
United States, for the period 1945-1960 in our individual-level dataset, that period 
is not included in Table 3.2. 
On the basis of these figures in Figure 3.1 and Tables 3.1 and 3.2, the descriptive 
questions on the levels of relative manual/nonmanual class voting in the twenty 
Figure 3.1. Figure of levels ofclass voting (measured. by Thomsen index) in twenty countries, 1945-1990
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Table 3.2. Levels of class voting (measured by Thomsen index) in sixteen countries, 
1961-1990 (individual dataset) 
Australia 
Austria 
Belgium 
Britain 
Canada 
Denmark 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Ireland 
Italy 
Netherlands 
Norway 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
United States 
Mean 
Std. deviation 
1961-1970 
1.34 
-
-
1.66 
-
-
-
-
0.84 
-
0.73 
1.04 
1.85 
-
-
0.83 
1.18 
0.40 
1971-1980 
1.37 
1.55 
1.30 
1.39 
-
2.11 
2.22 
0.96 
0.92 
-
0.85 
0.99 
1.69 
1.81 
1.25 
0.56 
1.36 
0.47 
1981-1990 
0.87 
0.94 
-
1.28 
0.84 
2.11 
-
-
0.74 
1.18 
0.58 
0.78 
1.08 
0.98 
-
0.43 
0.98 
0.41 
countries in the postwar period are addressed. Our analyses confirm the findings of 
previous, more limited studies that use Alford indices. That is, also when examining 
levels of relative class voting, countries differ in the level of class voting. 
Furthermore, when countries are ordered on the basis of their levels of class voting, 
the ordering remains fairly stable over the four periods considered. The lowest levels 
of class voting are found in the United States and Canada. In these countries we find 
low positive Thomsen indices. This implies that manual workers vote more left-wing 
than nonmanual workers. However, the strength of the relationship between class and 
voting behaviour in these two countries - and especially in Canada - is low. The 
Thomsen indices of these countries rarely exceed 0.50. When ranking the countries 
on the basis of the Thomsen indices, a few countries have somewhat higher, but still 
relatively low levels of class voting. These countries are France, Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland. In all these countries, the Thomsen 
indices are rarely larger than one. Then follows a group of countries with 
intermediate levels of class voting. These countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, 
Germany and Luxembourg. In these countries the Thomsen indices have 
predominantly a value between 1 and 1.5. Finally, in some countries we find 
relatively high levels of class voting, the Thomsen indices are higher than 1.5. These 
countries are the four Scandinavian countries and Britain. In the Scandinavian 
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countries the Thomsen indices are occasionally even higher than two. 
It should be noted that differences between countries in the levels of class voting 
have become smaller over the last decades. This can be shown by investigating the 
standard deviation over the Thomsen indices across countries. For example, in Table 
3.1, in the period 1945-1960, the standard deviation of the levels of class voting 
across countries had the value 0.66, while in the period 1961-70 it fell to 0.59. 
Subsequently, in the period 1971-80, the variation dropped to 0.33, and to 0.30 in 
the period 1981-90. A similar conclusion can be drawn from Table 3.2. 
Summarizing the results of our between-country examinations, we can conclude 
that there is a clear indication of substantial differences in levels of relative 
manual/nonmanual class voting across democratic industrialized countries in the 
postwar period. This conclusion can be drawn on the basis of our analyses of both 
our aggregated country data and our individual dataset. 
33 Trends within countries 
Having described the differences between countries in levels of class voting, we next 
examine the changes over-time in levels of class voting within these countries. A 
pioneering study of trends in class voting, using the Alford index, was Kemp (1978). 
It demonstrated a reduction of the level of class voting in Australia during the 1945-
1975 period. Others have also analysed trends in class voting for various individual 
countries. For example, Andeweg (1982) has analysed trends in the strength of the 
relationship between class and vote for the Netherlands, Abramson and his 
colleagues (1990) for the United States, and Listhaug (1989) for Norway. Some have 
shown a decline in the levels of class voting in several countries simultaneously. 
Lipset (1983) has presented evidence of a downward trend in Alford indices of 
Britain, Germany, and the United States between 1945 and 1980. A continuing 
decline has been supported by further analyses of data from the early 1980s (Clark 
et al. 1993: 313). In addition, Sainsbury (1987, 1990) has shown a decline in class 
voting in the Scandinavian countries, while Lane & Ersson (1991: 94), comparing 
the 1950/oOs with the 1970/80s, have found less class voting in the later period for 
nine Western industrialized nations and stronger class voting in only two countries 
(France and Italy). 
Our findings, on the basis of Thomsen indices instead of Alford indices, for twenty 
countries in the period 1945-1990, confirm the findings of these earlier studies. A 
substantial decline in the levels of class voting occurred in most countries. A first 
indication is provided by Tables 3.1 and 3.2, which show higher Thomsen indices 
for earlier periods than for more recent years. A second, more precise indication of 
the decline in levels of class voting in most countries is provided by the figures in 
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Table 3.3. Linear trends in the levels of class voting (measured by Thomsen index) 
in twenty countries (aggregated country dataset) 
Australia 
Austria 
Belgium 
Britain 
Canada 
Denmark 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Norway 
Portugal 
Spain 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
United States 
Intercept (class 
voting in 
parameter 
0.93* 
0.96* 
0.86* 
1.06* 
0.28* 
1.15* 
1.57* 
0.60* 
0.64* 
0.40* 
0.76* 
0.64* 
0.99* 
0.77* 
1.09* 
0.43 
0.74* 
1.48* 
0.80* 
0.37* 
1980) 
s.e. 
0.06 
0.11 
0.07 
0.05 
0.14 
0.08 
0.27 
0.05 
0.05 
0.18 
0.08 
0.04 
0.10 
0.04 
0.09 
0.51 
0.19 
0.07 
0.15 
0.06 
Trend 
(change 
parameter 
-0.18* 
-0.27* 
-0.20* 
-0.22* 
-0.01 
-0.30* 
-0.30 
-0.15* 
-0.31* 
0.15 
-0.15 
-0.19* 
-0.14 
-0.01 
-0.44* 
0.27 
-0.16 
-0.27* 
-0.07 
-0.12* 
/ 10 years) 
s.e. 
0.03 
0.13 
0.11 
0.03 
0.06 
0.05 
0.21 
0.00 
0.04 
0.34 
0.13 
0.05 
0.19 
0.05 
0.06 
0.72 
0.30 
0.04 
0.25 
0.05 
Rank 
10 
6 
8 
7 
18 
4 
3 
12 
2 
19 
13 
9 
14 
17 
1 
20 
11 
5 
16 
15 
N. of 
cases 
17 
5 
20 
30 
13 
29 
5 
25 
25 
10 
18 
20 
17 
25 
11 
5 
6 
12 
4 
27 
Range 
1946-90 
1968-89 
1968-90 
1945-90 
1945-84 
1945-90 
1958-87 
1947-90 
1953-90 
1980-89 
1969-90 
1953-90 
1973-90 
1950-90 
1949-90 
1985-89 
1979-89 
1946-88 
1972-87 
1948-90 
Notes: * ρ < 0.05 
The variable Year is centred around 1980. 
Tables 3.3 and 3.4, where summary measures are reported for the decline - or rise -
in the level of class voting for each country in the aggregated country dataset and 
the individual dataset respectively. For every country, a linear regression analysis 
was performed on the Thomsen indices with the exact year of observation as 
independent variable.2 A decline in the level of class voting should be indicated by 
a negative trend-parameter. We should point out that we do not argue that a negative 
linear trend-parameter for a country implies a strict linear declining trend in the level 
of class voting in that country. The parameters are only regarded as a summary 
measure of the overall increase or decrease in class voting in a country, and not as 
the best representation of the developments in class voting over-time. 
In Table 3.3, negative trend-parameters are reported for eighteen out of the twenty 
countries in our aggregated dataset. The only two countries with a positive (non­
significant) trend-parameter are Greece and Portugal. However, for these two coun-
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Table 3.4. Linear trends in the levels of class voting (measured by Thomsen index) 
in sixteen countries (individual dataset) 
Australia 
Austria 
Belgium 
Britain 
Canada 
Denmark 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Ireland 
Italy 
Netherlands 
Norway 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
United States 
Notes: * ρ < 
Intercept (class 
voting in 
parameter 
1.07* 
1.29* 
-
1.39* 
-
1.95* 
-0.06 
-
0.84* 
2.86 
0.68* 
0.89* 
1.36* 
1.44 
1.16 
0.47* 
0.05 
1980) 
s.e. 
0.07 
0.19 
-
0.04 
-
0.22 
-
-
0.04 
-
0.10 
0.03 
0.10 
-
-
0.07 
Trend 
(change 
parameter 
-0.26* 
-0.50 
-
-0.21* 
-
-0.38 
-3.51 
-
-0.16* 
-1.78 
-0.10 
-0.15* 
-0.46* 
-0.46 
-0.14 
-0.06 
The variable Year is centred around 1980. 
/ 10 years) 
s.e. 
0.08 
0.27 
-
0.05 
-
0.41 
-
-
0.07 
-
0.12 
0.06 
0.11 
-
-
0.06 
Rank 
4 
1 
-
5 
-
3 
-
-
6 
-
8 
7 
2 
-
-
9 
N. of 
years 
9 
4 
1 
12 
1 
6 
2 
1 
13 
2 
3 
14 
7 
2 
2 
24 
Range 
1965-90 
1974-89 
1975 
1964-90 
• 1984 
1971-81 
1972-75 
1978 
1969-90 
1989-90 
1968-85 
1970-90 
1965-90 
1972-90 
1972-76 
1956-90 
tries data are only available over the periods 1980-1990 and 1985-1990 respectively. 
Of the eighteen slope-parameters that are negative in Table 3.3, eleven are 
statistically significant at the 0.05 level. The pertinent countries are: Australia, 
Austria, Belgium, Britain, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Norway, Sweden, and 
the United States. Furthermore, the fact that we find statistically insignificant slope-
parameters for Finland, Spain and Switzerland might be caused by the fact that for 
these countries we have data for only a limited number of years. Thus, in general, 
our data lend support to the statement that levels of class voting in Western 
industrialized societies have declined over the postwar period. The only countries for 
which we do not find significant declines in their levels of class voting, but where 
we have data for a sufficient number of years to detect significant trends, are 
Canada, Ireland, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. Inspection of the graphs for these 
countries in Figure 3.1, shows that indeed hardly any decline in class voting occurred 
in these countries. 
Next, in Table 3.4 we present the parameters of the trend analyses of our individual 
dataset. For all thirteen countries we find a negative slope. For five out of the nine 
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countries where we had data for more than two years, we find significant trends. 
These countries are Australia, Britain, Germany, the Netherlands, and Norway. 
A comparison of the entries in Tables 3.3 and 3.4 shows that for the four 
countries, except the Netherlands where there is a significant trend noted in Table 
3.4, there is also a significant trend in Table 3.3. The fact that analysing our 
aggregated dataset for the Netherlands does not yield a significant trend-parameter 
and analysing our individual dataset does, is due to peculiarities of the developments 
in class voting in that country. As an inspection of the graph for the Netherlands in 
Figure 3.1 shows, the developments are non-linear, and therefore sensitive to the 
period investigated. In addition, we find some countries for which a significant trend 
is reported in Table 3.3, but not in Table 3.4. For most of these countries this is due 
to the fact that the trend analyses in Table 3.3 are based on a larger number of cases. 
This is the case in Austria, Denmark, Italy, Sweden, and the United States. However, 
for the United States an additional remark can be made. As the graph for the United 
States in Figure 3.1 indicates, the significant decline in class voting in that country 
presented in Table 3.3 might be due to the exceptional high level of class voting in 
1948. 
Some special attention should be paid to the trend in class voting in Britain. The 
graph for Britain in Figure 3.1 shows that the level of class voting was relatively 
stable over the period 1945-1964. Just after this period, there was a strong sudden 
decline in the level of class voting. Thereafter, from 1965 until 1990, the level of 
class voting was relatively stable again. Thus, when Heath and his associates only 
analysed data from 1964 until 1987, they could not find a long term trend. However, 
when the period 1945-1964 is included in the analyses, a long term decline in the 
level of class voting shows up. 
Having ascertained that the levels of class voting in most Western industrialized 
countries declined, we next examine whether the extent of these declines differed 
between the countries. The figures in Tables 3.3 and 3.4 show that of all the 
countries featured in this study, Norway shows the strongest absolute decrease in the 
Thomsen indices, followed by the other Scandinavian countries. In Germany and 
Britain substantial absolute decreases in the Thomsen indices are also found. In the 
other countries the decline in class voting is less marked, whereas in Canada and the 
United States hardly any trend emerges. The question can then be raised whether 
these results would also have been obtained if the level of class voting had been 
measured by Alford indices. 
3.4 Comparing Alford and Thomsen indices 
Although we follow the theoretical considerations of scholars of the third generation 
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Table 3.5. Levels of class voting (measured by Alford index) in twenty countries, 
1945-1990 (aggregated country dataset) 
Australia 
Austria 
Belgium 
Britain 
Canada 
Denmark 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Norway 
Portugal 
Spain 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
United States 
Mean 
Std. deviation 
1945-1960 
32.9 
-
-
37.3 
7.0 
39.8 
48.4 
24.4 
36.0 
-
-
26.6 
-
14.0 
52.5 
-
-
51.0 
-
16.2 
32.2 
14.9 
1961-1970 
29.3 
27.4 
25.4 
38.3 
7.7 
52.0 
50.2 
18.3 
24.8 
-
14.1 
14.5 
-
14.7 
32.0 
-
-
40.7 
-
7.7 
26.5 
14.2 
1971-1980 
27.8 
28.9 
17.9 
24.3 
-
28.1 
36.9 
17.0 
14.9 
12.3 
8.7 
17.8 
24.8 
21.8 
33.8 
-
18.4 
37.3 
17.6 
10.9 
22.2 
8.6 
1981-1990 
19.4 
18.3 
16.4 
23.4 
4.0 
20.9 
35.7 
11.7 
13.4 
9.7 
7.3 
13.1 
18.8 
15.5 
20.5 
14.9 
15.5 
32.7 
12.8 
8.1 
16.6 
7.8 
(Heath et al. 1985; Hout et al. 1993) in regarding the Thomsen indices as a better 
measure of class voting for a two by two table than the Alford index, it is of interest 
to examine the extent to which empirical testing does yield different results using the 
Alford index or the Thomsen index. Therefore, we again use the data from our 
aggregated country dataset in the twenty countries in the period 1945-1990. On the 
basis of the 324 class voting cross-tabulations available, we calculated Alford indices 
as measures of the levels of absolute class voting in the countries in the various 
years. 
Having calculated the Alford indices we first compared them with the Thomsen 
indices from the same year and country. In Chapter 2, we have already argued that 
in practice, for two by two class/vote tables, the advantages of the Thomsen index 
over the Alford index should not be overstated. Only when the distribution of the 
general popularity of political parties or the distribution of social classes is more 
skewed than 25:75 or 75:25 - which is seldom the case -, the Alford and Thomsen 
indices might yield substantially different conclusions. This idea is confirmed by our 
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Table 3.6. Linear trends in the levels of class voting (measured by Alford index) in 
twenty countries (aggregated country dataset) 
Australia 
Austria 
Belgium 
Britain 
Canada 
Denmark 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Norway 
Portugal 
Spain 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
United States 
Notes: * ρ < 
Intercept (class 
voting in 
parameter 
22.5* 
22.7* 
17.7* 
27.3* 
5.4* 
24.5* 
36.4* 
14.4* 
15.4* 
8.0* 
8.5* 
15.5* 
22.0* 
17.8* 
26.0* 
10.9* 
18.3* 
35.2* 
15.4* 
8.8* 
0.05 
1980) 
s.e. 
1.4 
2.5 
1.5 
1.7 
3.3 
1.3 
5.9 
1.0 
1.1 
3.0 
0.7 
1.0 
2.2 
1.0 
2.1 
11.4 
4.7 
1.3 
2.7 
1.4 
Trend 
(change 
parameter 
-4.2* 
-6.1* 
-4.3* 
-5.9* 
-0.7 
-4.9* 
-6.1 
-3.7* 
-7.0* 
4.4 
-2.3 
^.3* 
-3.8 
-0.2 
-9.1* 
5.9 
-4.1 
-5.5* 
-3.8 
-2.8* 
The variable Year is centred around 1980. 
/ 10 years) 
s.e. 
0.7 
3.0 
2.4 
1.2 
1.4 
0.8 
4.6 
0.8 
1.0 
5.7 
1.3 
1.2 
4.1 
1.0 
1.5 
6.0 
7.1 
0.9 
4.4 
1.0 
Rank 
10 
4 
8 
5 
17 
7 
3 
14 
2 
19 
16 
9 
13 
18 
1 
20 
11 
6 
12 
15 
N. of 
cases 
17 
5 
20 
30 
13 
29 
5 
25 
25 
10 
18 
20 
17 
25 
11 
5 
6 
12 
4 
27 
Range 
1946-90 
1968-89 
1968-90 
1945-90 
1945-84 
1945-90 
1958-87 
1947-90 
1953-90 
1980-89 
1969-90 
1953-90 
1973-90 
1950-90 
1949-90 
1985-89 
1979-89 
1946-88 
1972-87 
1948-90 
analyses. The Pearson correlation between the Alford and the Thomsen indices of 
the 324 years in the twenty countries has the value 0.97 (p=0.000). Thus, the 
descriptions using Thomsen indices yield very much the same conclusions as 
descriptions using Alford indices.3 
In addition, we compared the mean values per country per period of the Thomsen 
indices with the mean values of the Alford index. Therefore, we first calculated the 
average values of the Alford indices of each country in the periods 1945-1960,1961-
1970, 1971-1980 and 1981-1990, and presented these in Table 3.5. Not surprisingly 
when taking into account the high correlation between all Alford and Thomsen 
indices, the rankings of the countries on both measures of class voting in all four 
periods are very similar. 
Finally, we compared the trends in the Alford indices and the Thomsen indices. To 
do this, for every country, a linear regression was computed of the Alford indices 
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in the specific years on the exact year of observation. The parameter estimates are 
reported in Table 3.6. The results are almost identical to the results in Table 3.3. For 
the countries we found positive trend-parameters in Table 3.3, positive trend-para-
meters are shown in Table 3.6. In addition, for the countries where we found 
insignificant negative trend-parameters and significant negative trend-parameters 
respectively in Table 3.3, such parameters are also presented in Table 3.6. 
Furthermore, if we compare the trend-parameters for the Alford indices to those for 
the Thomsen indices - i.e. the trend-parameters in Tables 3.6 and 3.3 respectively -
we find that the ranking of the countries is almost identical. Scandinavian countries 
are ranked highest, the United States and Canada lowest. The largest difference in 
ranking number for the countries is for Switzerland which moved four places, down 
from rank 12 to rank 16, and Denmark and Ireland which moved three positions, 
from 7 to 4 and from 16 to 13 respectively. To illustrate the similarity in the 
findings for the Alford and the Thomsen index, we also calculated the Pearson 
correlation between the trend-parameters in Table 3.3 and those in Table 3.6. This 
has the value 0.97 (p=0.000). 
Concluding, although Heath et al. (1985) and Hout et al. (1993) are right in 
regarding the Thomsen indices as a theoretically better measure of class voting for 
a two by two table than the Alford index, we note that empirical testing does not 
yield substantively different results. The conclusions of the first generation 
researchers, who employed the Alford index, are unlikely to be largely biased by 
their method of analysis. 
3.5 Conclusions 
Following a long tradition of research on stratification and politics, in this chapter 
we described the strength of the relationship between class and voting behaviour in 
many Western industrialized countries over the postwar period. In the firstgeneration, 
such descriptions are given, focussing on absolute levels of class voting, i.e. when 
employing the Alford index as a measure of the level of class voting. However, 
scholars of the third generation of research on stratification and politics have cast 
doubts on the conclusions drawnjn studies using this measure. These scholars have 
claimed that the findings might be misleading, since the Alford index is sensitive to 
changes in the overall popularity of the political parties. They therefore propose 
focusing on the levels of so-called "relative class voting", i.e. when using the log-
odds-ratio as a measure of class voting in a country. 
In the present chapter we followed the developments in this research area, and 
investigated the between-country and over-time variation in the levels of relative 
class voting in twenty Western industrialized countries in the postwar period. Our 
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main investigations were based on a dataset that consists of 324 tabulations cross-
classifying class (manual/nonmanual) and voting behaviour (left-wing/right-wing). 
On the basis of these tables we computed for each year in each country where data 
were available, a log-odds-ratio - dubbed the Thomsen index - as a measure of the 
level of relative class voting. Furthermore, we also analysed a more restricted 
dataset, i.e. our individual-level dataset of 113 surveys from sixteen countries over 
the period 1956-1990. However, the analyses on both these datasets yielded the same 
conclusions. 
Summarizing, the analyses clearly indicated that substantial differences in levels 
of relative manual/nonmanual class voting have existed across democratic 
industrialized countries in the postwar period. The Scandinavian countries and 
Britain have had relatively high levels of manual/nonmanual class voting, while the 
United States and Canada have had low levels. 
In addition, our analyses showed that substantial declines in the level of relative 
manual/nonmanual class voting have occurred in many of the democratic 
industrialized countries in the postwar period. These declines have not occurred with 
the same speed in all countries. The declines in class voting were largest in the 
Scandinavian countries, followed by Germany and Britain. In the United States the 
smallest decline was found. Furthermore, in Canada, Ireland, Luxembourg and the 
Netherlands no systematic declines in class voting at all were found over the last 
decades. In Greece and Portugal rises in levels of class voting were found, however 
nonsignificant. 
In this chapter we also compared the levels of relative manual/nonmanual class 
voting, i.e. measured by the Thomsen index, with the levels of absolute 
manual/nonmanual class voting, i.e. measured by the Alford index. The obtained 
Alford indices and Thomsen indices correlated at 0.97. More importantly, whether 
using the Thomsen or the Alford index, the same rankings of the countries with 
respect to the levels of class voting, as well as to the speed of decline of class voting 
were obtained. Thus, although theoretically we regard the Thomsen index as a better 
measure of class voting for a two by two table than the Alford index, we have to 
conclude that empirical testing in this chapter does not yield substantively different 
results when using the Alford index. 
4 Effects of Social and Political Characteristics of 
Countries on Manual/Nonmanual Class Voting 
4.1 Introduction1 
Having established that there have been substantial differences in levels of relative 
class voting between Western industrialized countries in the postwar period, and that 
during the same period significant declines occurred in class voting levels within 
these countries, we now attempt to explain these differences and trends. In the 
present chapter we examine whether the variations in class voting between countries 
and periods can be explained by variation in various social and political 
characteristics of the countries and periods. 
When examining the effects of such country characteristics on class voting, we 
build on various studies of stratification and politics from the first up to and 
including the third generation that have suggested how social and political 
characteristics affect levels of class voting in countries. The characteristics raised by 
such studies range from variations in ethnic diversity, via rises in the general 
standard of living, to differences in the prominence of class issues in politics. Studies 
suggesting these explanations, however, seldom tested these explanations by 
analysing data from many countries and years and by employing strong tests. In 
studies of the first generation, the link between social and political characteristics of 
countries and their levels of class voting was at best weakly empirically tested. In 
these studies limited comparable data were available on both class voting and on 
explanatory variables. Furthermore, the attention was on levels of absolute rather 
than relative class voting. In studies of the second generation, tests of explanations 
of variation in class voting had a low priority on the research agenda. So far, studies 
of the third generation have also paid little attention to these explanations. However, 
this third generation has characteristically focused on relative class voting, and has 
been able to take advantage of much larger datasets and more appropriate research 
techniques. 
This chapter aims to fill the gap in research to date, by using the possibilities with 
respect to data and techniques of the third generation, and by addressing the 
following two questions. The first is: To what extent can differences across 
democratic industrialized countries in the levels of relative manual/nonmanual class 
voting be explained by differences between these countries in their social and 
political characteristics? and the second is: To what extent can changes within 
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democratic industrialized countries in the levels of relative manual/nonmanual class 
voting be explained by changes within these countries in their social and political 
characteristics ? 
When addressing these questions, we aim to improve on earlier studies in several 
ways. First, in our analyses we explain the level of class voting in a country by 
using measures of specific social and political characteristics of that country, instead 
of by simply referring to general explanations or to peculiarities of countries. Thus, 
names of countries are replaced with scores on variables (cf. Przeworski & Teune 
1970). In this respect our study differs from those electoral change studies that do 
not employ measures for country characteristics in the final comparative analysis 
(Dalton et al. 1984; Franklin et al. 1992). Instead, we follow the lead of Korpi 
(1983) and Kerr (1990) who correlated country characteristics with indices of the 
level of class voting. Second, the present chapter addresses its explanatory question 
by subsuming a list of concrete hypotheses involving country characteristics under 
a more general notion. By doing so it avoids mere enumeration and grand 
generalization and aims at systematic explanation. Third, this chapter presents 
analyses of data for a considerable number of countries and over numerous points 
in time. We analyse our aggregated dataset for twenty countries in the period 1945-
1990. In this way the present study goes beyond earlier studies involving a limited 
number of countries (Alford 1963; Ken 1990) and few points in time (Korpi 1983; 
Lane & Ersson 1991). We hope that our expanded dataset lessens the chance of not 
accepting hypotheses due to a lack of statistical power, when in reality these 
hypotheses hold. Moreover, our dataset allows us to test hypotheses using 
multivariate techniques. A test employing such techniques goes well beyond the best 
earlier ones of Korpi (1983) and Kerr (1990). 
The outline of this chapter is as follows. In the next section we review, 
systematize, and correct current hypotheses concerning the levels of class voting in 
Western industrialized countries over the postwar period. In the third section the 
results of bivariate tests of the hypotheses are described. Section 4 contains a 
comprehensive multivariate test of the hypotheses, while in Section 5 the tenability 
of these hypotheses in light of the results is discussed. 
4.2 Hypotheses 
In studies addressing questions on class voting, several hypotheses have been 
formulated concerning the effects of country characteristics on a country's level of 
class voting at a certain point in time. In this section we review this literature and 
list several of these hypotheses. No claim is made that the list of hypotheses is 
exhaustive. We do claim, however, to have selected the current hypotheses that 
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pertain to explanatory factors for which measurable variables are available. 
As to absent hypotheses we would like to note that we formulated our hypotheses 
without incorporating feedback effects. Country characteristics are assumed to have 
an effect on a country's level of class voting, and not the other way around. 
However, in some cases it might well be that a country's level of class voting affects 
a particular characteristic of a country. For example, comparing the income 
differences and the levels of class voting of a dozen Western industrialized countries, 
Lenski et al. (1991), and Lane & Ersson (1991) found that smaller income 
differences and more class voting go together. According to them, the comparison 
suggested that class-based party systems tend to reduce income inequality somewhat. 
Furthermore, it seems plausible that the higher the level of class voting in a country, 
the more prominent class issues are in daily politics. However, we have decided not 
to formulate and test hypotheses incorporating feedback effects in this study. 
Although a research design with mutual influences could be regarded as ideal, such 
a design goes well beyond what the presently available data allow. 
Before listing our hypotheses, a comment is in order on the degree to which 
hypotheses remain unconnected in the literature and are connected in the present 
study. When reviewing the literature, the hypotheses formulated in the various 
studies neither seem to be related to each other nor to a general notion. In this 
chapter we seek to incorporate the hypotheses into a single framework by using 
general theories on individual voting behaviour. From these theories, we employ in 
particular the general notion that people, at least with respect to voting, act to further 
their interests. This idea may also be expressed as a hypothesis according to which 
voters regard political parties as different means through which they can attain their 
goals. In this view, individuals vote for the party that contributes most to the 
realization of these goals. This idea is more or less implicit in Lipset (1960) and is 
prominent in Downs (1957). 
Material interests of voters 
Let us start with hypotheses on the material goals or interests of voters. To specify 
hypotheses about these interests, an assumption is required that states which political 
party furthers the material interests of what kind of persons. According to revisionist 
historical materialism (Bernstein 1899), manual workers have economic interests 
opposed to those of nonmanual workers and the propertied classes. For manual 
workers, voting for a left-wing party furthers these interests more than it would for 
members of the nonmanual classes. Voting for a right-wing party would be against 
the material interests of manual workers since these parties appeal more to the 
interests of the nonmanual classes. A left-wing party promises manual workers better 
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living conditions in general, and a higher income in particular. A right-wing party 
seeks to maintain or improve the material conditions of the nonmanual classes. With 
this assumption and the idea that people act to further their economic interests, 
Lipset (1983: 239) explained the finding of class voting. 
To develop a more comprehensive theory about the economic interests of voters, 
this first hypothesis should be supplemented with other predictions. One such 
prediction holds that as income differences between the classes of a country increase, 
the level of class voting in that country increases (Lane & Ersson 1991: 95). The 
assumption - probably not always correct but sufficiently approximate - required for 
deriving this prediction from our unifying statement has been made by Alford 
(1963). It holds that if income differences between classes are larger, people stand 
to win or to lose more in an economic sense, by voting for a particular party. 
Therefore it can be expected that: 
The larger the income differences between classes in a country at a certain point 
in time, the higher that country's level of class voting at that moment. 
Kerr et al.'s (1960) theory of industrial society maintains that in countries and in 
times with a lower general standard of living, persons from the manual classes stand 
to win more in economic respects by voting according to their economic interests 
than would be the case in countries and periods where industrialization has led to a 
higher standard of living. In countries and periods where standards of living are high, 
persons from the nonmanual classes voting for a left-wing party incur less severe 
losses than they would in countries and times of a lower standard of living. 
Something like the phenomenon of diminishing marginal utility seems to be at work. 
This yields the prediction that: 
The higher the standard of living in a country at a certain point in time, the lower 
its level of class voting at that moment. 
It has often been held that social class mobility weakens class conflict (Sombart 
1976 [1906]; Dahrendorf 1959; Alford 1963; Lenski 1987). This macro-level 
hypothesis can also be derived from assumptions at the individual-level. It can 
plausibly be held that the longer persons belong to a certain class, the higher the 
likelihood of their acting in accordance with their present economic interests. After 
all, for individuals it need not be immediately apparent what their economic interests 
are. Since socially mobile persons may be presumed to belong to their present class 
for a shorter period than socially stable persons, and consequently to be less 
socialized into it, their voting patterns will be somewhere between the voting 
behaviour of their origin class and their destination class. A line of research at the 
individual-level stretching from Lipset & Bendix (1959) to De Graaf and his 
colleagues (1995), has shown that persons moving out of the manual classes vote in 
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a more right-wing way than those staying behind and in a more left-wing way than 
those they are joining in their new station in life. Downwardly mobile persons are 
more leftist than those staying in their class of origin and more rightist than those 
stable in their class of destination. Thus, the odds for manual workers of voting for 
left-wing parties rather than right-wing parties are determined by the percentage of 
manual workers originating in the nonmanual classes. In a similar vein, it can be 
maintained that as the probability of nonmanual class workers originating in the 
manual classes increases, the chances of these workers voting for a right-wing party 
decrease. 
However, in order to move from separate hypotheses for individual manual and 
nonmanual classes members to a single hypothesis linking a country's level of 
mobility and its level of class-based voting, more assumptions are required. For 
example, it may be held that an increase in the inflow to a certain class goes together 
with a stable or increasing inflow to another class. Under this assumption it follows 
that the total percentage of mobility increases. Given this assumption, one obtains 
the macro-hypothesis that in countries with a higher percentage of persons mobile 
between the social classes, the level of class voting is lower. However, it will be 
apparent that in cases where the inflow to one class decreases while increasing in the 
other, no macro-predictions about mobility percentages and class-based voting can 
be derived without yet further assumptions. We know of no comparative study in the 
field of mobility that directly addresses the question of the tenability of the 
assumption that an increase in the inflow to one class is not accompanied by a 
decrease in the inflow to another class. Indeed, the figures for eleven countries 
assembled in Erikson & Goldthorpe (1992: 190) provide at least some evidence 
against it. Nevertheless, accepting this assumption it can be predicted that: 
The higher the percentage of intergenerational class mobility in a country at a 
certain point in time, the lower that country's level of class voting at that moment. 
Korpi (1983: 35) has argued that the higher the union density in a country, the 
higher that country's level of class voting. This hypothesis was supported by a 
correlation of 0.71 between union density and class voting for eighteen OECD 
countries in the 1970s. However, once again a difficulty arises with respect to the 
derivation of this macro-hypothesis from individual-level assumptions. 
When thinking of the effects of a rise in union density, it is quite clear that as 
union density rises among the working classes of any country, the chances of manual 
class members voting left-wing will be higher and thus the level of class voting in 
that country will also be higher. In this case, we simply assume that for people with 
certain economic interests, being a member of organizations representing these 
interests, increases the chances of voting according to their economic interests. 
Without the support of such organizations it would be less clear for persons what 
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their economic interests are, and what behaviour these interests promote. 
The effects of union membership among nonmanual workers on the chances of 
voting for the left or right are also straightforward. From the earliest election studies 
in small towns in the United States (Lazarsfeld et al. 1948), it has been shown at the 
individual-level that labour union membership, independent of a person's social 
class, increases the likelihood of voting for the left. Similarly, recent findings based 
on data from various Norwegian election surveys from 1957 until 1985, have shown 
that nonmanual workers who were union members were more likely to vote for the 
left than were nonmanual workers who had no union affiliations (Listhaug 1989:77). 
This hypothesis yields the macro-prediction that the higher the rate of union 
membership among the nonmanual classes of a country at a given point in time, the 
greater the chances of nonmanual workers voting for the political left. 
It is not immediately apparent, however, how the above derivations are to be 
squared with Korpi's hypothesis that a higher union density makes for more class 
voting. To do this, additional assumptions are required. In general, it may be 
assumed - as Korpi probably did - that the contribution of unionisation to left voting 
by the manual classes is stronger than its contribution to left voting among 
nonmanual classes. In addition, one might presume that an overall rise in union 
density amounts to more or less the same rise for manual and nonmanual workers. 
If these two assumptions hold, Korpi's hypothesis can be derived. The first 
assumption is corroborated by casual inspection of published tables, the second by 
the data in Visser (1989). Thus, as our final hypothesis on material interests we 
propose that: 
The higher the union density in a country at a certain point in time, the higher 
that country's level of class voting at that moment. 
Non-material interests of voters 
Apart from material interests, people have non-material interests linked to factors 
such as the ethnic group they identify with or are assigned to, the language they 
speak and the religion they practice. Ethnic minorities are in favour of positive 
discrimination, people practising a language want it to be used in court and 
government publications, and people with a certain religion want their children to 
be taught about it in schools. Just as it can be assumed that voting to some extent 
reflects people's economic interests, it can also be held that their non-material 
interests in some degree influence their voting. In most countries, people with the 
same economic interests do not fully share the same non-material interests. The 
occurrence of these cross-cutting cleavages has been amply documented (Lipset & 
Rokkan 1967; Lijphart 1979). In addition, it may be assumed that in most countries 
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the non-material interests of symbolic minorities are represented by left-wing parties 
(for instance, those of Jews and blacks in the United States by the Democrats), while 
the non-material interests of symbolic majorities are championed by right-wing 
political parties (for instance, those of Catholics and Lutherans in Germany by the 
Christian-Democrats). Larger and more numerous symbolic minorities and smaller 
majorities make for greater symbolic heterogeneity. 
To make specific predictions about the effects of non-material interests on the 
level of class voting in a country, it can be supposed that ethnicity, language and 
religion are sources of non-material interests. The importance of these characteristics, 
besides class, in explaining individual voting behaviour has been shown by Lijphart 
(1979) and by Franklin and his colleagues (1992). Assuming cross-cutting of class 
on the one hand and religion, language and ethnicity on the other, and assuming that 
people act to further their interests, it can be predicted that in countries with high 
religious and ethnic diversity both manual and nonmanual workers will be less apt 
to vote according to their economic interests than in countries with low diversity. 
Consequently, the following hypotheses can be formulated: 
The higher the religious and ethnic diversity among the population of a country 
at a certain point in time, the lower is that country's level of class voting at that 
moment. 
Characteristics of parties and politicians 
Applying the unifying assumption that people act to further their own interests, 
additional predictions on class-based voting in a country can be obtained by 
regarding not only voters as actors during elections, but also the politicians and 
parties they vote for. Coleman (1982) emphasized the importance for social theory 
of corporate actors, as distinct from natural persons. Furthermore, Lane & Ersson 
(1991), and Sartori (1990) have stressed the pertinence of institutional factors for 
comparative voting research. 
One concrete prediction stemming from this line of reasoning relates to the role 
of issues in politics, or more precisely the matters that politicians debate and 
legislate upon. Let us assume that the stronger class features are as an issue for 
politicians, the more a person from a certain class stands to win by voting according 
to economic interests. It then can be derived that the more class figures as an issue 
in a country's politics, the more voting will be class-based in that country. This is 
consistent with Lane & Ersson's (1991: 132) proposition, and leads us to the 
hypothesis: 
The more a country's politics involve class issues at a certain point in time, the 
higher that country's level of class voting at that moment. 
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These considerations lead us to derive a final hypothesis about the interaction 
between voters and politicians. If politicians seek to govern and stay in business, and 
if voters and politicians act to further their economic interests, then rational 
politicians will respond to changes in a country's class structure. The greater the 
proportion of manual workers in a country, the more politicians from left-wing 
parties will try to win votes from that manual class part of the electorate. 
Conversely, as Przeworski (1985) argued, the lower the percentage of manual 
workers in a population, the more likely it is that politicians from left-wing parties 
will adapt their policies in order to attract votes of nonmanual workers. Kerr's 
(1990) findings for eight industrialized nations in the 1970s, support this hypothesis 
by showing a negative relationship between the ratio of blue collar to white collar 
workers and the extent of class voting. We can thus predict that: 
The lower the proportion of manual workers in a country's population, the lower 
is that country's level of class voting at that moment. 
4.3 Bivariate results 
We now test our hypotheses proposed to explain the differences in the levels of class 
voting across countries and trends in the levels of class voting within these countries. 
In our analyses we use the set of country data discussed in Chapter 2 and in 
Appendix A. In this dataset we have 324 Thomsen indices plus measures of country 
characteristics for twenty countries over various years. This relatively large dataset 
allows us to test hypotheses concerning the effect of one country characteristic, while 
controlling for the effects of other characteristics. However, we start by simple tests 
of our hypotheses by calculating the zero-order correlations between our explanatory 
variables and levels of class voting. 
Explaining differences between countries 
To determine whether variation in the country characteristics adduced in the previous 
section account for differences in the levels of class voting across countries, we 
could calculate simple zero-order correlations on all data. However, since the 324 
year/country combinations are not independent, we examine the effects of country 
characteristics on the levels of class voting when using the mean values of the 
observations for four periods: 1945-1960, 1961-1970, 1971-1980 and 1981-1990. In 
this way thus eliminating the effects of period or year characteristics and eliminated 
errors in the several observations for one country. We then calculated for these 
periods the correlations between the mean levels of class voting for a country in that 
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Table 4.1. Zero-order correlations between explanatory variables and the levels of 
class voting per period, 1945-1990 
Income differences 
Std. of living 
Pere, mobile 
Union density 
Rel.-ethn. diversity 
Class as issue 
Pere, manual 
1945-1960 
(N„„=12) 
-0.52* 
-0.37 
-0.08 
0.63* 
-0.80* 
-0.11 
0.71* 
1961-1970 
(N^=14) 
-0.60* 
-0.30 
-0.32 
0.62* 
-0.57* 
-0.01 
0.41 
1971-1980 
(N^=18) 
-0.44* 
-0.04 
0.27 
0.78* 
-0.32 
0.02 
0.52* 
1981-1990 
(N„,„=20) 
-0.38 
0.04 
0.43* 
0.78* 
-0.31 
0.12 
0.40* 
Note: * ρ < 0.05 
period and the mean values of the explanatory variables in that period. The zero-
order correlations calculated for all data over the periods defined are presented in 
Table 4.1. 
The pattern in the columns of Table 4.1 is quite consistent. Four country 
characteristics out of seven have significant effects on levels of class voting. These 
characteristics are income differences, union density, religious- and ethnic diversity, 
and the percentage of manual workers. Three of these effects are in the expected 
direction. As predicted, the higher the religious and ethnic diversity in a country, the 
lower the level of class voting. Similarly, the higher the union density in a country, 
the higher the level of class voting. In addition, as predicted, the higher the 
percentage of manual workers in a country, the higher the level of class voting. 
However, the effect of the extent of income differences is not as predicted. The 
negative sign of the correlation indicates that high income differences in a country 
are linked to low levels of class voting, a finding which is contrary to our 
hypothesis. 
Our three other explanatory variables give also results not fitting with the 
formulated hypotheses. The correlation between the percentage mobility and the level 
of class voting is only statistically significant in one out of the four periods, and 
even then the correlation has a sign that is in the opposite direction to what our 
hypothesis predicts. Furthermore, neither a country's standard of living, nor the 
extent to which class is an issue in a country's politics, offer a significant 
contribution to the explanation of differences in class voting across countries. 
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Table 4.2. Zero-order correlations between explanatory variables and the levels of 
class voting per country, 1945-1990 
Australia 
Austria 
Belgium 
Britain 
Canada 
Denmark 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Norway 
Portugal 
Spain 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
United States 
Standard of 
living 
-0.78* 
-0.73 
-0.44* 
-0.79* 
-0.06 
-0.74* 
-0.64 
-0.64* 
-0.85* 
0.35 
-0.01 
-0.67* 
-0.14 
0.09 
-0.89* 
0.22 
-0.25 
-0.92* 
0.10 
-0.46* 
Pere. 
mobile 
-0.72* 
-0.59 
0.25 
-0.80* 
-0.03 
-0.68* 
-0.45 
-0.58* 
-0.79* 
-
-0.14 
-0.59* 
-
-0.11 
-0.63* 
-
-0.22 
-0.88* 
-
-0.37* 
Union 
density 
-0.10 
0.69 
-0.37* 
-0.37* 
-0.05 
-0.81* 
-0.78 
0.55* 
-0.19 
0.32 
0.30 
-0.31 
-0.04 
0.32* 
-0.39 
-
0.22 
-0.80* 
-0.50 
0.39* 
Pere. 
manual 
0.65* 
0.38 
0.02 
0.72* 
0.05 
0.59* 
0.52 
0.09 
0.69* 
-0.66* 
0.35 
0.40* 
-0.18 
0.11 
0.85* 
-0.29 
-0.28 
0.90* 
0.08 
0.45* 
N. of cases 
17 
5 
20 
30 
13 
29 
5 
25 
25 
10 
18 
20 
17 
25 
11 
5 
6 
12 
4 
27 
Note: * ρ < 0.05 
Explaining trends within countries 
We next tried to explain trends within countries using zero-order correlations. 
However, before looking at these correlations, a remark about the actual scores on 
the explanatory variables is necessary. Our hypotheses do not distinguish between 
explaining differences in the course of time and explaining differences across 
countries. Thus, on theoretical grounds, all explanatory factors can be expected to 
explain both differences between countries and trends within countries. In fact, 
however, the scores of some of our explanatory variables hardly show any variation 
within countries. As the figures in Table A.l in Appendix A make clear, the 
measures for religious and ethnic diversity, and for class as an issue are almost 
constant over-time within each country. In addition, our measure of income 
differences comes from one source, and has a very small variation. Thus, knowing 
that levels of class voting changed substantially over-time, these variables cannot 
explain developments in the levels of class voting within countries. Consequently, 
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we cannot test the hypotheses that trends in the levels of class voting within 
countries can be explained by trends in the levels of religious and ethnic diversity, 
the prominence of class as an issue and the extent of income differences in these 
countries. 
. The zero-order correlations between the levels of class voting of countries at a 
given point in time, and the values of the remaining explanatory factors - standard 
of living, percentage mobile, percentage manual workers and union density - at that 
time, are presented in Table 4.2.2 This shows that the correlations between standard 
of living, percentage of mobility, and size of the manual class at various times and 
the level of class voting at these times are, for almost every country, in the expected 
direction and often significant: the higher the standard of living in a country, the 
higher the percentage mobile, and the lower the percentage of manual workers, the 
lower the level of class voting in that country. Thus, three of our hypotheses are 
corroborated by these zero-order correlations. However, the effect of union density 
on the level of class voting at a given point in time for any country is less clear. The 
coefficients in Table 4.2 show that in some countries a higher union density makes 
for a rise in the level of class voting, while in other countries it is accompanied by 
a decline in class voting. 
4.4 Modelling the effects of country characteristics 
To determine the extent to which a zero-order correlation between a country's 
characteristic and a country's level of class voting is spurious, multivariate analysis 
is needed. This allows us to control for the effects of other country characteristics. 
In this chapter we used a multivariate technique to analyse our dataset containing 
287 Thomsen indices over various year in sixteen countries out of the original 
twenty countries. This restriction was due to the fact that for four countries - Austria, 
Greece, Luxembourg, and Portugal - there were missing data on one or two of the 
explanatory variables (i.e. on income differences or percentage mobile). 
In this analysis, rather than more traditional techniques like OLS regression, we 
used so-called "multi-level" models, that distinguish between three levels, i.e. the 
individual-level, the year-level and the country-level. There were two reasons for 
this. First, the multi-level approach takes account of the layered character of our 
data. In our dataset, for each country there is information about class voting from 
various years. Compared to traditional techniques the multi-level method has the 
benefit that, by estimating separate year- and country-level errors, it adjust for the 
correlation of errors within years and within countries (Goldstein 1987). Second, the 
multi-level technique is able to deal with the different reliabilities of our measures 
of the level of class voting, i.e. the Thomsen indices.3 In our dataset some Thomsen 
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indices were calculated for class voting tables containing many respondents, while 
others were based on tables containing only a small number of respondents. By 
including an individual-level in a multi-level model the Thomsen indices from small 
surveys were given less weight than those from large surveys. 
Some additional explanatory remarks are required about the multi-level models we 
used to test our hypotheses. These hypotheses pertain to three types of effects: (1) 
the effect of an individual's social class on the log-odds of voting for a left-wing 
rather than a right-wing political party in a certain country and a certain year, (2) 
year-level effects on the level of class voting within a specific country, (3) country-
level effects on cross-country differences in the level of class voting.4 An advantage 
of the multi-level approach was that regression equations corresponding to these 
three effects could be estimated simultaneously. 
At the individual-level, for each individual i in year j and country k, the log-odds 
of voting for a left-wing rather than a right-wing party was given by: 
logttTfLefvyU - 7i*Left,jk)) = β № + ß.Jk Manual classljk + e,jk (1) 
where the variable for the voting behaviour of individuals, Left, is coded (1) when 
they vote for a left-wing party and (0) when they vote for a right-wing party. In this 
equation, the ßp^-parameter represents the log-odds for nonmanual workers of voting 
for a left-wing rather than a right-wing party. This parameter is taken as random at 
both higher levels. Thus, it varies over countries and years, implying that the number 
of left-wing party adherents may differ between years and among countries.5 ß0jk is 
defined as a random parameter since our major concern is neither with the voting 
behaviour of the manual class as such nor with that of the nonmanual class per se. 
Instead, we are predominantly interested in the differences in voting between these 
two classes. The ß)jk coefficient in the individual-level equation represents the 
difference in voting behaviour between the manual and the nonmanual class. This 
ßljk coefficient is defined as the difference between the log-odds for manual workers 
of voting for a left-wing rather than a right-wing political party and the log-odds for 
nonmanual workers of voting for a left-wing rather than a right-wing party. As 
discussed in Chapter 2 of this study, this difference in log-odds for the manual and 
nonmanual class is equivalent to the Thomsen index. 
Since the major research aim in this chapter was to explain the differences in 
Thomsen indices across countries and between years within countries, the level of 
class voting within countries, indicated by the ßljk-parameter, was first predicted at 
the year-level by the following equation: 
ßijk = ßiok + ßno Std. of livingjk + ß120 Pere. Mobilejk + 
ß130 Union densityjk + ß140 Pere. Manualjk + yljk (2) 
Effects of Social and Political Characteristics of Countries 69 
This year-level equation does not contain all our explanatory variables. As we have 
already stated in the previous section of this chapter, some country characteristics -
income differences, religious and ethnic diversity, and class as an issue - did not 
show over-time variation. Consequently, it made no sense to include these 
characteristics in this year-level equation. Since the formulated hypotheses do not 
state that the strength of the effects of the country characteristics differ between 
countries, the ßI10 to ß140 coefficients in the year-level equation were constrained to 
be equal across countries. This implied that the effects of the explanatory variables 
on the levels of class voting were constant over the countries. Thus, in equation (2) 
it is only the intercept ß10k that has to be allowed to vary from country to country. 
The intercept parameter ß10k then serves as dependent variable in the country-level 
equation that uses the means per country of the explanatory variables as predictors:6 
Pit* = ßioo + ßioi Income diff.k + ß102 Std. of livingk + ß,03 Pere. Mobi^ + 
ß104 Union densityk + ß10J Religious and ethnic diversity,, + 
ß106 Class as an issue,, + ß107 Pere. Manualk +
 10к (3) 
In order to obtain sensible and interpretable parameter estimates, we had to make a 
decision on how to choose the location of the intercepts and the slopes in the multi­
level equations (see Bryk & Raudenbush 1992: 25-29). In this study we decided to 
centre the original within-country predictors in equation (2) around their country 
means. By doing so, the intercept-parameter in equation (2) - which is also the 
dependent variable in equation (3) - represented the mean level of class voting in 
each country in our dataset. A benefit of this centring strategy was that the 
explanatory variables at the year-level were uncorrelated with the between-country 
variance (cf. Ganzeboom et al. 1989: 36). 
4.5 Multivariate results 
To investigate to what extent social and political characteristics of countries explain 
over-time and between-country variation in class voting, we first examined how 
much variation there was in class voting. To do this we fitted a null multi-level 
model, which is the same as the model described7, but without including the listed 
explanatory variables. As mentioned before, the discussed multi-level model was 
applied to data for sixteen out of our original twenty countries. This was because for 
four countries - Austria, Greece, Luxembourg and Portugal - there were missing data 
on one or two of the explanatory variables (i.e. on income differences or percentage 
mobile). Table 4.3 contains the estimated parameter coefficients of this null model. 
The parameter estimates of interest are those pertaining to the variable Manual class. 
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The fixed effect-parameter of this variable indicates that the average of the Thomsen 
indices over all years and countries in the dataset has the value 0.887. Furthermore, 
the variance components pertaining to that variable show that the Thomsen index 
varies significantly both at the year-level (0.082) and at the country-level (0.168). In 
addition, these parameters show that of the total variance in Thomsen indices, the 
greatest variance, i.e. 0.168/(0.082 + 0.168), or 67 per cent, was across countries, 
with 33 per cent between years. 
Next, to investigate how much of the between-country and over-time variation in 
class voting can be explained by variation in social and political characteristics of 
countries, as a second step, we fitted the full multi-level model, including all 
explanatory variables.8 The estimated parameters of this model are presented in the 
last two columns of Table 4.3.9 The variance component parameters of this full 
model show that of the original variance in the Thomsen indices at the country-level 
(0.168 - 0.034)/0.168, or about 80 per cent, is explained by the included explanatory 
variables. Of the year-level variance (0.082 - 0.039)/ 0.082, or about 52 per cent, is 
explained. The parameters also indicate that significant variance at the year- and 
country-level exist in the full model.10 
However, our goal was not simply to determine the percentages of variance in class 
voting that could be explained by variation in the social and political characteristics 
of the countries, we also and primarily aimed to test the formulated hypotheses. 
Therefore, next we examined the effects of the explanatory variables on the levels 
of class voting, as measured by the Thomsen index. These effects are represented by 
the fixed components presented in the last two columns of Table 4.3. The question 
is, to what extent do the parameters of these fixed components lend support to the 
formulated hypotheses? 
Explaining differences between countries 
Let us first review the seven hypotheses that have been modelled to explain 
differences between countries. To do this, we have to pay attention to the fixed 
components at the country-level in Table 4.3. The signs for two of the coefficients, 
i.e. for religious and ethnic diversity in a country and union density in a country, are 
significant and in the expected direction. Thus, two of our hypotheses are 
corroborated: the lower the religious and ethnic diversity, and the higher the 
percentage of union members in a country, the higher the level of class voting in that 
country. 
The two other promising candidates from the bivariate analyses - a country's 
income differences and the size of its manual class - are not statistically significant. 
Thus, their significant zero-order correlations have to be regarded as spurious given 
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Table 4.3. Parameter estimates of multi-level models explaining the levels of class 
voting in sixteen countries, 1945-1990 
Fixed components 
COUNTRY-LEVEL 
Manual*Income differences 
Manual*Std. of living 
Manual*Perc. mobile 
Manual*Union density 
Manual*Rel.-ethn. diversity 
Manual*Class as issue 
Manual *Perc. manual 
YEAR-LEVEL 
Manual*Std. of living 
Manual*Perc. mobile 
Manual*Union density 
Manual*Perc. manual 
INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL 
Constant 
Manual 
ßlOl 
ß.02 
ßl03 
ß.04 
ßlQS 
ßl06 
ß.07 
ßno 
ßl20 
ßl30 
ßl40 
ßoco 
ß.00 
Null model 
parameter 
-0.675* 
0.887* 
s.e. 
0.108 
0.105 
Full model 
parameter 
-0.068 
-0.016 
0.088* 
0.009* 
-0.227* 
-0.133 
0.003 
-0.076* 
-0.002 
-0.011* 
0.003 
-0.678* 
0.357 
s.e. 
0.038 
0.048 
0.030 
0.004 
0.091 
0.078 
0.013 
0.011 
0.009 
0.003 
0.003 
0.109 
1.629 
Variance components 
COUNTRY-LEVEL 
Constant 
Manual 
YEAR-LEVEL 
Constant 
Manual 
INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL 
Constant 
variO«*) 
аг(
 10к) 
var(Yo,k) 
var(Yljk) 
агСЕід) 
0.180* 
0.168* 
0.087*' 
0.082* 
0.066 
0.063 
0.008 
0.009 
0.181* 
0.034* 
0.087* 
0.039* 
1 
0.067 
0.014 
0.008 
0.005 
0 
Notes: * ρ < 0.05 
N = 431,424 individuals within 287 years within 16 countries. 
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their links with union density and religious and ethnic diversity and the connection 
between the last two factors and the level of a country's class voting. The standard 
of living factor and the factor of class as an issue had no effects in the Divariate 
analysis, and again have no effects in the multivariate analysis. 
Furthermore, in the multivariate analysis the coefficient for the effect of the 
percentage of mobile persons in a country does have a significant effect. Its sign 
indicates that the higher the percentage of mobile persons in a country, the higher 
the level of class voting in that country. This is evidence against the hypothesis 
stated in Section 2, and it suggests that assumptions used when deducing this macro-
hypothesis from micro-theory need to be revised. 
Explaining trends within countries 
When explaining the decline in class voting in most countries we adduced four 
factors. We hypothesized that if the standard of living in a country increases, the 
percentage of its population that is mobile grows, its union density descents, and the 
size of its manual class decreases, then the level of class voting in that country will 
decrease. In our multi-level model, of the four coefficients for these explanatory 
variables at the year-level, only the coefficients for the standard of living and union 
density factors differ significantly from zero. The coefficient for standard of living 
is in the expected direction, but the sign of the coefficient for union density is not. 
Furthermore, on the basis of the multivariate multi-level analyses, the hypotheses 
concerning the effects of the percentage of mobile and percentage of manual workers 
on levels of class voting have to be rejected. 
A surprising result of our analyses is that the sign of the coefficient pertaining to 
union density at the year-level is in the unexpected direction. This result implies that 
the higher the level of union density in a country becomes, the lower the level of 
class voting in that country becomes. The figures on union density in Table A.l in 
Appendix A, hint at an explanation for this unexpected finding. The listed 
percentages indicate that in most countries the union density has been relatively 
stable over-time, but that in Denmark, Finland and Sweden, substantial changes in 
union density have occurred. In these countries, the levels of union density were high 
to begin with, and increased over the period under investigation. For example, in 
Sweden the percentage of the labour force that belonged to a union, increased from 
62 per cent in 1950 to 93 per cent in 1990. Therefore, it is plausible that the growth 
in union density was not only a growth in density among manual workers, but 
disproportionably one among nonmanual workers. This might explain, under the 
assumption that nonmanual class workers who are union members are more likely 
to vote for a left-wing party than nonmanual class workers who are not union 
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members, why the growth of union density led to a decline in the level of class 
voting in these countries. In the theoretical section of this chapter, when deriving 
macro-hypotheses from individual hypotheses, we already hinted that the relationship 
between union membership and class voting was not straightforward. 
In concluding our presentation of the coefficients from the multi-level models, we 
should add one further piece of evidence. Applying multi-level models, we tested the 
hypothesis that the higher the standard of living in a country at a certain point in 
time, the lower that country's level of class voting at that time. An extra prediction 
that can be deduced in line with this hypothesis, states that in countries where the 
standard of living rose more sharply than in other countries, the levels of class 
voting dropped more strongly. A test of this prediction is not superfluous since we 
found a decrease in the level of class voting for most countries. Furthermore, we 
know that the standard of living in a country is positively correlated with time." 
Evidence bearing on the prediction that larger rises in the standard of living in a 
country lead to more marked declines in class voting in that country, is presented in 
Table 4.4. In this table we present the linear trend-parameter in the level of class 
voting, in the standard of living, in the percentage of manual workers, in the 
percentage of intergenerational mobile and in union density in all twenty countries. 
The trend-parameters for the level of class voting are, of course, the same as those 
presented in Table 3.3 in Chapter 3. If our prediction holds, we expect that the more 
positive the trend-parameters for standard of living are, the more negative the trend-
parameters for the level of class voting in this country will be. As expected, the 
correlations of the trend in standard of living with the trend in class voting takes the 
value -0.39 (p=0.04).12 This result therefore corroborates our hypothesis. The 
correlation between the trend-parameter of union density and that of the level of 
class voting also has a large negative value (-0.36; p=0.07). The correlations between 
the trend-parameter of the level of class voting and the trend-parameters of the two 
remaining explanatory variables, percentage manual (0.25; p=0.14) and percentage 
mobile (-0.04; p=0.44), do not significantly differ from zero. Concluding, this extra 
test confirms the results from the earlier analyses: the higher the standard of living 
in a country becomes, the lower the level of class voting becomes. Furthermore, 
these results confirm the idea that rising union density in some countries generated 
a decline in the level of class voting within these countries. 
4.6 Conclusions 
Recognizing that substantial differences in levels of class voting existed between 
countries and that declines in these levels occurred in most of the Western 
industrialized countries over the postwar period, in this chapter we aimed to test 
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explanations for this variation in levels of class voting. The specific explanations we 
tested were mainly suggested in studies that appeared during the first and second 
generation of research on stratification and politics. The general idea of these 
explanations was that variations in the social and political characteristics of countries 
were responsible for differences in levels of class voting between these countries and 
trends within these countries. The social and political characteristics suggested 
ranged from variations in ethnic diversity to rises in the general standard of living, 
to differences in the prominence of class issues in politics. However, until now these 
explanations had not been subjected to strong empirical tests of large datasets and 
using multivariate techniques. 
In this chapter we improved upon earlier studies by putting the suggested 
explanations to strong tests. On the basis of individual-level assumptions we 
formulated concrete hypotheses explaining the level of class voting in countries in 
terms of seven social and political characteristics of these countries. Subsequently, 
we tested these hypotheses using a dataset containing data for twenty Western 
industrialized countries and over numerous points in time in the period 1945-1990. 
This large dataset lessened the chance of not accepting hypotheses due to a lack of 
statistical power, when in reality these hypotheses hold. Furthermore, our large 
dataset allowed us to test hypotheses using multivariate techniques. The employed 
tests of the hypotheses resulted in somewhat different conclusions for explanations 
for between-country and over-time variation in class voting. 
When examining between-country variation, the test revealed that two out of the 
seven characteristics had a significant effect in line with what was expected by our 
hypotheses. First, the higher the religious and ethnic diversity among a country's 
population, the lower its level of class voting. Second, the higher the union density 
in a country, the higher the level of class voting in that country. Consequently, our 
analyses investigating differences across countries, suggested a rejection of the other 
five hypotheses. For four characteristics - a country's income differences, the size 
of the manual class, standard of living, and class as an issue - no significant effects 
were found. Of a fifth characteristic an effect was found that was significant, but in 
the unexpected direction: the higher the percentage of mobile persons in a country, 
the higher the level of class voting in that country. 
When investigating the extent to which changes over-time within countries could 
be explained by changes in the social and political characteristics within these 
countries, significant effects were found for only two factors. One was in the 
expected direction: the higher the standard of living in a country, the lower the level 
of^ss voting becomes in that country. The other was in the unexpected direction: 
the higher a country's union density, the lower the level of class voting becomes in 
that country. An additional analysis showed how a growth in union density could 
lead to a decline in the level of class voting, probably because of a rise in union 
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membership among nonmanual workers in some countries. 
The falsification of many of the hypotheses of this chapter, in our view, does not 
necessitate their outright rejection. In this chapter we sought to derive various 
specific macro-hypotheses from a single general individual theory. We did so to 
bring order into a seemingly unrelated list of hypotheses. Yet, this was not a goal 
in itself. When deriving macro-predictions from micro-statements, additional 
assumptions were made. In some cases these assumptions appeared plausible. In 
other cases they seemed less so. For example, we made the assumption that as the 
overall union density in a country increases, the density among manual workers 
increases to more or less the same degree as that among members of the nonmanual 
classes. We have already provided some indication that this assumption might be 
wrong. We would like to stress that where hypothesis testing indicates that a derived 
hypotheses can not pass an empirical test, such an outcome does not require the 
outright rejection of the general theory. We would say that the general theory is 
needed to suggest ways in which our specific hypotheses might be amended. A 
rejection of derivations thus supports the goal of building a complete theory, because 
it suggests the limits of current specific hypotheses. An occasionally forgotten goal 
in deriving current macro-hypotheses from corroborated micro-statements is to find 
conditions under which these macro-hypotheses might not hold. In fact, such 
conditions form the bridge between micro- and the macro-levels of analysis 
(Silverman 1991; Pammett 1991). 
To make progress on the existing literature on stratification and politics, we 
continue by focusing on two explanations for variation in countries' levels of class 
voting that apply such a macro-micro-macro link. When doing so, we remain firmly 
within a class perspective. We do so, not only because a fullblooming alternative 
perspective explaining the findings of differences between countries and trends 
within countries seems to be lacking.13 We also do so, because a refutation of the 
hypothesis that a person's social class - measured in a certain way - displays in all 
Western industrialized countries in all elections the same relationship with voting -
calculated in a certain way -, does not imply the abandonment of a class perspective. 
It may be that the specific assumptions behind the measurement of class may be at 
fault. These assumptions may have their shortcomings, because the strength of the 
relationship between class and voting has been determined using the wrong analytical 
techniques. Furthermore, the assumptions may be flawed, because it is not only a 
person's own social class that influences that person's vote, but also the class of that 
person's significant others, such as parents. 
It is in this spirit that in Chapter 5 we focus on the effects of varying composition 
of the manual and nonmanual classes on class voting. This class composition 
explanation implies the micro-level assumption that the voting behaviour of 
individuals can be explained by their membership of a sub-class of the manual or 
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nonmanual class. Furthermore, the explanation invokes the bridge-assumption, or 
condition, that the countries differ in the composition of the manual and nonmanual 
class. If both the micro- and bridge assumptions hold, then the macro-level effect of 
the composition of the manual and nonmanual classes on the level of class voting 
in that country, might be in order. 
In Chapters 7, 8 and 9 of this study we pay attention to the macro-micro-macro 
explanation of variation in class voting which invokes rates of intergenerational class 
mobility as an explanatory variable. (Erikson & Goldthorpe 1992: 380-381). Macro-
statements such as "the more mobility within a country, the lower this country's 
level of class voting" leave the individual mechanism by which mobility has its 
effects unspecified, but hint at several quite different mechanisms. It may be that 
mobile individuals display voting behaviour which is different from that of stable 
individuals; it also may be the case that the voting behaviour of stable individuals 
in a society with more mobility differs from the voting behaviour of stable 
individuals in a society with less mobility (cf. De Graaf & Ultee 1990; De Graaf et 
al. 1995). In the first instance, aggregating a statement with individuals as units and 
using the absolute properties of these individuals, yields a macro-hypothesis like the 
one tested in this chapter; in the second instance the statement to be aggregated also 
has individuals as units but this statement involves contextual characteristics of these 
individuals. Again, such statements form an attractive bridge between micro- and 
macro-levels of analysis. 

5 Effects of Composition of Manual and 
Nonmanual Classes on 
Manual/nonmanual Class Voting 
5.1 Introduction1 
In this chapter we once more address a question on the relationship between 
stratification and voting behaviour. In previous chapters concerning this 
relationship, we used a manual/nonmanual class dichotomy when measuring 
levels of class voting. In Chapter 3, we found trends in levels of class voting 
within most countries and substantial differences in these levels between 
countries. In Chapter 4, we tested, using multivariate analysis, several macro 
hypotheses explaining these trends and differences, and suggested that it would be 
worthwhile to re-examine the individual hypotheses behind these macro 
hypotheses. Indeed the way the first generation ascertained a country's level of 
class voting presupposes such an individual hypothesis. It states that a person's 
vote depends upon this person's belonging to either the manual or the nonmanual 
class, with the implicit assumption that these classes are internally homogeneous 
or that the sizes their "sub-classes" have not changed or do not differ between 
countries. 
In the present chapter we focus on an explanation of varying levels of class 
voting that goes back to the individual-level and invokes a more detailed 
individual hypothesis than the one behind our indices of a country's level of class 
voting. This class composition explanation - as we call it - was already hinted at 
in studies of the first generation of research into social stratification and politics 
(Alford 1963; Lipset 1960), and was fully stated in studies of the third generation 
(Heath et al. 1991; Goldthorpe 1994; Hout et al. 1994).2 The class composition 
explanation holds that the voting behaviour of an individual can be explained in 
terms of that individual's membership of a sub-class of the manual or nonmanual 
class. The explanation furthermore holds that there are differences in the 
composition of the manual and nonmanual classes between countries and periods. 
Therefore, variations in levels of class voting found between countries or between 
periods, when using a manual and nonmanual class distinction might, to some 
extent, be explained by variations in the composition of the manual and the 
nonmanual classes. For example, when the relative size of the skilled manual 
worker group increases while that of the unskilled manual workers decreases, and 
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when - as generally is the case - skilled workers are less left-wing than unskilled 
workers, then the manual class as a whole will become more right-wing, and a 
decline of manual/nonmanual class voting would be registered. This decline 
would then not be due to a process of class dealignment, but solely due to a class 
composition effect. A similar argument can be given to explain differences in 
levels of manual/nonmanual class voting between countries. The finding that in 
some countries the level of class voting is higher than in others might be due to 
the fact that in certain countries the proportion of unskilled manual workers 
within the manual class as a whole, is smaller than in other countries. 
In studies of the first generation of research on stratification and voting 
behaviour no comparable detailed class scheme was available to test the class 
composition explanation. Recent developments in measurement procedures in this 
research area, however, have made it possible to apply more detailed class 
schemes in cross-national or over-time comparative studies. One such class 
scheme is the so-called "EGP" class scheme, that was originally developed for 
class mobility research (Erikson et al. 1979; Erikson & Goldthorpe 1992), but can 
be applied in research on stratification and politics (Heath et al. 1985; Evans et 
al. 1991). This class scheme distinguishes between class members that have 
distinct interests (Evans 1992) and consequently might be expected to have 
different voting behaviour (Evans et al. 1989). The EGP classification, as outlined 
in Chapter 2, divides the manual classes into the skilled manual class, the 
unskilled manual class, and the agricultural workers class, and the nonmanual 
class into the service class, the routine nonmanual class, the petty bourgeoisie, 
and farmers. 
Using this EGP classification, we test the class composition explanation for 
variation in class voting, by addressing the following question: To what extent 
can differences across democratic industrialized countries and changes within 
these countries in levels of class voting, when measured by the 
manual/nonmanual class distinction, be explained by differences between these 
countries and changes within these countries in the composition of the manual 
and the nonmanual classes? 
When addressing this question we analyse survey data from many countries and 
from various years over a substantial period, that contain information about 
respondents' occupations such that it is possible to classify respondents into the 
detailed EGP classes. For this study, as discussed in Chapter 2, we collected such 
surveys and merged these into a single datafile. It is this datafile on individual 
respondents from 113 surveys held in sixteen countries covering the period 1956-
1990, that is analysed in this chapter. From these data we selected male 
respondents aged eighteen years or older who had a valid score on class and 
voting behaviour. These restrictions left us with a total of 75,783 respondents. 
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The outline of this chapter is as follows. In Section 2, we discuss relevant 
characteristics of the sub-classes. Furthermore, we formulate and test hypotheses 
on the voting behaviour of the EGP classes. In Section 3, we investigate the 
extent to which changes in the composition of the manual and nonmanual classes 
have occurred, and the extent to which cross-country differences exist. Thereafter, 
in Section 4, we answer the central question of this chapter, i.e. we examine the 
extent to which variations in levels of manual/nonmanual class voting can be 
explained by variations in the composition of the manual and nonmanual classes 
in these countries and periods. In Section 5 we discuss the results. 
5.2 Sub-classes and their voting behaviour 
Before investigating the extent to which differences in the composition of the 
manual and nonmanual class can account for differences in the levels of class 
voting, we test the hypothesis that the voting behaviour of the various sub-classes 
of the manual and nonmanual class differs. This is of relevance, because if these 
sub-classes did not differ in voting behaviour, variations in the class composition 
would not be able to explain variations in class voting. Therefore, some relevant 
characteristics of the classes that can be distinguished according to the EGP class 
scheme are discussed. On the basis of these characteristics predictions about the 
voting behaviour of the classes are specified. A summary of the main 
characteristics of the sub-classes and their expected voting behaviour is presented 
in Table 5.1. 
Following Goldthorpe, the main interests of EGP class members can be traced 
back to their conditions of employment stipulated in their labour contracts (see 
Goldthorpe 1982; Erikson &. Goldthorpe 1992). This leads to several 
characteristics that are pertinent to the voting behaviour of members of the 
different classes. These include the amount of income, the degree of occupational 
security (unemployment prospects, sick pay regulations, promotional aspects, 
etcetera), the collectivistic possibilities to strive for their interests, and the chances 
of inheriting capital (see also: Evans 1992; Heath et al. 1985). On the basis of 
these characteristics, members of the various EGP classes make the decision to 
vote for a specific political party. In this way we assume - as we did in Chapter 4 
- that voting behaviour has an economic purpose.3 People know on which side 
their bread is buttered, and they realize that they can benefit from voting for a 
party that has political goals nearest to their own economic interest. Members of a 
certain class therefore vote for the party that serves their class interests best. 
When doing so, class members can vote for left-wing and right-wing political 
parties. In general, left-wing parties are in favour of active redistribution of 
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Table 5.1. Characteristics and expected left-wing voting behaviour of EGP 
classes 
EGP classes Security Wages Collective Inherit Left-wing 
Action Voting 
Service class 
Routine nonmanual 
Petty bourgeoisie 
Farmers 
Skilled manual 
Unskilled manual 
Agricultural labourers 
++ 
+ 
-
-
-
— 
--
++ 
+ 
+-
+-
-
— 
--
+-
+-
-
-
+ 
+ 
+ 
wealth by central government, whereas right-wing parties are not (Lipset 1960). 
Furthermore, left-wing parties are more in favour of better occupational security 
regulations than are right-wing parties. The left-wing parties try to accomplish 
their preferred policies by raising taxes and by wage regulations. In addition, left-
wing parties are more in favour of collective organizations like labour unions, and 
of regulations on heritages than are right-wing parties. 
The main economic interests of the EGP classes and the related policy 
preferences of left-wing and right-wing political parties allow us to make 
predictions about the voting behaviour of class members. In doing so, a major 
distinction between employer and employee classes should be recognized. 
Employer classes, i.e. the petty bourgeoisie and farmers, can be expected to 
have the least left-wing voting behaviour of all classes. On the basis of their 
interests, employers are not in favour of wage regulations beneficial to the non-
employer classes, have a high degree of occupational security, and strong 
possibilities for collective action among their employees in general. Furthermore, 
because left-wing parties strive for greater equality, they might do so by higher 
taxes on inheritances. Since the petty bourgeoisie and farmers in particular are 
inclined to donate their property to their children, members of these classes can 
be assumed to be opposed to left-wing parties. 
Employee classes can on the basis of their interests be expected to have more 
left-wing voting behaviour than employers. However, within the employee classes 
there are also significant differences in labour contracts and conditions of 
employment. Consequently, significant differences in voting patterns between the 
service class, manual working classes, and the routine nonmanual class can be 
expected. 
According to their interests, members of the service class are likely to be the 
most right-wing of the employee classes. Members of the service class enjoy 
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conditions of employment which are decidedly advantaged relative to those of 
other grades of employees, especially when viewed in lifetime perspective. The 
service class, therefore, has a substantial stake in the status quo. Thus, the 
expectation must be that this class will constitute an essentially conservative 
element within modem societies (Goldthorpe 1982: 179-80), and that members of 
this class are likely to vote for a right-wing political party. 
The manual classes (skilled, unskilled and agricultural labourers) can be 
expected to be the most left-wing. Their members have least occupational 
security, lowest wages, and consequently strongest incentives for collective action. 
Thus, it is in their interest to vote for parties that are in favour of a policy that is 
beneficial to them. Within the manual working classes, it can be expected that 
unskilled workers are more likely to vote for left-wing parties than are skilled 
workers. In general, the employment conditions of the unskilled are poor 
compared to those of the skilled manual workers. Furthermore, the skilled manual 
workers have higher job security, and better chances of getting a job when they 
are unemployed. However, Evans (1992) failed to find clear differences between 
the employment relations of skilled workers and unskilled workers in Britain. If 
this also holds for other countries, these classes can be expected to have similar 
voting behaviour. 
Special attention must be paid to the voting behaviour of agricultural labourers, 
whose voting behaviour is difficult to predict. In principle, agricultural labourers 
are in the same position as skilled or unskilled labourers. Therefore, they are 
expected to have left-wing voting tendencies. However, many agricultural 
labourers are sons of farmers, and some know that they will inherit their father's 
farm in the near future. Thus, agricultural labourers are a mixture of "real" 
agricultural labourers and (future) farmers. Here we are applying the idea that 
voting behaviour is not only based on present interests, but also on future 
interests. Thus, because it is the interest of farmer's sons that the state does not 
restrict inheritance possibilities, and because farmer's sons are likely to vote 
according to their future interests, the voting behaviour of agricultural labourers 
can be expected to be somewhere between that of "real" agricultural labourers and 
that of farmers. 
Finally, the employment conditions of the routine nonmanual class are between 
those of skilled manual workers and service class workers. The members of this 
class have levels of job security, and wages which in general are higher than 
those of skilled manual class members, but lower than those of service class 
members. Therefore, it can be anticipated that the voting patterns of the routine 
nonmanual class will be less left-wing than those of the skilled manual classes, 
and more left-wing than those of the service class. 
The next question is whether our predictions on the differences in voting be-
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haviour between the EGP classes can be confirmed empirically. To answer that 
question we examine the voting behaviour of the various EGP classes in our 
dataset. Therefore, in Table 5.2 the percentages of left-wing voters in the various 
EGP classes are presented for the sixteen countries and, where our dataset is 
sufficient, for four periods: 1956-1960, 1961-70, 1971-1980, and 1981-1990. We 
find that the voting behaviour of the unskilled and skilled manual classes is very 
similar in most of the countries. This hints at the fact that - similar to the 
situation in Britain as described by Evans (1992) - the employment relations of 
these two classes are not very different. However, the major conclusion that can 
be drawn is that substantial differences in voting behaviour exist between the 
other EGP classes. Agricultural labourers are in general less left-wing than 
unskilled and skilled manual workers. Their voting behaviour resembles that of 
the routine nonmanual class. The service class is significantly less inclined to vote 
for left-wing parties than is the routine nonmanual class. The voting behaviour of 
the petty bourgeoisie does not differ much from that of the service class. Only in 
Austria, Denmark and Germany are the petty bourgeoisie far more right-wing 
than the service class. Finally, the farming class by far contains the most right-
wing voters. Only in Canada and the United States are farmers relatively left-
wing. Thus, the conclusion is that in all countries and periods under investigation, 
the EGP classes differ substantially in their voting behaviour, and that in general 
the pattern of differences in voting behaviour between the EGP classes is like we 
expected. 
5.3 Variation in composition of manual and nonmanual classes 
Having established the expected differences in voting behaviour between the sub-
classes of the manual and nonmanual classes, it is of interest to pay attention to 
the composition of manual and nonmanual classes. In particular, we raise the 
question of whether cross-national differences in the composition of the manual 
and nonmanual classes have existed and whether changes have occurred in the 
countries under investigation. After all, if it is assumed that the composition of 
the manual and nonmanual classes did not vary at all, then any detected variation 
in manual/nonmanual class voting can not possibly be explained by the class 
composition explanation. 
In Table 5.3 the distributions of the EGP classes are presented over four 
periods for the various countries. Because we are interested in composition 
changes within the manual and within the nonmanual classes, the percentage 
figures for the unskilled, skilled, and agricultural labourers sum to 100. So do the 
percentages for the routine nonmanual, service class members, petty bourgeoisie 
Effects of Class Composition on Class Voting 87 
and farmers. According to the figures in Table 5.3, there are substantial 
differences between countries with respect to the composition of the manual and 
nonmanual classes. The composition of the manual class shows some variation 
with respect to the agricultural class, although the differences become smaller 
over-time. This percentage is largest in the earliest period in Italy, and is smallest 
in Switzerland and the United States. For Italy in the period 1961-1970, however, 
the percentage of agricultural workers (28 per cent) has to be considered as an 
outlier. This is probably due to the small number of cases in the data for Italy in 
that period. With respect to the unskilled and skilled manual classes, it can be 
seen that the Irish case is an extreme one, with only 38 per cent of manual 
workers in the skilled manual class and 55 per cent in the unskilled manual class. 
The other extreme is France were 77 per cent of manual workers are in the 
skilled manual class and only 19 per cent in the unskilled manual class. The 
composition of the nonmanual class differs mainly in the percentages of farmers 
and service class members. In Britain, Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Sweden and the United States, the service class forms the largest part of 
the nonmanual class. Furthermore, the farmers constitute a relatively large group 
in Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Ireland and Italy. 
In order to get an impression of the class-composition changes over-time in the 
composition of the manual and nonmanual classes, we present, in Table 5.4, 
summary measures for trends in the distribution of EGP classes within the manual 
and nonmanual classes.4 For every country a linear regression analysis was 
performed, where the percentages in a year were regressed on a variable "year". 
The obtained trend-parameters represent the change in the relative percentages of 
distribution per year. For example, a trend-parameter that has a value one, 
indicates that the relative size of that class grows by one per cent each year. 
Positive trend-parameters indicate a growth and negative trend-parameters a 
decline in the relative size of a class. Since only one survey was available for 
Belgium, Canada, and France, and since for Ireland only two surveys in 
successive years were accessible, no trend-parameters for these countries were 
estimated. 
The parameters in Table 5.4 show that within the nonmanual class the major 
change during the last decades has been the substantial growth of the service 
class. Furthermore, a decrease in the size of the farmer population has occurred in 
all countries. Except in Australia, Denmark, Ireland and Norway, there has also 
been a decline of the petty bourgeoisie. The picture for the routine nonmanual 
class is more mixed. With regard to the manual class, there has been a decrease 
in the percentage of agricultural labourers in almost all countries. For unskilled 
and skilled manual workers, the general picture is somewhat vague. 
Summarizing, it is clear that substantial differences between countries exist in 
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the composition of the manual and nonmanual classes. Countries differ partic-
ularly in the (relative) size of the farming and agricultural labourer groups. 
Furthermore, substantial changes have occurred in the composition of the manual 
and nonmanual classes during the past decades. Of these changes a growth of the 
service class and a decrease in the farming population are the most notable. Thus, 
these findings imply that it is possible that variation in the composition of the 
manual and nonmanual classes to some extent are responsible for variation in 
levels of manual/nonmanual class voting. 
5.4 Results 
To examine the extent to which variation in manual/nonmanual class voting can 
be explained by variation in the composition of the manual and nonmanual 
classes, we again analyse our dataset on individual respondents from sixteen 
countries over the years 1956-1990. 
To begin with we constructed two by two tables cross-classifying class 
(manual/nonmanual) by vote (left-wing/right-wing). On the basis of these class 
voting tables, Thomsen indices were calculated as measures of the strength of the 
relationship between class and vote. These observed Thomsen indices give us a 
picture of the differences between countries and the trends within countries in 
class voting. These indices are presented in column A of Table 5.5. We find that 
the observed Thomsen indices differ substantially between the countries. Because 
the same data are involved as in Table 3.2 and 3.4, we again find that the 
Scandinavian countries and Britain have the highest levels of class voting, 
whereas the United States has the lowest. In addition, we also find substantial 
within-country variance in levels of class voting, i.e. we find a declining trend in 
class voting within most countries. 
Explaining differences between countries 
Next, we address the research question central in this chapter, i.e. we investigate 
the extent to which differences in manual/nonmanual class voting between 
countries are due to differences in the composition of manual and nonmanual 
classes between these countries. The most obvious way to examine the link 
between the class compositions and the level of class voting in a country, is to 
directly link a single measure of a country's class composition with a single 
measure of class voting in that country. However, because differences might exist 
in the composition of both the manual and the nonmanual class, and since within 
92 Effects of Class Composition on Class Voting 
the manual and nonmanual class more than two classes can be distinguished, no 
single measure of a country's class composition is applicable. For this reason, 
following Heath and his colleagues (1985: 36) when they analysed the effects of 
changing class structures on the election results, we will do some simulations. 
These simulations take two consecutive steps. 
As a first step, we constructed two by two class voting tables and calculated 
the Thomsen indices of each year, assuming constant voting behaviour for the 
EGP classes across countries and time. To be able to do this we had to decide 
what voting behaviour of the EGP classes to choose as a baseline. To avoid 
dependence upon incidental changes we decided not to choose the voting 
behaviour of a single country in a specific period but rather the average voting 
behaviour of the EGP classes over all countries and years in our dataset. We 
already presented this average voting behaviour of the EGP classes in the bottom 
row of Table 5.2. The Thomsen indices obtained in this way are reported in 
column В of Table 5.5.5 The closer the Thomsen indices obtained in this first 
step are to the observed Thomsen indices, the more the varying composition of 
the EGP classes can be held responsible for differences in class voting between 
countries. These outcomes, however, do not tell us about the relative amount of 
variation that can be explained by variation in the class composition and variation 
in the voting behaviour of the EGP classes. 
Therefore, as a second step, we examine the extent to which variation in the 
voting behaviour of the EGP classes, controlling for variation in the composition 
of these classes, is responsible for variation in manual/nonmanual class voting. To 
do this, we calculated Thomsen indices under the assumption of constant sub­
class distributions over countries and time, but varying voting behaviour of the 
EGP sub-classes. As a baseline we chose the mean class distribution over all 
years and countries. The calculated Thomsen indices obtained from this analysis 
are presented in column С of Table 5.5. The closer the Thomsen indices obtained 
in this second step are to the observed Thomsen indices, the more the variation in 
voting behaviour of the EGP classes can explain variation in levels of class 
voting. Furthermore, if the Thomsen indices obtained in this second step are 
closer to the observed Thomsen indices than the Thomsen indices obtained in the 
first step, then the between-country variation in the composition of the manual 
and nonmanual classes explains to a lesser extent the between-country variation in 
class voting, than does the between-country variation in the voting behaviour of 
these sub-classes. 
When examining the relative contributions of the two factors in explaining the 
variation in levels of class voting between countries, we first take a superficial 
look at the entries in Table 5.5. Subsequently, to come to more quantitative 
conclusions, we apply linear regression to the entries of the table. 
Table 5.5. Observed and simulated levels of class voting (measured by Thomsen 
index) in sixteen countries, 1956-1990 
Australia 
Austria 
Belgium 
Britain 
Canada 
Denmark 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
1965 
1967 
1973 
1979 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1990 
1974 
1985 
1988 
1989 
1975 
1964 
1966 
1970 
1974 
1979 
1983 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1984 
1971 
1972 
1975 
1977 
1979 
1981 
1972 
1975 
1978 
1969 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1982 
1984 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1990 
Observed 
A 
1.43 
1.24 
1.62 
1.12 
0.79 
0.66 
0.90 
1.10 
0.89 
1.55 
1.30 
0.55 
0.97 
1.30 
1.83 
1.68 
1.48 
1.48 
1.29 
1.46 
1.51 
1.29 
1.33 
1.34 
1.01 
1.00 
0.23 
1.96 
2.77 
1.99 
2.13 
1.72 
2.11 
2.75 
1.69 
0.96 
0.84 
1.05 
0.93 
1.03 
0.94 
0.75 
0.80 
0.77 
1.01 
0.70 
0.50 
0.99 
0.58 
Between-country simulations 
Vote 
Constant 
В 
1.02 
0.99 
1.00 
0.94 
0.93 
0.91 
0.92 
0.94 
0.95 
1.10 
0.95 
0.98 
1.02 
0.83 
0.92 
0.90 
0.96 
0.93 
0.94 
0.94 
0.94 
0.96 
0.94 
0.94 
0.95 
0.95 
1.04 
1.00 
1.25 
1.09 
1.07 
1.06 
0.95 
1.26 
1.07 
1.01 
0.96 
0.91 
0.91 
0.89 
0.89 
0.90 
0.91 
0.92 
0.89 
0.90 
0.93 
0.89 
0.92 
О ass 
Constant 
С 
1.48 
139 
1.76 
1.06 
1.16 
1.00 
1.13 
1.39 
1.18 
1.52 
1.38 
1.04 
0.97 
-
2.03 
1.83 
IJ l 
1.72 
из 
1.84 
1.72 
1.27 
1.56 
1.32 
1.30 
1.25 
0.14 
. 
-
-
-
-
-
2.23 
1.74 
1.24 
1.18 
1.22 
1.19 
1.46 
1.14 
0.92 
1.02 
0.87 
1.43 
1.14 
0.77 
0.91 
0.84 
VoteÄ 
Class 
Constant 
D 
1.10 
1.10 
1.10 
1.10 
1.10 
1.10 
1.10 
1.10 
1.10 
1.10 
1.10 
1.10 
1.10 
1.10 
1.10 
1.10 
1.10 
1.10 
1.10 
1.10 
1.10 
1.10 
1.10 
1.10 
1.10 
1.10 
1.10 
1.10 
1.10 
1.10 
1.10 
1.10 
1.10 
1.10 
1.10 
1.10 
1.10 
1.10 
1.10 
1.10 
1.10 
1.10 
1.10 
1.10 
1.10 
1.10 
1.10 
1.10 
1.10 
Over-time simulations 
Vote 
Constant 
E 
1.26 
1.22 
1.20 
1.10 
1.11 
1.10 
1.09 
1.12 
1.13 
1.27 
1.04 
0.99 
1.14 
1.30 
1.33 
1.31 
1.38 
1.36 
1.36 
1.37 
1.38 
1.41 
1.38 
1.38 
1.39 
1.38 
0.23 
1.89 
2.48 
2.12 
2.03 
2.04 
1.80 
2.32 
1.92 
0.96 
0.89 
0.87 
0.86 
0.81 
0.81 
0.81 
0.81 
0.84 
0.80 
0.79 
0.80 
0.80 
0.85 
α ass 
Constant 
F 
1.34 
1.22 
1.61 
1.09 
0.84 
0.74 
0.94 
1.13 
0.83 
1.47 
1.43 
0.81 
0.94 
1.30 
1.89 
1.80 
1.45 
1.49 
1.30 
1.45 
1.50 
1.23 
1.32 
1.31 
0.99 
1.04 
0.23 
2.12 
2.26 
1.89 
2.18 
1.74 
2.36 
2.57 
1.86 
0.96 
0.73 
1.00 
0.89 
1.02 
0.95 
0.77 
0.81 
0.76 
1.03 
0.75 
0.48 
0.89 
0.56 
VoteÄ 
Class 
Constant 
G 
1.15 
1.15 
1.15 
1.15 
1.15 
1.15 
1.15 
1.15 
1.15 
1.14 
1.14 
1.14 
1.14 
1.30 
1.37 
137 
1.37 
1.37 
1.37 
1.37 
1.37 
1.37 
1.37 
1.37 
137 
1.37 
0.23 
2.05 
2.05 
2.05 
2.05 
2.05 
2.05 
2.08 
2.08 
0.96 
0.83 
0.83 
0.83 
0.83 
0.83 
0.83 
0.83 
0.83 
0.83 
0.83 
0.83 
0.83 
0.83 
Table 5.5. (Continued) 
Ireland 1989 
1990 
Italy 1968 
1975 
1985 
Netherland» 1970 
1971 
1972 
1974 
1976 
1977 
1979 
1981 
1982 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1989 
1990 
Norway 1965 
1972 
1977 
1981 
1985 
1989 
1990 
Sweden 1972 
1990 
Switzerland 1972 
1976 
United 1956 
Sutes 1958 
1960 
1964 
1966 
1968 
1970 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1980 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
19B7 
1988 
1989 
1990 
Observed 
A 
126 
109 
073 
085 
058 
104 
109 
081 
0 82 
094 
116 
1 12 
0 86 
077 
093 
076 
078 
0 80 
055 
185 
202 
136 
126 
149 
0 84 
073 
181 
098 
128 
122 
031 
0 57 
0 56 
101 
0 88 
061 
-0 53 
072 
059 
049 
056 
020 
094 
052 
048 
071 
059 
064 
032 
055 
0 38 
019 
022 
028 
Between-country simulations 
Vote 
Constant 
В 
1 11 
1 19 
0 82 
095 
001 
094 
096 
096 
090 
090 
090 
091 
0 89 
0 89 
090 
0 89 
091 
090 
090 
1 10 
108 
105 
100 
0 98 
099 
093 
101 
095 
100 
101 
107 
105 
104 
099 
101 
097 
100 
095 
096 
092 
094 
097 
097 
093 
0 % 
095 
095 
092 
096 
096 
095 
093 
094 
095 
Dass 
Constant 
С 
1 18 
0.58 
1 19 
1 12 
071 
из 
129 
101 
i 10 
141 
150 
1 14 
078 
136 
125 
101 
105 
1 17 
084 
177 
205 
142 
1 19 
129 
082 
090 
176 
1 16 
139 
155 
020 
0 59 
0 58 
104 
106 
0 81 
-055 
095 
071 
073 
088 
032 
078 
044 
0 73 
080 
068 
046 
0 36 
063 
040 
016 
015 
003 
Vote* 
Class 
Constant 
D 
110 
110 
1 10 
1 10 
1 10 
1 10 
110 
1 10 
1 10 
1 10 
1 10 
1 10 
1 10 
1 10 
no 
1 10 
110 
I 10 
1 10 
no 
no 
1 10 
1 10 
1 10 
1 10 
110 
1 10 
1 10 
110 
110 
1 10 
1 10 
1 10 
1 10 
no 
1 10 
1 10 
1 10 
no 
110 
1 10 
1 10 
1 10 
1 10 
1 10 
1 10 
1 10 
no 
1 10 
1 10 
1 10 
1 10 
1 10 
1 10 
Over-time simulations 
Vote 
Constant 
E 
105 
128 
0.59 
068 
069 
097 
100 
098 
090 
091 
090 
0 91 
0 89 
0 88 
0 88 
089 
089 
089 
0 88 
135 
133 
129 
124 
127 
129 
123 
161 
146 
1 19 
124 
045 
046 
042 
045 
045 
041 
043 
048 
0 47 
047 
047 
046 
048 
046 
046 
046 
046 
047 
049 
048 
0 48 
048 
047 
049 
Class 
Constant 
F 
132 
092 
091 
0 82 
061 
099 
099 
0 76 
0 82 
097 
1 18 
104 
0 85 
0 83 
093 
0 78 
0 81 
0 87 
059 
1 80 
188 
134 
127 
144 
0 83 
0 77 
174 
103 
130 
1 18 
0 37 
061 
065 
102 
0 86 
0 65 
-058 
0 68 
0 58 
049 
061 
017 
092 
050 
0 53 
069 
060 
062 
034 
0 55 
0 37 
018 
019 
024 
Vote* 
Class 
Constant 
G 
1 15 
115 
065 
065 
065 
091 
091 
091 
091 
091 
0 91 
0 91 
091 
0 91 
091 
091 
091 
091 
091 
129 
129 
129 
129 
129 
129 
129 
154 
154 
121 
121 
046 
046 
046 
046 
046 
046 
046 
046 
046 
046 
046 
046 
046 
046 
046 
046 
046 
046 
046 
046 
046 
046 
046 
046 
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A visual inspection of Table 5.5 reveals that the Thomsen indices obtained in the 
first step show only a limited variation between countries. The Thomsen indices 
obtained in the second step show a similar pattern of variation between countries 
as the observed Thomsen indices. In addition, the Thomsen indices that were 
obtained in the second step (column C) are in general closer to the observed 
Thomsen indices (column A), than to the results obtained in the first step (column 
B). However, in Germany and in the Netherlands, the Thomsen indices in column 
В are more similar to the indices in column A than to those in column C. For 
these countries in all years the Thomsen indices in column С have a larger value 
than those in columns A and B. 
In order not to be too dependent on individual datasets and possible error in 
them, we present in Table 5.6 for each country the mean values of the calculated 
Thomsen indices of three periods: 1961-1970, 1971-1980, and 1981-1990. For 
these three periods we find that the mean of the Thomsen indices obtained under 
the assumption that voting behaviour was constant across the countries (and the 
EGP class distribution was allowed to vary), has a small level of variation across 
the countries. The mean of the Thomsen indices obtained when assuming the 
class distribution to be constant across countries (and the voting behaviour of the 
classes to differ), shows more variation across countries. More importantly, the 
Thomsen indices of the various countries, predicted under the assumption of 
constant class distribution, very much resemble the observed Thomsen indices, 
whereas the Thomsen indices predicted under the assumption of constant voting 
behaviour do to a much smaller extent. In other words, it seems that the 
differences between countries in the observed Thomsen indices can to a far 
smaller extent be explained by differences in the compositions of the manual and 
nonmanual classes in these countries, than by differences in the voting behaviour 
of the sub-classes between these countries. 
To quantify the relative contribution of both explanations in accounting for 
variations in class voting, we estimated parameters of a simple linear regression 
model on the entries of Table 5.6. To do this, we took for each period separately 
the observed Thomsen indices as the dependent variable, and the Thomsen indices 
obtained in the first and second step as explanatory variables: 
Observed Thomsen index = 
ß0 + ß,*(Thomsen index: Vote constant) + ß2*(Thomsen index: Class constant) 
The standardized parameter estimates β, and β2 then represent the relative effects 
of differences in class composition and of differences in voting behaviour on the 
differences in class voting between the countries. It is to be noted that due to the 
way we set up our analyses, these two effects together explain all variation in 
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levels of class voting between the countries. Therefore, it holds that the variation 
in the observed Thomsen indices between the countries can for (ß,/(ß,+ß2))*100 
per cent be explained by variation in class composition, and for (ß2/(ß,+ß2))*100 
per cent by variation in voting behaviour of the sub-classes. 
Analyses for the three periods demonstrate that in the period 1961-1970 a 
proportion of 0.315/(0.315+0.845), or 27 per cent of the variation in class voting 
was due to variation in class composition between the countries. For the period 
1971-1980 this was 0.240/(0.240+0.800), or 23 per cent, and for the last period 
0.438/(0.438+0.925), or 32 per cent.6 Conversely, in the three subsequent periods 
about 73 per cent, 77 per cent and 68 per cent of the variation in class voting 
between the countries can be explained by variation in the voting behaviour of 
the EGP classes between these countries. 
Thus, the conclusion is that of the total variation in levels of class voting 
between countries, when measured by the manual and nonmanual class 
distinction, on average about a quarter can be explained by variations in the 
composition of the manual and nonmanual classes between these countries. The 
remaining three-quarters of the variation in manual/nonmanual class voting 
between countries can be explained by differences between these countries in the 
voting behaviour of the sub-classes of the manual and nonmanual class. Thus, the 
claim by scholars of the third generation (Heath et al 1985; Hout et al. 1994), that 
the different levels of class voting found between countries, when measured by 
manual and nonmanual class distinction, to some extent are the result of 
differences in the class composition of the manual and nonmanual classes in these 
countries and not totally due to differences in the relationship between class and 
voting behaviour, seems to be correct. 
Explaining changes over-time 
We next investigated the extent to which changes in the composition of the 
manual and nonmanual classes are responsible for the observed decline in class 
voting within most countries, when employing the manual/nonmanual distinction. 
For this purpose we applied similar analyses as those used when investigating 
differences between countries. The contrast is that we now do not assume that 
voting behaviour and class distributions are constant over time and countries, but 
that voting behaviour and the EGP class distribution are constant over-time within 
countries. Doing so, we avoid confounding the effects of between-country and 
over-time variation in class composition. In fact, we followed the same idea as in 
Chapter 4, that years are nested within countries. 
Thus, as a first step Thomsen indices of each year were calculated, while 
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assuming constant voting behaviour over-time (not over countries) for the seven 
EGP categories. In order not to be dependent upon incidental changes we chose 
the average voting behaviour for each class in each country as a baseline. The 
calculated Thomsen indices obtained are presented in column E of Table 5.5. As 
a second step, we calculated Thomsen indices under the assumptions of varying 
voting behaviour but constant class distributions over-time. The average voting 
behaviour within each country was chosen as a baseline. The results are reported 
in column F of Table 5.5. 
If changes in the composition of the EGP classes are to a substantial extent 
responsible for changes in class voting within countries, we would expect the 
Thomsen indices obtained in the first step (column E) to be closer to the observed 
Thomsen indices, than the Thomsen indices obtained in the second step (column 
F). We find, however, that there is hardly any over-time variation in column E in 
Table 5.5 within countries, whereas we find much over-time variation in column 
F. This suggests that most of the over-time variation in observed levels of class 
voting is due to changes in the voting behaviour of the EGP classes, and only to 
a small extent, if at all, to changes in the composition of the manual and 
nonmanual classes. 
Just like for the between-country differences, we can quantify the extent to 
which the observed over-time variation in levels of manual/nonmanual class 
voting can be explained by variation in the class composition and by variation in 
the voting behaviour of the EGP classes. We take for each country separately the 
observed Thomsen indices as the dependent variable, and the Thomsen indices 
obtained in the first and second step as explanatory variables.7 We find in the 
nine countries where we have data from more than two points in time, that 
changes in the class composition to some extent explain changes in levels of 
manual/nonmanual class voting: In Australia the over-time variation in the 
composition of the manual and nonmanual classes explains 12 per cent of the 
over-time variation in the levels of class voting within that country. In Austria it 
explains 31 per cent of the variation in class voting, in Britain 17 per cent, in 
Denmark 52 per cent, and in Germany 18 per cent. Furthermore, the over-time 
variation in the class composition explains 41 per cent of the variation in class 
voting in Italy, 20 per cent of the variation in the Netherlands, 3 per cent in 
Norway, and 5 per cent in the United States. Thus, we can conclude that on 
average changes in levels of class voting within countries, when measured by the 
manual and nonmanual class distinction, can for about a fifth be explained by 
changes in the composition of the manual and nonmanual classes within these 
countries. The remaining four-fifths of the over-time variation in levels of 
manual/nonmanual class voting within countries is due to changes in the voting 
behaviour of the sub-classes of the manual and nonmanual class. 
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5.5 Conclusions 
In the first and second generation of research on the relationship between class 
and voting behaviour, studies appeared that used the Alford index as a measure of 
the level of class voting in a country. This index examines the absolute 
differences in voting behaviour between the manual and the nonmanual class in a 
country at a certain point in time. Scholars from the third generation have raised 
two points of criticism on the use of this strategy. First, they argue that one 
should not focus on absolute differences in voting behaviour between classes, but 
on relative differences. In Chapter 3, we paid attention to this criticism and 
examined the relative levels of class voting, using the log-odds-ratio. We 
concluded that this criticism was right in itself, but that descriptions with both 
measures yielded about the same results. A second point of criticism on the 
traditional research strategy was on the use of a dichotomous class scheme. When 
applying the manual/nonmanual class distinction in studies of the first generation, 
substantial variations in the levels of class voting across countries and over-time 
within countries were found. Scholars from the third generation claimed that this 
variation might to some extent not be due to real variation in the strength of the 
relationship between class and voting behaviour, but due to variation in the 
composition of the manual and nonmanual classes. 
In this chapter we tested the hypothesis embedded in this second criticism. We 
investigated the extent to which the variations in class voting can be explained by 
differences and changes in the composition of the manual and nonmanual classes. 
It was presumed that the manual and the nonmanual classes can be divided into 
sub-classes according to the so-called "EGP" class scheme. 
The main finding in this chapter was that between-country and over-time 
variation in the levels of class voting can to some extent be explained by 
variation in the composition of the manual and nonmanual classes. In general, 
around one quarter of the variation across democratic industrialized countries in 
levels of class voting, when measured by the manual/nonmanual class distinction, 
could be explained by differences between these countries in the composition of 
the manual and the nonmanual classes, when distinguishing between seven EGP 
classes. Our analyses showed that in the period 1961-1970 about 27 per cent, in 
the period 1971-1980 about 23, and in the period 1981-1990 about 31 per cent of 
the differences in class voting between countries could be explained by 
differences in the composition of the manual and nonmanual classes between 
countries under investigation. 
Furthermore, our analyses yielded the conclusion that on average around a fifth 
of the over-time variation within democratic industrialized countries in levels of 
class voting, when measured by the manual/nonmanual class distinction, could be 
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explained by over-time variations within these countries in the composition of the 
manual and the nonmanual classes, when distinguishing seven EGP classes. In 
Denmark and Italy we found the highest percentage of variance explained, i.e. 
more than 40 per cent. In Norway and the United States only about 5 per cent 
could be explained. These results then indicate that scholars of the third 
generation were right, when they claimed that not all variation detected when 
examining manual/nonmanual class voting, was due to variation in the strength of 
the relationship between class and voting behaviour. 
However, our findings also imply that differences and changes in the voting 
behaviour of the EGP classes do appear to be the foremost causes of variations in 
class voting. Our results imply that in general a substantial part (i.e. more than 
three-quarters) of the variation in class voting is due to "real" changes in the 
strength of the relationship between class and voting behaviour. This then makes 
it of interest to address once more our descriptive question on the differences 
between countries and trends within countries in class voting, but now measured 
by the EGP class scheme, and therefore controlling for variation in the 
composition of the manual and nonmanual classes. 
6 Description of EGP Class Voting 
6.1 Introduction' 
Traditionally, in studies on stratification and politics, substantial differences in the 
levels of class voting between Western industrialized countries have been found, 
when distinguishing between manual and nonmanual classes. The Scandinavian 
countries show the highest levels of class voting, and the United States and 
Canada the lowest. Furthermore, when using the manual and nonmanual class 
distinction, declines in the levels of class voting have been found in most of the 
Western industrialized countries in the postwar period. Indeed, in Chapter 3 of 
this study we confirmed the results of these traditional studies of the first 
generation of research on stratification and politics. 
However, in studies of the third generation the manual/nonmanual class scheme 
has been criticized as too crude to be useful in descriptive studies on class voting. 
In these studies it has been argued that when a more detailed class scheme - like 
the EGP class scheme - is used, descriptive studies on levels of class voting 
might result in different conclusions. This argument has been given some merit 
by the results of the previous chapter. In that chapter we found that in general 
about a quarter of the between-country and about a fifth of the over-time 
variation in manual/nonmanual class voting was due to variation in the 
composition of the manual and the nonmanual classes. Thus about three-quarters 
of the between-country variation in manual/nonmanual class voting was due to 
"real" variation in the strength of the relationship between class and voting 
behaviour, and four-fifth of the over-time variation. 
In this chapter we readdress our descriptive research questions on the between-
country and over-time variation in levels of class voting, but now while 
employing a detailed class scheme and techniques of analyses that are typical for 
the third generation. We address the following question: To what extent did the 
levels of class voting, when measured by EGP classes, differ across democratic 
industrialized countries in the postwar period?, and: To what extent was there a 
decline in the levels of class voting, when measured by EGP classes, in these 
countries over that period? 
The answers to these questions are of interest in themselves. However, we are -
of course - also interested in the extent to which the variation in levels of EGP 
class voting differs from the variation in manual/nonmanual class voting found in 
Chapter 3. For example, it is of interest to examine whether the ranking of 
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countries with respect to their levels of class voting, when measured by EGP 
classes, is the same as the ranking when investigating the levels of 
manual/nonmanual class voting. In addition, it is of interest to examine whether 
the same countries show a decline in class voting. The results of Chapter 5 
indicated that about four-fifths of the over-time variation in manual/nonmanual 
class voting was due to changes in the strength of the relationship between class 
and voting behaviour, but the analyses in that chapter did not show in which 
direction these changes were. Furthermore, in this chapter we test whether the 
speed of decline differs for manual/nonmanual and EGP class voting. 
In addressing the formulated research questions, this chapter is one of a 
growing list of studies addressing such descriptive questions. Since the beginning 
of the third generation, scholars have been using detailed class schemes, focusing 
on relative levels of class voting, and applying appropriate techniques to 
investigate the relative levels of class voting. The present study distinguishes 
itself from earlier studies by its scope. So far studies in the third generation have 
predominantly focused on trends in class voting within a single country. For 
example, Evans et al. (1991) and Heath et al. (1995) analysed data for Britain. 
They found no trend, but only trendless fluctuation in the level of class voting. 
Hout et al. (1994) came to a similar conclusion for the United States when 
applying a detailed class scheme. Furthermore, Weakliem & Heath (1994b) found 
little evidence of a continuing decline of class voting in Britain, France, and the 
United States. The aim of this chapter is not only to examine the existence of 
trends in EGP class voting in single countries, but also to study differences in 
class voting across many countries, and to compare the speed of the trends in 
class voting that occurred within these countries. 
To answer the questions posed in this chapter, we use the same data as in the 
previous chapter. These pertain to 75,783 male respondents aged eighteen years or 
older from 113 surveys held in sixteen countries and covering the period 1956-
1990. For all years in each country for which data were available, cross-
tabulations of the EGP classes versus voting behaviour were constructed. 
According to the EGP classification seven class categories were distinguished, i.e. 
service class, routine nonmanual class, petty bourgeoisie, farmers, skilled manual 
workers, unskilled manual workers, agricultural labourers. For voting behaviour 
the traditional categories left-wing and right-wing were distinguished. Since for 
some years in some countries several surveys were available, this resulted in 103 
class voting tables that are analysed in the present chapter. 
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a description of the 
differences in voting behaviour between classes in the various countries during 
the postwar period, based on a visual inspection of tables. Section 3 discusses 
specific models that we apply to describe the levels of class voting, when using 
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the EGP class scheme. By using these models, Section 4 describes differences 
across countries and trends within countries in EGP class voting. Section 5 
compares the levels and trends in EGP class voting with the levels and trends in 
manual/nonmanual class voting. In the last section, Section 6, the results are 
discussed. 
6.2 Differences in voting behaviour between EGP classes 
When using the manual/nonmanual class distinction in this study, the log-odds-
ratio (which we called the Thomsen index) is used to measure differences in 
voting behaviour between the manual and nonmanual classes in a country. As 
suggested by, among others, Heath et al. (1985) and Hout et al. (1994), the log-
odds-ratio can also be applied to assess differences in voting behaviour between 
classes, using a more detailed class scheme. When analysing these tables the 
advantages of log-odds-ratios become more clear. When investigating levels of 
class voting using EGP classes, the distribution of the classes and the voting 
behaviour are regularly far more skewed than 25:75. Thus, when applying EGP 
classes, the advantages of the log-odds-ratio over the Alford index as explained in 
Chapter 2 are clear. 
In Table 6.1 we present log-odds-ratios representing the differences in voting 
behaviour between the EGP classes for sixteen countries and for four periods. To 
compute these log-odds-ratios we first calculated the mean percentage of left-
wing voters per EGP class in each period based on our survey data, i.e. within 
each period we took the weighted mean of the percentages of the surveys in that 
period. Consequently, surveys with a small number of respondents were less 
heavily weighted than surveys with many respondents. This had the benefit that 
the results were not too much dependent on data from a single small survey. The 
calculated percentages of left-wing voters per class were already presented in the 
previous chapter, i.e. in Table 5.2. On the basis of these presented percentages, 
we computed the log-odds-ratios. These log-odds-ratios are listed in Table 6.1, 
where the classes are ordered from the generally most left-wing class, the 
unskilled manual workers, to the typically least left-wing class, the farmers. When 
calculating the log-odds-ratios, the unskilled manual class was chosen as the 
reference category. Consequently, the calculated log-odds-ratios represent the 
difference in voting behaviour between the unskilled manual class and the other 
classes.2 
Let us first get some overall idea of the differences in voting behaviour 
between EGP classes. Therefore, we present in the bottom row of Table 6.1 log-
odds-ratios that are based on all respondents in all countries and periods in our 
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dataset. In this way these log-odds-ratios represent the mean differences in voting 
behaviour between the EGP classes in all countries and years under investigation. 
The figures in this bottom row show that on average the difference in voting 
behaviour between the two most left-wing classes - the unskilled and the skilled 
manual classes - can be represented by a log-odds-ratio of 0.06. Thus, in general 
these classes have about the same voting behaviour. The difference in voting 
behaviour between the unskilled manual class and the service class is represented 
by a log-odds-ratio of 1.00. Furthermore, the log-odds-ratio for the difference 
between the two classes with the most different voting behaviour - the unskilled 
manual class and the farmers - has the value 1.77. The log-odds-ratio for the 
difference between the service class and the farmers can be calculated by 
subtracting from the log-odds-ratio for the difference between the unskilled 
manual class and the farmers (1.77), the log-odds-ratio for the difference between 
the unskilled manual class and the service class (1.00). Thus, this log-odds-ratio 
has the value 0.77. 
In the other rows of Table 6.1, the log-odds-ratios represent the differences in 
the voting behaviour of the unskilled manual class and the other EGP classes, 
separately for each country and period under investigation. These figures reveal 
that the differences between the classes vary substantially from country to 
country. For example, in Norway during the period 1971-80 the difference 
between the most left-wing class and the most right-wing class, that is between 
the unskilled manual workers and the farmers, is 2.75, while in the United States 
for the same period the difference between these classes is only 0.97. Differences 
between the other classes are also larger in Norway than in the United States. 
The figures in Table 6.1 also give a global indication that a decline occurred in 
class voting within some countries. This can be made clear by examining the 
differences in voting behaviour between the unskilled manual class and the 
service class. In many countries, i.e. in Australia, Britain, Italy, Netherlands, 
Norway, and Sweden, the log-odds-ratios for the more recent periods are smaller 
than those for the earlier periods. 
However, the log-odds-ratios in Table 6.1 are insufficient to conclude that a 
general decrease in class voting has occurred within these countries. Examining 
so many log-odds-ratios to investigate the extent to which the overall levels of 
class voting differ between countries and over-time, is inconvenient. As already 
discussed in Chapter 2, Hout et al. (1994: 20), therefore, have suggested using the 
standard deviation of the log-odds-ratios measuring the difference in voting 
behaviour between the classes, as a measure of the overall level of class voting in 
a country in a certain year. They labelled this measure the kappa index. The 
higher the value of the kappa index, the more the sub-classes differ in their voting 
behaviour. Or in other words, the higher the value of the kappa index, the higher 
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Table 6.2. Levels of class voting (measured by kappa index) in sixteen countries, 
1961-1990 (individual dataset) 
Australia 
Austria 
Belgium 
Britain 
Canada 
Denmark 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Ireland 
Italy 
Netherlands 
Norway 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
United States 
Mean 
Std. deviation 
1961-1970 
0.81 
-
-
0.99 
-
-
-
-
1.37 
-
0.55 
0.90 
0.96 
-
-
0.20 
0.83 
0.34 
1971-1980 
1.00 
1.14 
0.83 
1.12 
-
1.62 
1.23 
0.76 
1.05 
-
0.61 
0.98 
1.01 
1.33 
1.00 
0.35 
1.00 
0.30 
1981-1990 
0.78 
1.18 
-
0.74 
0.50 
1.71 
-
-
0.73 
1.08 
0.42 
0.68 
0.52 
0.89 
-
0.32 
0.80 
0.37 
the level of class voting in a country. The advantage of this kappa index is that it 
reports a single standardized score that reflects the level of class voting for a 
particular country in a particular year or period, and therefore provides a uniform 
metric for making cross-national and over-time inferences. 
However, a disadvantage of the kappa index is that, when calculating the index 
on a set of log-odds-ratios, the separate log-odds-ratios are given equal weights. 
When analysing small datasets with different numbers of respondents in the 
distinguished classes, the separate log-odds-ratios are computed on different 
numbers of respondents. This then yields estimates of the log-odds-ratios that 
differ in reliability. For example, the log-odds-ratio for the difference in voting 
behaviour between the agricultural workers - a small class - and the unskilled 
manual class, will be less reliable than the log-odds-ratio for the difference in 
voting behaviour between the service class - a large class - and the unskilled 
manual class. The fact that log-odds-ratios which differ in reliability are given 
equal weights might bias the results of descriptive analyses when applying the 
kappa index. We deal with this drawback later, but since we use the kappa index 
in later chapters and our dataset contains many respondents in almost all classes, 
we first examine the levels of EGP class voting with the kappa index. We 
calculated kappa indices for each country and period on the basis of the present-
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Table 6.3. Linear trends in the levels of class voting (measured by kappa index) 
in thirteen countries (individual dataset) 
Intercept (class Trend (change / N. of Range 
voting in 1980) 10 years) years 
Australia 
Austria 
Belgium 
Britain 
Canada 
Denmark 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Ireland 
Italy 
Netherlands 
Norway 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
United States 
parameter 
0.90* 
1.22* 
-
0.94* 
-
1.40* 
0.77 
-
1.03* 
1.54 
0.50* 
0.92* 
0.81* 
1.13 
0.71 
0.52* 
s.e. 
0.06 
0.16 
-
0.50 
-
0.21 
-
-
0.05 
-
0.06 
0.04 
0.06 
-
-
0.05 
parameter 
-0.04 
0.24 
-
-0.15* 
-
-0.34 
-0.77 
-
-0.41* 
-0.62 
-0.08 
-0.11 
-0.25* 
-0.24 
-0.15 
-0.04 
s.e. 
0.07 
0.22 
-
0.06 
-
0.38 
-
-
0.08 
-
0.08 
0.07 
0.07 
-
-
0.04 
9 
4 
1 
12 
1 
6 
2 
1 
13 
2 
3 
14 
7 
2 
2 
24 
1965-90 
1974-89 
1975 
1964-90 
1984 
1971-81 
1972-75 
1978 
1969-90 
1989-90 
1968-85 
1970-90 
1965-90 
1972-90 
1972-76 
1956-90 
Notes: * ρ < 0.05; 
The variable Year was centred around 1980. 
ed log-odds-ratios in Table 6.1, and these are reported in Table 6.2. In Table 6.2 
it is shown, for example, that the kappa index for Australia in the period 1961-
1970, i.e. the standard deviation over the seven figures given in the first row of 
Table 6.1, has the value 0.81. When examining all presented kappa indices in 
Table 6.2 it is clear that in each of the distinguished periods the kappa indices 
differ considerably between the countries. In fact, the same picture comes up as in 
Chapter 3, where we described the level of manual/nonmanual class voting with 
the Thomsen index. Canada and the United States have the lowest levels of class 
voting, while Britain and the Scandinavian countries have the highest levels of 
class voting. 
To investigate whether the level of EGP class voting has declined over-time like 
the levels of manual/nonmanual class voting in these countries, we present Table 
6.3. In that table summary measures are reported for the decline in class voting in 
each country, measured by the kappa index. For every country a linear regression 
was computed, in which the kappa index was defined as the dependent variable, 
and year of survey as the independent variable. Any decline in the kappa indices 
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would be evidenced by negative trend-parameters. The more the decline in the 
kappa indices, the stronger the decline in class voting in that country. The figures 
in Table 6.3 show negative trend-parameters for all countries under investigation, 
except Austria. Thus, we can carefully conclude that - similar to the 
developments in levels of manual/nonmanual class voting - declines in the levels 
of EGP class voting in most countries have occurred. The trend-parameters differ 
significantly from zero in only Germany, Britain, and Norway. The fact that some 
trend-parameters are not statistically significant different from zero, might be due 
to the fact that for the pertinent countries only a limited number of datasets were 
available. However, for the United States and the Netherlands, i.e. countries 
where we have data from more than 10 years, we can be reasonably sure that no 
systematic decline has occurred. 
To summarize, on the basis of these results we can conclude that substantial 
differences in the levels of EGP class voting, when measured by the kappa index, 
existed in the post war period between the Western industrialized countries. 
Furthermore, we can also conclude that notable declines in the levels of EGP 
class voting, when measured by the kappa index, occurred in the postwar period 
in most of these countries. 
6.3 Modelling the description of EGP class voting 
When using the kappa index as a measure of the level of EGP class voting in a 
country - as already discussed - we have to realize that the kappa index is 
calculated on sets of log-odds-ratios that represent differences in voting behaviour 
between two particular classes. When calculating these log-odds-ratios on the 
basis of a dataset these measures have sampling errors. These sampling errors 
depend, of course, on the number of respondents in the two particular classes. 
Thus, calculating log-odds-ratios in countries where some classes are small, and 
where we have a dataset with only a small number of respondents, yields unre-
liable estimates of the log-odds-ratios. Consequentially, this also yields unreliable 
estimates of the kappa index, and possibly biased descriptions of between-country 
and over-time differences in levels of EGP class voting. 
Therefore, to describe the differences in levels of class voting between countries 
and the changes in class voting within countries, we need models that avoid this 
problem. Such models should make it possible to examine the relationship 
between class and voting behaviour net of changes in the sizes of the classes and 
the popularity of the parties. Furthermore, these models should assume that 
differences in voting behaviour between classes can be measured by log-odds-
ratios, and that these log-odds-ratios are simultaneously estimated. Or in other 
по 
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words: "classes can be ranked according to an unchanging order that corresponds 
to the left-to-right ranking of parties even if the strength of association between 
class and voting might change from election to election and from country to 
country" (Hout et al. 1994: 29). Models that take these considerations into 
account have been developed by Erikson & Goldthorpe (1992) and independently 
by Xie (1992), and are called uniform difference models. The name refers to the 
fact that in these models it is assumed that differences between all the classes in 
their voting behaviour, measured by log-odds-ratios, vary uniformly by a constant 
proportion across countries and years.3 A benefit of these uniform difference 
models is that they provide a single measure of the strength of the association 
between class and voting for each country and year. 
The general uniform difference model, can be represented by the following 
equation: 
log((7i*Left)/(l - 7i*Left)) = 
ßojk + 5jk * [ ß,*(Skilled manual class) + pViAgric. labourers) + 
ß3*(Routine nonmanual class) + ß4*(Service class) + 
ß5*(Petty Bourgeoisie) + ß6*(Farmer) ] 
where the variable for the voting behaviour of the respondents, Left, is coded (1) 
when respondents vote for a left-wing party and (0) when they vote for a right-
wing party. Furthermore, in this equation the seven EGP classes are represented 
by six dummy variables. Again the unskilled manual class is defined as the 
reference category. Consequently, the β
Γ
 to ß6-parameters represent the average 
differences in voting behaviour, measured by log-odds-ratios, between the 
unskilled manual class and the other EGP classes. 
According to the equation, the intercept, ß ^ represents the log-odds for 
unskilled manual workers of voting for a left-wing rather than a right-wing party. 
This intercept is allowed to vary over years (j) and countries (k) in order to 
control for the variations in the general popularity of left-wing parties in the 
various countries and years. This parameter, however, is of limited interest 
because our concern is with class differences in voting behaviour and not with the 
absolute popularity of left-wing and right-wing parties. 
Our main interest lies in the 6jk-parameters of the model. Under the fitted 
model, the 5jk-parameters give a measure of the overall differences and changes in 
the strength of the relationship between class and voting behaviour. They 
therefore show in which direction and to what extent class differences in voting 
behaviour uniformly (i.e. by a constant proportion) vary across years (j) and 
countries (k). Thus, these 5jk-parameters can be regarded as the "overall" level of 
class voting in a specific year in a specific country. 
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6.4 Results 
Model selection 
To test statistically whether the overall levels of class voting differed significantly 
across countries and whether significant trends had occurred within these 
countries, some variations of the Uniform difference models were applied.4 Each 
model gives a different representation of the country-differences and trends. To 
select the model that summarizes our data best, we compared the fit of one model 
with the fit of a less general one nested within the first. The traditional 
Likelihood-ratio test and the BIC (Bayesian Information Coefficient) were used to 
detect whether the fits of models differed significantly. When comparing several 
models, the model with the most negative BIC is the one to be preferred. 
Furthermore, the BIC shows whether a model describes the data reasonably. In 
that case the BIC takes a negative value. 
We used both the Likelihood-ratio test and the BIC statistic since both have 
advantages over the other measure. On the one hand, the BIC statistic has the 
advantage over the Likelihood-ratio test that it takes into account the number of 
cases in the analyses. To select between two models, when analysing a large 
dataset (as we do in this chapter) and using the Likelihood-ratio, differences 
between models can too easily tum out to be statistically significant (Raftery 
1986). On the other hand, the BIC statistic has the disadvantage over the 
Likelihood-ratio test that it is biased in favour of parsimony as against fit 
(Erikson & Goldthorpe 1992: 101). The addition of a parameter to a model 
resulting in a substantially refinement in the representation of the data might not 
yield a smaller BIC, but might yield a significant improvement in the Likelihood-
ratio. 
In addition to the Likelihood-ratio and the BIC we used the dissimilarity index 
to compare the fit of the models. This index shows the percentage of all cases in 
the table analysed that are misclassified, that is the percentage allocated to the 
wrong cell. The fit statistics of all models are presented in Table 6.4. 
We wanted to investigate whether differences existed in levels of EGP class 
voting between countries, and whether trends in these levels had occurred within 
these countries. To do this, we fitted models that represent various possibilities. 
We first fitted the Independence model, which assumes that there is no 
association between class and voting behaviour in all countries and years (i.e. all 
5jk-parameters are assumed to be zero). The BIC for this model is only slightly 
negative, and the dissimilarity index is twelve. Thus, this model gives a poor 
representation of our data. This model serves as a baseline, a model upon which 
to asses the degree of improvement provided by more specific models. Therefore, 
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Table 6.4. Results of fitting uniform difference models to class voting data for 
sixteen countries 
A. 
B. 
С 
D. 
E. 
F. 
Independence model (5Jk = 0) 
No differences model (ojk =1) 
Country differences model (8¡k = δ
№
) 
Country differences and general linear 
trend (ojk = 80k + δ, * Year) 
Country differences and country 
specific linear trends 
(δ,, = δα, + δ,,* Year) 
Country differences and country 
specific nonlinear trends (ojlt = 8Jk) 
L2 
6567.9 
1648.1 
842.7 
793.0 
728.3 
622.1 
df 
612 
606 
591 
590 
577 
504 
rL2 
0 
74.9 
87.2 
87.9 
88.9 
90.5 
BIC 
-308.3 
-5160.7 
-5797.6 
-5836.0 
-5754.7 
-5040.7 
DI 
12.0 
5.3 
4.3 
4.1 
4.0 
3.5 
Notes: N. of cases = 75,783; df: Degrees of freedom; L2: Likelihood-ratio; rL2: Percentage 
reduction in the L2 compared to the independence model; BIC: Bayesian Information 
Coefficient; BIC = L2-df
uje(l*log(N); DI: Dissimilarity index, showing the percentage of all 
cases in the tables analysed that are misclassified - that is, allocated to the wrong cell - by a 
particular model. 
for the other models in Table 6.4 the percentage reduction in the Likelihood-ratio 
(L2) compared to the Independence model is given. 
With the second model we applied, we wanted to investigate whether a 
relationship existed between class and voting behaviour. Therefore, the No 
differences model was fitted. This model presumes that in general there is an 
association between class and vote. In addition, it assumes that the strength of 
this association, i.e. the level of class voting, is the same in all countries and 
years. To do this, in the model all o^-parameters are assumed to have the value 
one. This model provides, both according to the Likelihood-ratio (AL2 = 4919.8, 
df= 6) and the BIC (ABIC = -4852.4), a much better representation of the data 
than does the Independence model. The Likelihood-ratio compared to that model 
is reduced by 74.9 per cent. This, of course, is not surprising when we consider 
the findings of the earlier chapters of this study, and the findings of Section 5.2. 
Furthermore, the large negative BIC indicates that the No difference model gives 
a good representation of the data. Consequently, we have to reject the assumption 
that there is no relationship between social class and voting behaviour in the 
countries under investigation. 
Next, we tested whether levels of class voting differed between countries. To do 
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this, we fitted the Country differences model that, like the No difference model, 
assumes that the strength of the relationship between class and vote is constant 
over-time, but that levels of class voting vary across countries. Therefore the 5jk-
parameter is allowed to have a different value for each country (i.e. Sjk = δ^). The 
figures in Table 6.4 reveal that according to both the Likelihood-ratio test (AL2 = 
805.4, df = 15 ) and the BIC (ABIC = -636.9 ) this model provides a significantly 
better fit than the No difference model. Thus, we have to reject the assumption 
that levels of class voting are the same in all countries under investigation, and 
can accept that countries differ in their levels of class voting. 
Next, we tested for the occurrence of trends in levels of class voting within 
countries. First, we examined whether we could detect a general linear trend in all 
countries in their levels of class voting. We fitted the Country differences and 
general linear trend model, which assumes that levels of class voting vary across 
countries, but also that these levels vary in a linear way over-time. In this model, 
we assume the same trend in class voting for all countries. The 5jk-parameter is 
assumed to be linearly dependent on the year variable, according to the equation: 
Sjk = δ№ + ô,*Year. Because of interpretation, the variable year was linearly 
transformed by subtracting 1980 from its original value. The estimates of the 
country-parameters (60k) therefore represent the levels of class voting in the 
various countries in the year 1980. According to both the Likelihood-ratio (AL2= 
49.7, df=l) and the BIC (ABIC = -38.4) this model represents the data 
significantly better than the preceding models. Therefore, on the basis of the fit 
statistics and the estimated general trend-parameter (i.e. -0.014, s.e. = 0.002) we 
provisionally conclude that in general a decline in levels of class voting has 
occurred in the countries featured in this chapter. 
Our next models tested whether trends differed among countries, and whether 
these trends were non-linear. For this reason we estimated first the parameters of 
the Country differences and country specific trends model. This model assumes 
that levels of class voting vary across countries, but also that these vary in a 
linear way over-time (i.e. 5jk = δ,^ + 6,k*Year). Furthermore, we fitted the 
Country differences and non-linear trends model. This model assumes that 
differences in class voting exist between countries, and that in each country a 
different non-linear trend has occurred in levels of class voting. To represent 
these non-linear trends for each country/year combination a separate ôjk-parameter 
was estimated (i.e. 6jk = δ^). Compared to the Country differences and general 
linear trend model, both these models show a significant improvement in fit 
according to the Likelihood-ratio test (AL2 = 64.7, df = 13, and AL2 = 170.9, df = 
86 respectively). However, the BIC's have less negative values than the Country 
differences and general linear trend model (ABIC = 81.3 and 795.3 respectively), 
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and thus do not suggest a substantial improvement in fit. Given our large sample 
size we tend to prefer the more parsimonious Country difference and general 
linear trend model. However, we note that although according to the BIC this last 
mentioned model has a better fit, this does not necessarily imply that there exists 
no trend differences at all among countries or that all trends are linear. For 
example, the model representing country specific linear trends uses for each of 
the thirteen countries where we have data of more than a single year, an extra 
trend-parameter compared to model E. Therefore, this model uses thirteen degrees 
of freedom more than the Country difference and general linear trend model. 
Furthermore, we already mentioned that the BIC statistic is biased in favour of 
parsimony as against fit. Hence, it is very possible that the BIC comparison does 
not detect that in some countries substantially different trends occurred, when in 
most countries indeed comparable trends occurred.5 Furthermore, in the model to 
represent non-linear trends within the countries, for each country many extra 
parameters are necessary, compared to the linear trend models. 
Concluding, of all the fitted models the Country difference and general linear 
trend model gives, when using the Likelihood-ratio and the BIC simultaneously, 
the best representation of our data. Thus, it is worthwhile to investigate the 
parameters of this most parsimonious fitting model. However, because our interest 
is not just to give the most parsimonious representation of the data, but also to 
give a fair description of the processes of dealignment in all countries and 
periods, in the next sections we also pay attention to the parameters of the 
Country differences and Country specific linear trend model and the Country 
difference and non-linear trend model. 
Before we interpreted the parameters of these models, we first checked whether 
the Country differences and general linear trend model satisfactorily fits with the 
data of tables of the individual countries and specific years. It might of course be 
that our preferred model in general gives a good representation of our data, but 
that for some countries or years this model does not provide a sufficient 
representation of the data. Analyses reveal that for 88 out of the 103 tables the 
model fits according to the classic criterion of statistical inference (i.e. L2 / df). 
For the 15 tables for which we do not obtain a good fit on this criterion we can 
see that they are in general those tables with a relative large number of cases. It 
is therefore not surprising that the BIC statistic results in a negative coefficient 
for 101 tables. Only the 1970 United States data and the 1979 Australian data 
yield positive BICs. Hence the model appears to provide an adequate summary of 
the class voting partem in each country and each year. Therefore, we are 
confident in interpreting the parameters of that model. 
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Interpretation of parameter estimates 
The parameter estimates of the preferred model, i.e. the Country differences and 
general linear trend model, are presented in Table 6.5.6 In the upper part of this 
table we present the estimates of the β,- to ß6-parameters for the model 
representing the general pattern of association between the EGP classes and their 
voting behaviour. The separate parameters represent the differences in voting 
behaviour between the unskilled manual class and the other EGP classes. 
According to the estimates of the ß-parameters, the difference between the 
unskilled manual class and the skilled manual class is 0.07, while between the 
unskilled manual class and the farmers it is 1.88. The pattern of class voting 
obtained from the estimated ß-parameters is - as could be expected - almost 
identical to that found in the last row of Table 6.1 where we calculated log-odds-
ratios on class voting tables based on our total dataset. 
The levels of class voting in the countries are represented by the country-
parameters, i.e. the o^-parameters. These parameters are presented in the bottom 
part of Table 6.5. Because in our model the variable Year was linearly 
transformed by subtracting 1980 from its original value, the estimates of the 
country-parameters represent the differences in the levels of class voting between 
countries in 1980. The country-parameters indicate that levels of class voting 
differed substantively from country to country in 1980. Canada and the United 
States had the lowest levels of class voting. Denmark had the highest level of 
class voting, followed by Finland, Sweden and Britain. The other countries are 
between these two groups. The interpretation of the parameters is that for 
example in Norway all log-odds-ratios are 1.205 times that in the general pattern. 
Hence, in that country in 1980 the log-odds-ratio indicating the differences in 
voting behaviour between the unskilled manual workers and the service class 
yields 1.22 * 1.02 = 1.24. The parameters for the United States imply that all log-
odds-ratios in the United States are 0.35 times smaller than in the general pattern. 
The parameters also allow to compare countries with each other. For example, the 
parameters indicate that in Norway all log-odds-ratios are 1.22/0.35, or 3.5 times, 
larger than in the United States. 
The estimated trend-parameter (δ,) of the Country difference and general trend 
model, represents the general linear trend in levels of class voting within all 
countries. This parameter takes the negative value -0.14 (s.e. 0.02), which implies 
a decline in the association between class and vote. More particularly, all the log-
odds-ratios representing the difference in voting behaviour between the EGP 
classes, i.e. the β,- to ß6-parameters, decrease 14 per cent points per decade. This 
has serious implications for the levels of class voting. For example, it means that 
in Norway the log-odds-ratio representing the difference in voting behaviour 
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Table 6.5. Parameter estimates of the Country differences and general linear 
trend model 
General pattern 
Unskilled manual class 
Skilled manual class 
Agricultural labourers 
Routine nonmanual class 
Service class 
Petty Bourgeoisie 
Fanners 
-
ß, 
ß* 
ß, 
ß4 
fc 
ß6 
-
0.07 
0.58 
0.66 
1.02 
1.21 
1.88 
Intercept 
(Class voting in 1980) 
parameter (60k) s.е. 
Trend 
(change / 10 years) 
parameter (δ,) s.e. 
All countries -0.14* 0.02 
Australia 
Austria 
Belgium 
Britain 
Canada 
Denmark 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Ireland 
Italy 
Netherlands 
Norway 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
United States 
1.16* 
1.35* 
1.28* 
1.43* 
0.01* 
1.75* 
1.71* 
0.97* 
0.97* 
1.25* 
0.59* 
1.04* 
1.22* 
1.53* 
1.30* 
0.35* 
0.13 
0.17 
0.26 
0.13 
0.18 
0.15 
0.20 
0.15 
0.13 
0.23 
0.14 
0.13 
0.14 
0.22 
0.19 
0.13 
Notes: * ρ < 0.05 
The variable Year was centred around 1980. 
between the unskilled manual workers and the service class, that has the value 
1.24 in 1980, will be in the year 2000: 1.24 - (2*0.14*1.24) = 0.92. 
As mentioned earlier, we do not only pay attention to the parameters of the 
Country difference and general linear trend model, but also to the parameters of 
two other models. The trend-parameters of the Country difference and country 
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Table 6.6. Parameter estimates of the Country differences and country specific 
linear trends model 
General pattern 
Unskilled manual class 
Skilled manual class 
Agricultural labourers 
Routine nonmanual class 
Service class 
Petty Bourgeoisie 
Farmers 
. 
ß. 
Ρ» 
β, 
ß4 
ß5 ß6 
. 
0.07 
0.58 
0.66 
1.02 
1.21 
1.88 
Australia 
Austria 
Belgium 
Britain 
Canada 
Denmark 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Ireland 
Italy 
Netherlands 
Norway 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
United States 
Notes: * ρ < 0.05 
Intercept 
(class voting in 
Parameter (δ^) 
1.15* 
1.37* 
1.35* 
1.45* 
-0.00 
1.64* 
0.80 
0.96* 
0.97* 
4.68 
0.63* 
1.04* 
1.21* 
1.50* 
1.37 
0.42* 
The variable Year was centred around 1980. 
1980) 
s.е. 
0.13 
0.17 
0.26 
0.13 
0.18 
0.18 
0.67 
0.16 
0.13 
3.50 
0.14 
0.13 
0.14 
0.22 
0.21 
0.13 
Trend 
(change /10 years) 
parameter (8lk) 
-0.16* 
-0.22 
-
-0.25* 
-
-0.40 
-1.59 
-
-0.19* 
-3.77 
-0.02 
-0.21* 
-0.41* 
-0.45* 
0.04 
0.01 
s.e. 
0.05 
0.15 
-
0.05 
-
0.24 
1.05 
-
0.07 
3.69 
0.08 
0.06 
0.06 
0.20 
0.26 
0.03 
specific linear trends model make it possible to check whether or not trends 
differed from country to country. These are reported in Table 6.6. The country 
specific trend-parameters, the 6lk-parameters, represent the linear trends in class 
voting within the countries. Table 6.6 shows that in eleven out of the thirteen 
countries the country specific trend-parameter has a negative value. 
Table 6.7. Estimated country/year parameters (b]t) of Country differences and 
country specific nonlinear trends model 
Country Year Parameter Country Year Parameter 
Australia 
Austria 
Belgium 
Britain 
Canada 
Denmark 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Ireland 
1965 
1967 
1973 
1979 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1990 
1974 
1985 
1988 
1989 
1975 
1964 
1966 
1970 
1974 
1979 
1983 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1984 
1971 
1972 
1975 
1977 
1979 
1981 
1972 
1975 
1978 
1969 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1982 
1984 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1990 
1989 
1990 
1328* 
1 140· 
1543* 
1 160· 
1 001* 
0 807· 
0981· 
1 141· 
0983· 
1512* 
1381* 
1036· 
1247· 
1367· 
1914· 
1818* 
1499· 
1610· 
1445· 
1549· 
1574· 
1261· 
1392* 
1232· 
1080* 
0963· 
-0003 
2179* 
2415* 
2 113* 
2 209* 
1643* 
2469* 
2097* 
1612* 
0997* 
1028» 
1270* 
1080* 
1 121· 
1096* 
0 860* 
0945* 
0 893« 
1 177* 
0 767* 
0J84* 
0965* 
0679* 
1295* 
0912* 
0168 
0 183 
0156 
0194 
0172 
0207 
0226 
0166 
0187 
0212 
0309 
0268 
0234 
0264 
0231 
0219 
0215 
0166 
0215 
0181 
0223 
0217 
0167 
0183 
0 181 
0 233 
0180 
0252 
0271 
0252 
0245 
0210 
0336 
0282 
0233 
0153 
0195 
0197 
0201 
0208 
0177 
0174 
0149 
0202 
0198 
0193 
0271 
0206 
0187 
0284 
0 302 
Italy 1968 
1975 
1985 
Netherlands 1970 
1971 
1972 
1974 
1976 
1977 
1979 
1981 
1982 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1989 
1990 
Norway 1965 
1972 
1977 
1981 
1985 
1989 
1990 
Sweden 1972 
1990 
Switzerland 1972 
1976 
United Stales 1956 
1958 
1960 
1964 
1966 
1968 
1970 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1980 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
0 612* 
0 804· 
0 583* 
1 152* 
1284· 
0950* 
1 153· 
0 948· 
1364· 
1252· 
0 953· 
0 933· 
1008· 
0 842· 
0 809· 
0 962· 
0765* 
1540* 
1803· 
1262' 
1025* 
1384· 
0713* 
0750· 
1873» 
1054* 
1279* 
1.509· 
0110 
0 371· 
0438· 
0740* 
0670* 
0476* 
-0258 
0713* 
0481* 
0537* 
0677* 
0275 
0768* 
0499* 
0462· 
0710· 
0562· 
0560· 
0260 
0493· 
0396« 
0063 
0212 
0176 
0171 
0196 
0 163 
0 207 
0174 
0191 
0247 
0.251 
0164 
0 285 
0 222 
0 226 
0186 
0167 
0 268 
0 266 
0 204 
0 186 
0256 
0191 
0 248 
0201 
0164 
0220 
0260 
0310 
0242 
0286 
0 174 
0193 
0207 
0193 
0224 
0202 
0188 
0 197 
0 205 
0 208 
0206 
0193 
0 195 
0 204 
0 200 
0 196 
0197 
0213 
0203 
0212 
0193 
0216 
0 205 
0217 
Note · ρ < 0 05 
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Switserland and the United States have positive trend-parameters, but the standard 
errors of these are so large that no definite conclusions of an increase in class 
voting can be drawn. Of the negative trend-parameters six are statistically 
significant, i.e. for Australia, Britain, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway and 
Sweden. The strongest decline (ignoring Ireland where our two years of survey 
are too close to interpret trends) is found in Finland, Norway and Denmark. 
Obviously, for those countries for which we have many datasets over a longer 
period of time we have a higher chance of finding a significant trend. 
The country-parameters of this model are similar to those of the Country 
differences and general linear trend model, and indicate that levels of class voting 
differed substantially from country to country in 1980. Canada and the United 
States had class voting the lowest level, while Denmark had the highest level of 
class voting, followed by Norway, Sweden and Britain. For Finland and Ireland 
we find an extremely high and an extremely low estimate of the country-
parameter respectively. This is due to the fact that for these two countries we 
only had two datasets in a short period and that levels of class voting in these 
datasets/years differed substantially.7 
The parameters of the Country differences and non-linear trend model are 
important when examining whether non-linear trends have occurred in some 
specific countries. For example, some researchers have shown that the trend in 
Britain has been non-linear, since it goes down until 1970 and from 1970 onward 
does not show any particular trend at all (Heath et al. 1985; Goldthorpe 1994; 
Heath et al. 1995). The country and year specific 6jk-parameters of the Country 
differences and country specific non-linear trend model, that give the levels of 
class voting for all countries and years, are reported in Table 6.7. We find that in 
all countries, except the United States and Switzerland where an increase in class 
voting is found, in general the decline in the level of class voting has been fairly 
monotonie. Furthermore, in all countries where we have data from more than two 
years, we find that around this monotonie trend fluctuations are visible. However, 
on the basis of the trend-parameters of the Country differences and country 
specific linear trend model, we claim that in all countries - except the United 
States and Switzerland - these fluctuations have to be regarded as part of an 
overall declining trend, and not as trendless fluctuations. Britain is no exception 
to this observation. 
6.5. Comparing manual/nonmanual class voting with EGP class voting 
Traditionally, scholars of the first generation of research into stratification and 
politics studied class voting using the manual and nonmanual class dichotomy. In 
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Table 6.8. Comparison of levels of class voting in 1980 according to Thomsen 
indices and delta indices 
Country dataset Individual dataset 
Thomsen index Thomsen index delta index 
(Table 3.3) (Table 3.4) (Table 6.6) 
Australia 
Austria 
Belgium 
Britain 
Canada 
Denmark 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Norway 
Portugal 
Spain 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
United States 
Level 
0.93 
0.96 
0.86 
1.06 
0.28 
1.15 
1.57 
0.60 
0.64 
0.40 
0.76 
0.64 
0.99 
0.77 
1.09 
0.43 
0.74 
1.48 
0.80 
0.37 
Rank 
8 
7 
9 
5 
20 
3 
11 
6 
14 
18 
12 
15 
6 
11 
4 
17 
13 
2 
10 
19 
Level 
1.07 
1.29 
-
1.39 
-
1.95 
-0.06 
-
0.84 
-
2.86 
0.68 
-
0.89 
1.36 
-
-
1.44 
1.16 
0.47 
Rank 
8 
6 
-
4 
-
2 
13 
-
10 
-
1 
11 
-
9 
5 
-
-
3 
7 
12 
Level 
1.15 
1.37 
1.35 
1.45 
-0.00 
1.64 
0.80 
0.96 
0.97 
-
4.68 
0.63 
-
1.04 
1.21 
-
-
1.50 
1.37 
0.42 
Rank 
9 
5 
7 
4 
16 
2 
13 
12 
11 
-
1 
14 
-
10 
8 
-
-
3 
6 
15 
Chapter 3 we followed this tradition and examined the levels of manual/ 
nonmanual class voting in twenty countries in the postwar period. We showed 
that substantial differences between countries existed and that declining trends 
within these countries had occurred. However, scholars of the third generation 
claimed that variation in manual/nonmanual class voting might not just reflect 
real variation in the strength of the relationship between class and voting 
behaviour, but might also be due to variation in the composition of the manual 
and nonmanual classes. We tested this claim in Chapter S, and concluded that 
variation in the composition of the manual and nonmanual classes to some extent 
can be held responsible for variation in levels of manual/nonmanual class voting. 
Therefore, it became of interest to investigate whether variation between countries 
and periods in class voting also could be found when using a detailed class 
scheme. We carried out such descriptive analyses in the present chapter, and 
established that also when using the EGP class scheme, substantial variation 
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between countries and declining trends within many countries could be identified. 
This implies that the third generation claim that the decline in class voting in 
some countries can only be identified when using the manual/nonmanual class 
distinction, and not using a detailed class scheme, has to be mitigated. 
However, it might be that the speed of the decline in class voting in a country 
is different, depending on whether the focus is on EGP class voting or on 
manual/nonmanual class voting. In addition, it might be that the ranking of 
countries with respect to both types of class voting differs. Therefore, we directly 
compare the results of the descriptions of manual/nonmanual class voting with the 
results of the descriptions of EGP class voting.We start by comparing the 
differences between countries for the EGP class voting and for the 
manual/nonmanual class voting. Measures of the differences between countries in 
EGP class voting are obtained from the Country difference and country specific 
linear trend model. We presented these parameters in Table 6.6. As discussed 
above, these country-parameters indicate the level of EGP class voting in the year 
1980. Measures of the observed country differences in manual/nonmanual class 
voting in the year 1980 were given in Chapter 3 in Table 3.3 and Table 3.4. We 
brought together these measures from the earlier tables, and listed them in Table 
6.8. According to the delta indices for the levels of EGP class voting, the ranking 
of the countries (given in the last column of Table 6.8) is as follows (ignoring the 
strange results in Ireland and Finland): Denmark, Sweden, and Britain are the 
three countries with the highest levels, followed by Austria, Switzerland, 
Belgium, Norway and Australia. The countries with low levels of class voting are 
the Netherlands, Germany, France, Finland, and Italy. The twocountries with the 
lowest levels are the United States and Canada. The question then is whether this 
ranking can also be found when examining the levels of manual/nonmanual class 
voting in these countries in the year 1980. To answer that question we compare 
the ranking of the countries in the last column with that for the Thomsen indices 
in Table 6.8. We find that the ranking of the countries is fairly similar. The main 
exceptions are obtained for Finland and Ireland. These exceptions, however, are 
more due to the fact that only two datasets for these countries were available (and 
thus the parameters are not robust), than to the fact that different class schemes 
were used. Leaving these countries aside, the Pearson-correlation between the 
entries in the second and the last main columns is 0.87 (N=14, p=0.00) and 
between the entries in the first and the last main columns 0.94 (N=11, p=0.00).8 
Thus, it can be concluded that the ranking of the countries, when measured by the 
EGP class scheme, is fairly similar to the ranking of the countries, when using 
the manual and nonmanual class scheme. 
Next, we investigate whether the amount of decline differs for the two types of 
class voting, and whether the ranking of countries with respect to the amount of 
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Table 6.9. Comparison of linear trends (change/10 years) in levels of class voting 
according to Thomsen indices and delta indices 
Australia 
Austria 
Belgium 
Britain 
Canada 
Denmark 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Norway 
Portugal 
Spain 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
United States 
Country dataset 
Thomsen index 
(Table 3.3) 
-0.18* 
-0.27* 
-0.20* 
-0.22* 
-0.01 
-0.30* 
-0.30 
-0.15* 
-0.31* 
0.15 
-0.15 
-0.19* 
-0.14 
-0.01 
-0.44* 
0.27 
-0.16 
-0.27* 
-0.07 
-0.12* 
N. of 
cases 
17 
5 
20 
30 
13 
29 
5 
25 
25 
10 
18 
20 
17 
25 
11 
5 
6 
12 
4 
27 
Individual dataset 
Thomsen index 
(Table 3.4) 
-0.26* 
-0.50 
-
-0.21* 
-
-0.38 
-3.51 
-
-0.16* 
-
-1.78 
-0.10 
-
-0.15* 
-0.46* 
-
-
-0.46 
-0.14 
-0.06 
delta index 
(Table 6.6) 
-0.16* 
-0.22 
-
-0.25* 
-
-0.40 
-1.59 
-
-0.19* 
-
-3.77 
-0.02 
-
-0.21* 
-0.41* 
-
-
-0.45* 
0.04 
0.01 
N. of 
cases 
9 
4 
-
12 
-
6 
2 
-
13 
-
2 
3 
-
14 
7 
-
-
2 
2 
24 
Note: * ρ < 0.05 
decline in class voting differs for EGP and manual/nonmanual class voting. The 
trends in class voting, when measured by EGP class scheme, in each of the 
countries are represented by the linear trend-parameters (Ôlk) of the Country 
difference and country specific linear trend model Usted in Table 6.6. In all 
countries, except Switzerland and the United States, a negative trend-parameter is 
listed, implying a decline in the level of EGP class voting in these countries. The 
decline is most pronounced (ignoring Ireland and Finland) in Sweden, Norway, 
Denmark, followed by Britain, Austria, and the Netherlands, and modest in 
Germany, Australia, and Italy. Small increases in the levels of class voting are 
detected in Switzerland and the United States. 
To examine whether the trends in class voting, when measured by the EGP 
class scheme, are comparable to the trends in class voting measured by the 
manual/nonmanual class scheme, we compare the linear trend-parameters in Table 
6.6 with the linear trend-parameters concerning manual/nonmanual class voting 
Description ofEGP Class Voting 123 
presented in Table 3.3, and Table 3.4. These trend-parameters are brought 
together and presented in Table 6.9. 
A comparison of the trend-parameters for the manual/nonmanual class voting 
with those for the EGP class voting, shows that in all countries, except 
Switzerland and the United States, a declining trend is found, both when focusing 
on manual/nonmanual class voting and on EGP class voting. However, 
considering the fact that the trends for both types are not statistically significant, 
it can be assumed that for both types of class voting no increase or decrease has 
taken place in these countries. In the other countries it is clear that in general the 
larger the decline in manual/nonmanual class voting, the larger the decline in 
EGP class voting. The Pearson-correlation between the trend-parameters from 
Table 3.3 and those from Table 6.6 (again leaving Finland and Ireland aside) has 
the value 0.67 (N=11, p=0.012), and the correlation between those from Table 3.4 
and Table 6.6 has the value 0.80 (N=11, p=0.001).9 
Concluding we can say that, although measuring class voting with EGP classes 
is theoretically preferable, it is fairly incentive for variation in the composition of 
classes. Descriptions of the levels of class voting using both class schemes in 
general result in the same ranking of the countries with respect to the level of 
class voting and the amount of decline. 
6.6 Conclusions 
In this chapter we again addressed the descriptive research question on the 
differences between countries and changes over-time in levels of class voting in 
Western industrialized countries in the postwar period. In doing so, we followed 
the suggestions of third generation studies on stratification and politics. In studies 
of that generation criticisms had been made about the tendency in this research 
area to use a dichotomous class scheme, and measures of absolute differences in 
voting behaviour between classes. Scholars of the third generation argued that 
although substantial differences in levels of class voting across countries and 
declines in levels of class voting within countries were found when applying a 
manual/nonmanual class distinction and a measure of absolute class voting, this 
might not be the case when applying a more detailed class scheme and measures 
of relative class voting. 
In this chapter we investigated whether differences between countries and trends 
within countries in levels of relative class voting could be found when applying a 
detailed class scheme. To examine this, data from 113 national representative 
surveys of sixteen Western industrialized countries over the period 1956-1990 
were analysed. These survey data allowed us to distinguish between detailed 
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classes according to the EGP class scheme. To deal with detailed classes and to 
use log-odds-ratios as measure of the strength of the relationship between these 
two variables, we used special loglinear models for analysing the strength of the 
relationship between two categorical variables, such as social class and voting 
behaviour. 
A major finding of this chapter was that substantial differences in levels of class 
voting, when measured by EGP classes, have existed between democratic 
industrialized countries in the postwar period. In fact, the ranking of the countries 
was similar to that found when examining the differences between countries in 
manual/nonmanual class voting. The Scandinavian countries had the highest levels 
and the United States and Canada the lowest. Furthermore, we found that in many 
democratic industrialized countries in the postwar period a declining trend 
occurred in levels of class voting, when measured by EGP classes. Again, these 
results resemble those of our examinations of the manual/nonmanual class voting 
in these countries. The strongest declines were found in the Scandinavian 
countries. In Switzerland and the United States no trends were found. 
Our results thus correspond to the conclusions of Hout et al. (1994) that claims 
of the declining significance of class are unfounded in the United States. This is 
not obvious, since they used a different class scheme, and analysed data from the 
American Election Studies for the period after 1970, while for that period we 
used data from the General Social Surveys. We decided not to use the American 
National Election Studies, since we were unable to come to a comparable EGP 
class scheme with these data. 
Our findings, however, do not correspond to those obtained by Heath et al. 
(1985), Evans et al. (1991) and Heath et al. (1995). They found over-time 
variations in levels of class voting in Britain over about the same period, but 
argued that this was trendless fluctuation. We found for the same period a 
declining trend in class voting in Britain. These different conclusions might be 
due to different analyses. First, we used not only data from the British Election 
studies as they did. We also analysed data from the International Social Science 
Program ongoing since 1985. Second, we restricted our analyses to men, while 
their analyses were based on both male and female respondents. The different 
conclusions, however, might also be due to different interpretation of the same 
type of findings. Heath et al. (1995) for example found that a model of linear 
trend resulted in a better fit than a no trend model, but did not fit better than the 
non-linear trend model (when classifying respondents to the class of the head of 
household). They concluded that no linear trend existed, where we concluded on 
similar results that trended variation took place. 
However, leaving the findings for Britain aside, we suggest that in general 
substantial differences between countries have existed in levels of class voting 
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and that in most democratic industrialized countries significant declines in these 
levels have occurred. It thus remains of interest to search for explanations of the 
variation in class voting. In the next three chapters we pay attention to one 
particular explanation, i.e. one concerning the effects of intergenerational class 
mobility on levels of class voting. 

7 Effects of Individual Intergenerational Class 
Mobility on Voting Behaviour 
7.1 Introduction1 
In Ulis study our prime concern is with explaining the varying strength of the 
relationship between social class and voting behaviour in societies. Some of these 
explanations such as those tested in Chapter 4 concern solely the macro-level. 
Other explanations also take the micro-level into account. In the present and the 
next two chapters we focus on an explanation that makes assumptions at both the 
micro- and the macro-level. This explanation concerns the effects of rates of 
intergenerational class mobility in countries on the levels of class voting in these 
countries. 
This explanation, that in particular has been suggested in studies of the first 
and third generation of research on stratification and politics, holds that we have 
to realize that classes in modern societies may be seen as comprising two types of 
persons: one more or less permanent "core" members, i.e. the intergenerationally 
immobile, the other made up of individuals of relatively recent membership, i.e. 
in our case the intergenerationally mobile. The latter are those who have either 
ascended or descended the social ladder with regard to their parents' social 
positions. Such intergenerational class mobility occurs in all Western countries, 
although its extent and pattern tend to differ across countries and over-time. 
Processes of class mobility, it is therefore argued, may help to explain "class-
deviant" behaviour within a country (Abramson 1972) and cross-national and 
over-time variations in levels of class voting (Alford 1963; De Graaf & Ultee 
1990). We examine the macro-level explanation linking the mobility patterns of 
countries with the levels of class voting in these countries in Chapter 9. 
However, before doing that, in this and in the following chapter we investigate 
the micro-level relationship between intergenerational class mobility and 
individual voting behaviour. As was already indicated in Chapters 1 and 4, it is 
important to take the micro-level assumptions, upon which macro-level 
hypotheses are built, into account. Results of studies of the three generations of 
research on stratification and politics suggest that "intergenerational mobility may 
affect attitudes through two fundamentally different processes (Lipset & 
Zetterberg 1956; Lipset & Bendix 1959; Barber 1970; Abramson & Books 1971; 
Abramson 1972; Knoke 1973; Turner 1992; Weakliem 1992). Mobile individuals 
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may change their social and political attitudes as a result of their own mobility; or 
people may change their attitudes because they perceive other individuals as 
mobile" (Abramson & Books 1971). In the next chapter, we pay attention to the 
second process, but in the present chapter we focus on the first process when 
addressing the question: What are the effects of individual intergenerational class 
mobility on the voting behaviour of intergenerationally mobile persons? 
The present chapter is, as discussed in Chapter 1, not the first study that 
examines the effects of class mobility on individual voting behaviour. Studies 
from all three distinguished generations have investigated these effects. Over 
these three generations considerable progress has been made with respect to the 
content of hypotheses, measurement procedures, data collection and techniques of 
analyses. In studies of the first generation relatively unspecified hypotheses were 
tested by inspecting with the naked eye percentage figures in tables cross-
classifying manual and nonmanual classes with voting behaviour. These cross-
tabulations were constructed from relatively small datasets. In studies of the third 
generation more precise hypotheses were tested. Furthermore, these studies 
analysed good quality data from large scale surveys containing information about 
detailed class schemes. In addition, complicated and - more importantly -
substantively appropriate techniques of analyses were employed. 
In this chapter we build on the studies of the third generation in various ways. 
First, we discuss two main explanations of the relationship between class and 
voting behaviour that are central in these studies. Based on these explanations, we 
suggest some precise hypotheses about the effects of individuals' intergenerational 
class mobility on their voting behaviour. Second, we employ, as in the previous 
two chapters, our individual dataset containing data from sixteen countries. These 
data contain detailed information about current and former class position of 
respondents. Also as in the previous two chapters, we select from the data male 
respondents, aged eighteen years or older who had a valid score on all relevant 
variables. This results in a dataset comprising 63,120 respondents. Third, to 
analyse these data we use models that are especially designed to analyse the 
effects of class mobility. 
The outline of this chapter is as follows. In Section 2 we discuss two main 
explanations of the relationship between class and voting behaviour. On the basis 
of these explanations we suggest some hypotheses about the effects of 
individuals' intergenerational class mobility on their voting behaviour. In Section 
3 we discuss the models we use to test these hypotheses. The results of these tests 
are presented in Section 4. In the last section, Section 5, some conclusions are 
drawn. 
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7.2 Hypotheses 
In order to gain insight into the consequences of intergenerational class mobility, 
we begin with two main approaches of individual voting behaviour. The first is 
the so-called "economic theory of political behaviour" (Downs 1957), sometimes 
also known as the "instrumental theory". Its basic idea is that voting behaviour is 
rational and self-interested: people vote for the party whose policies will bring 
them the greatest utility. Class voting can then be explained on the grounds that 
people in lower social classes have an interest in egalitarian redistributive 
policies, which are typically espoused by left-wing parties, while the members of 
higher social classes have an interest in opposing such policies (Lipset et al. 
1954). 
The second approach, labelled by Heath et al. (1985: 9) the "expressive 
theory", conceives voting as a social act rather than an instrumental one. In this 
theory, it is assumed that people have a political identity and that this identity is 
developed through interaction with others. Individual voting behaviour is thus an 
expression of a person's political identity and will in turn reflect the norms and 
values of a person's normative membership group. With this theory, too, it is 
relatively straightforward to explain the relationship between class position and 
voting behaviour. In many cases people associate with others occupying the same 
class position. They are raised by them, live in the same area as them, attend the 
same schools, work together as colleagues, and thus learn the traditional culture 
of their shared class. Consequently, they will vote in the way their fellow class 
members traditionally vote. 
These two approaches are quite different with respect to their initial 
assumptions but, in predicting the relationship between class and voting 
behaviour, they are not contradictory but complementary (Heath et al. 1985: 9; 
see also: Weakliem & Heath 1994a). This complementary relationship can be 
stated thus: people vote for the same party both because of their analogous 
interests and because they are influenced by each other and this influence carries 
on in later periods. We might add that associating with others from the same class 
and thus having similar interests, may make people more conscious of their 
interests and of the party that best serves them. These interests will then become 
part of people's political identity. 
When we turn to the relationship between individual class mobility and voting 
behaviour, according to the simplest version of the theories, intergenerationally 
mobile persons are only assumed to interact with people of their newly obtained 
class. Furthermore, they are assumed to base their voting behaviour on their 
current class interests. Thus, the simplest application of the instrumental and 
expressive theory predicts that the voting behaviour of the mobile is only affected 
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by their current class position, and not by their class of origin. This yields what 
De Graaf & Ultee (1990) have labelled the strict economic hypothesis: 
The voting behaviour of intergenerationally mobile people will be identical to 
the typical voting behaviour of their class of destination. 
This hypothesis may seem superfluous, because it is unlikely that people's origins 
have no effect on their voting behaviour. Although the interests of mobile people 
may change, their identities do not change so quickly. However, this hypothesis 
provides a baseline against which other more plausible hypotheses can be tested. 
In fact, this baseline hypothesis was already discussed and tested in Chapter 6. 
A number of empirical studies from the various generations of research on 
stratification and politics have investigated the impact of class mobility on 
individual voting behaviour (Lipset & Zetterberg 1956; Lipset & Bendix 1959; 
Barber 1970; Abramson 1972; Knoke 1973; Turner 1992; Weakliem 1992). 
Almost invariably they have shown that the political behaviour of the mobile is 
somewhere between that of the stable members of their origin and destination 
classes. 
Some modest influence from social origins might also be expected if we 
consider an elaboration of instrumental and expressive theories. People might 
expect their current class positions to be temporary and might anticipate returning 
to their class of origin; hence they might define their long-run interests to be 
those of their class of origin.2 For example, in many cases sons of farmers, who 
are currently agricultural labourers, know that in the near future they will take 
over their fathers' farms and become fanners themselves. This may cause them to 
exhibit patterns of political behaviour that are more in line with the class from 
which they came (and that to which they are likely to return) than the class to 
which they currently belong. Another reason why class origins may influence 
people's political identities and their voting behaviour is that, as Goldthorpe 
(1980) points out, people are likely to interact with members of their former 
class, and not only with members of their own current class. Therefore, the weak 
economic hypothesis reads: 
The voting behaviour of intergenerationally mobile people will be between the 
typical voting behaviour of their class of destination and the typical voting 
behaviour of their class of origin. 
This hypothesis only says that the voting behaviour will be "somewhere" between 
that of the origin and destination class. A less vague hypothesis predicts that 
social origins will have a more important role for young people than for older 
people. This specification is in line with Blau's "pattern of acculturation" (1956) 
and follows the expressive theory of voting behaviour. The culture of people's 
origin class is likely to be particularly important in early political socialization 
(Campbell et al. 1960; Butler & Stokes 1974; Nieuwbeerta & Wittebrood 1995). 
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Furthermore, social networks change slowly and it may take time for the mobile 
to integrate socially into their class of destination and thereby lose their old social 
identities. Thus, assuming that older respondents in general have had longer 
periods in their class of destination than have younger people, the acculturation 
hypothesis can be formulated:3 
The voting behaviour of older intergenerationally mobile people will be closer 
to the typical voting behaviour of their class of destination relative to the 
typical voting behaviour of their class of origin, than will the voting behaviour 
of younger intergenerationally mobile people. 
Another specification of the weak economic hypothesis assumes an asymmetry in 
the patterns of adaptation of upwardly and downwardly mobile people. Lipset 
(1960), for example, found when analysing data for the United States in 1948, 
that upwardly mobile people adapted more quickly to their destination class than 
did those who were downwardly mobile. Lipset's explanation of this finding was 
that people in general prefer to adopt the more prestigious identity and, thereby, 
to maximize their status. That is, people may prefer to perceive their normative 
reference group as whichever is the higher of their classes of origin and 
destination. Similar statements have been made by Parkin (1971: 51, 54), 
Thorbum (1979), Abramson (1972), and De Graaf & Ultee (1990). The status 
maximization hypothesis, then, is that: 
Upwardly intergenerationally mobile persons orient their voting behaviour 
геЫі еІу more to the typical voting behaviour of their class of destination, 
than do downwardly intergenerationally mobile persons.* 
The acculturation hypothesis and the status maximization hypothesis are not 
mutually exclusive, since the latter does not say how fast the maximization 
process proceeds. Therefore, three additional possibilities can be specified 
regarding how the voting behaviour of intergenerationally mobile persons might 
be affected by their individual class mobility. A first combination of the 
acculturation and the status maximization hypothesis implies that the upwardly 
mobile who have just arrived in their class of destination instantly adjust more 
than the downwardly mobility who have just arrived in their class of destination. 
Subsequently, for both the upwardly and downwardly mobile it takes the same 
number of years to adopt to their new class. A second combination implies that, 
while for the upwardly and downwardly mobile the initial adjustment to their 
destination class is the same, the acculturation to their new class takes less years 
for the upwardly mobile than for the downwardly mobile. Since the upwardly 
mobile gain status, they adapt faster to their class of destination than the 
downwardly mobile. A third combination implies that the first two combinations 
are simultaneously valid. 
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7.3 Modelling the effects of individual class mobility 
The formulated hypotheses distinguish between the voting behaviour of mobile 
and immobile individuals. Furthermore, in these hypotheses the voting behaviour 
of the immobile is taken as a reference for the voting behaviour of the mobile. 
The importance of taking the immobile as the reference has been suggested by -
among others - Sorokin (1959 [1927]: 509-10), when he argued that "if we want 
to know the characteristic attitudes of a farmer, we do not go to a man who has 
been a farmer for a few months, but go to a fanner who is a farmer for life". 
Even better, we would argue, go to a fanner who was born and bred a farmer. 
We thus think of the immobile respondents as representing the core of the class 
and defining its norms and values to which newcomers may or may not 
acculturate. We therefore need a statistical model which corresponds to these 
substantive concerns. 
As discussed in Chapter 1, scholars from the first generation of research on 
stratification and voting behaviour analysed cross-tabulations with the naked eye, 
when examining the effects of class mobility on voting behaviour. Scholars from 
the second generation were the first to use statistical models to investigate the 
effects of individual class mobility on people's voting behaviour (Knoke, 1973; 
Jackman 1972a, 1972b; Thorburn 1979). In these models, voting behaviour was 
the variable to be explained, while origin, destination and a term for interaction 
between origin and destination were explanatory variables. These second 
generation models, however, did not conespond to the substantive concerns 
expressed above. As Hope (1971) and Sobel (1981) made clear, in these 
conventional models the explanatory (reference) categories include - probably 
different - mixtures of mobile and immobile respondents.5 
Fortunately, studies of the third generation have at their disposal a model that 
takes the voting behaviour of the immobile as a reference for the voting 
behaviour of the mobile. This substantively more appropriate model is Sobel's 
diagonal mobility model (Sobel 1981, 1985).6 In this model the voting behaviour 
of mobile individuals is modelled in such a way that it is a weighted average of 
the voting behaviour of the immobile in their classes of origin and that of the 
immobile in their classes of destination. The model therefore does away with 
vague conclusions that the voting behaviour of mobility is somewhere in between 
the voting behaviour of their origin and destination class. The diagonal mobility 
model allows us to examine precisely how much closer the voting behaviour of 
the mobile is to the voting behaviour of the immobile members in their class of 
destination than to that of the immobile members in their class of origin. These 
diagonal mobility models were introduced into research on stratification and 
politics by De Graaf & Ultee (1987, 1990), when they examined the effects of 
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class mobility on voting behaviour in the Netherlands. Since then these diagonal 
mobility models have been employed in various studies analysing the effects of 
mobility on voting behaviour in other countries (Weakliem 1992; Clifford & 
Heath 1993; Breen & Whelan 1994; De Graaf et al. 1995). 
The logistic version of the diagonal mobility model that we apply in this 
chapter to test the hypotheses can be expressed as follows:7 
logCiTC'LeftiJ/u - TCLeftjJ) = ρ a d + (1-p) a0 + ßL*covUod (1) 
where Lefiiod is the value of the dependent variable, i.e. left-wing voting behaviour 
of respondent i, whose origin class was o, and whose current (destination) class is 
d. Obviously, for immobile class members the origin and destination classes are 
the same (o=d). The variable Left is coded (1) for voting for a left-wing political 
party and (0) for voting for a right-wing party. The ad-parameters represent the 
log-odds of voting for a left-wing rather than a right-wing party for the immobile 
class members in the destination class of the respondent. The a0-parameters 
represent the voting behaviour of the immobile class members in the origin class 
of the respondent. Therefore, the parameters ρ and (1-p) are destination and origin 
weights which indicate for mobile respondents the relative importance of the 
voting behaviour of the destination and the origin classes (Sobel 1981).8 
When fitting the models we include various dummies as covariates (cov) and 
estimate a ß-parameter for each covariate. Consequently, if we have L dummies 
we have to estimate L ß-parameters. The covariates are included because when 
testing the formulated hypotheses on the effects of individual class mobility we 
have to realize that, as we also found in Chapter 4, people vote not only 
according to their material interests, but also according to their non-material 
interests. Therefore, we can assume that people's voting behaviour, as well as 
being influenced by their current and former class positions, is also affected by 
their religion, age, ethnicity and the period the live in. When investigating the 
effects of their current and former class positions, it is therefore important to 
control for the effects of these variables. In our models religion is divided into 
five groups: Catholic, Protestant, Rereformed (for The Netherlands only), other 
denomination and no religion. Given the importance of ethnicity for predicting 
voting behaviour in the United States we include ethnicity (0 = non-black; 1 = 
black) for the United States. For the other countries there are so few blacks that 
ethnicity can not sensibly be included as an independent variable. Furthermore, to 
take account of the main effects of age we include three age groups (18-30; 
31-50; 51+) as covariates since there appears to be non-linear relationships 
between age and party preference. In addition, we recode the variable period into 
a set of dummies representing several periods in which the surveys were held: 
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1961-1965, 1966-1970, 1971-1975, 1976-1980, 1981-1985, and 1986-1990.' This 
controls for the varying popularity of the left-wing and right-wing political parties 
over-time. In our models we have chosen the reference category as: no religion, 
age group 31-50, non-black, and period 1981-1985. However, for countries where 
no information on respondents in this reference category were available, other 
reference categories are taken. 
The model that is given by equation (1), model A (in Tables 7.2 and 7.3), 
represents the weak economic hypothesis. This hypothesis states that the voting 
behaviour of mobile persons will be between the typical votin behaviour of their 
class of destination and that of their class of origin. To test the other formulated 
hypotheses, we adjust model A by constraining the p-parameter, or by including 
extra parameters in the model. 
The strict economic hypothesis predicts that the voting behaviour of the mobile 
will only be affected by current class position, and not by class of origin. 
Therefore, the voting behaviour of intergenerationally mobile people will be 
identical to the typical voting behaviour in their class of destination. This 
hypothesis is represented by constraining the weight-parameter ρ to unity. This 
gives model B: 
logCÍT^LefU/ü - Tf-LefU) = «„ + ßL*covUo<1 (2) 
The acculturation hypothesis states that the older people are, the greater is the 
influence of their destination class relative to that of their origin class. In other 
words, this hypothesis implies that the weight-parameter ρ varies according to the 
length of time that a person has been a member of a class. Model С represents 
the acculturation hypothesis and therefore includes an interaction between age and 
the origin and destination weights: 
log((7C*LefW/(l - ^ L e f U ) = 
(p0 + 5*age) * ocd + (1- (p0 + 5*age)) * a„ + ßL*covUod (3) 
A positive value of the δ-parameter estimate in this equation implies that the 
older mobile persons are, i.e. the longer they have been members of their 
destination class, the more likely it is that they vote according to the voting 
behaviour in their destination class and the less likely it is that they vote 
according to the voting behaviour in their origin class. In order to get 
interpretable parameter estimates for the p0 variable, when applying this model 
the continuous variable age was recoded to: years of age minus 40. Thus, the 
value zero represents respondents with the age of 40 years. This is about the 
average age in each country. 
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The status maximization hypothesis predicts that upwardly intergenerationally 
mobile persons orient their voting behaviour relatively more towards the voting 
behaviour of their class of destination than do downwardly intergenerationally 
mobile persons. To test this hypothesis we use Model D, which is identical to the 
model that represented the acculturation hypothesis, except that the variable age is 
replaced by a variable up/down: 
log(^*Left,ed)/(l - Tf-LefU) = 
(p0 + 5*up/down) * <xd + (1- (p0 + ô*up/down)) * α 0 + Рь*со ио<1 (4) 
The variable up/down in this equation takes the value 1 for upwardly mobile, -1 
for downwardly mobile, and 0 for stable class members. To be able to define 
whether a class member is upwardly mobile, downwardly mobile or stable, an 
ordering of the EGP class categories is necessary. However, the EGP scheme is 
not constructed around one single principle from which a full ordering of the 
classes can be derived. But, following Erikson & Goldthorpe (1992: 45), a 
threefold hierarchical division between classes, in terms of their prestige, socio­
economic status, or "general desirability", can be distinguished. According to this 
hierarchical division the highest class is formed by the service class, the lowest 
class by the unskilled manual workers and agricultural workers, and the other 
classes, i.e. the skilled manual class, the routine nonmanual class, the petty 
bourgeoisie and farmers, form the intermediate class. 
To test the three combinations of the acculturation hypothesis and status 
maximization hypothesis that we discussed, we include both the age and up/down 
variables in our models. A first combination of the acculturation and the status 
maximization hypotheses implies that upwardly mobile persons who have just 
arrived in their class of destination instantly adjust more than the downwardly 
mobile persons who have just arrived in their class of destination, but also that 
there are no differences in the acculturation or age effect between upwardly and 
downwardly mobile. To test this combination hypothesis, we use Model E where 
both the additive effects of up/down and age are included: 
log(^*Left,J/(l - J fLefO) = 
(p0+ 6,*age + 62*up/down) * ad + 
(l-(Po+ 6,*age + 52*up/down)) * a 0 + р *со и я 1 (5) 
A second combination implies that, since the upwardly mobile gain status, they 
will adapt faster to their class of destination than will the downwardly mobile. 
Thus, the acculturation to their new class takes more years for the upwardly 
mobile than for the downwardly mobile. To test this combination hypothesis we 
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use Model F, where - in addition to the acculturation or age effect - an interaction 
effect between the variables age and up/down is included: 
log((7i*LefU/(l - if-LefU) = 
(p0+ 5,*age + 52*age*up/down) * ocd + 
(l-(p0+ 5,*age + S^age+up/down)) * a 0 + рь*со и и 1 (6) 
The third combination implies that both the instant adjustment and the 
acculturation over the years are different for the upwardly and downwardly 
mobile. Therefore, in Model G we include both the additive effect of up/down 
and the interaction effect between the variables age and up/down in the diagonal 
mobility models: 
logtt^LefU/d - 7C*LefU) = 
(p0+ ô]*age + ^""up/down + 53*age*up/down) * ad + 
(1- (p0+ 5,*age + 62*up/down + 53*age*up/down)) a0 + p\.*covUod (7) 
Models A to G are fitted on the data for all sixteen countries separately. To select 
the model that represents the data best, we compare the fit of one model with a 
less general one, i.e. one that is nested within that model. 
7.4 Results 
Before applying the diagonal mobility models, we first make clear the difficulties 
that scholars of the first generation of research on social stratification and voting 
behaviour had, when they had to examine the effects of mobility on voting 
behaviour by analysing cross-tabulations. In studies of the first generation 
scholars typically presented cross-tabulations on the voting behaviour of the 
mobile and immobile class members. In Table 7.1 we give an example of such a 
table based on data from our own dataset. This table displays the proportion of 
respondents with left-wing voting behaviour in each category of the 
intergenerational mobility table. Although in subsequent analyses we look at data 
for all sixteen countries, in Table 7.1 figures for only four countries are presented, 
i.e. Germany, Britain, the Netherlands, and the United States. These countries 
were selected for two reasons. First, there are obvious technical advantages of 
using countries for which large datasets are available (for example, respondents 
are included in almost all cells of the table). Second, the countries chosen allowed 
us to include considerable variation in levels of class voting. In Britain the level 
of class voting is relatively high, in Germany and the Netherlands it is moderate, 
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and in the United States it is relatively low. 
In Table 7.1 we find, as already discussed in Chapter 6, that class has a clear 
relationship with voting behaviour. In all countries except the United States 
farmers form the least and the unskilled manual class the most left-wing class. 
Table 7.1 also shows that in all four countries the voting behaviour of mobile 
people is typically different to that of the stable members of their destination 
class. For example, unskilled manual class workers from service class 
backgrounds display lower levels of left-wing voting behaviour than is the case 
among the stable members of the unskilled manual class. Conversely, persons 
who move into the service class from the unskilled manual class tend to display 
lower levels of left-wing voting behaviour than do the intergenerationally stable 
service class members. In general, Table 7.1 shows that the voting behaviour of 
the mobile is in between that of their origin and destination class. However, 
whether the voting behaviour of the mobile in these countries is also statistically 
different from the origin and/or destination class, and whether the voting 
behaviour of the upwardly mobile is statistically closer to that in their destination 
class than is the case for the downwardly mobile, can not be analysed by simply 
looking at the figures in Table 7.1. To answer these questions, we employ the 
diagonal mobility models designed for this purpose. 
Model selection 
To test our hypotheses for all our countries, we need to choose between the 
diagonal mobility models A to G, each representing a single hypothesis. We fit 
these models separately for each country. Thus, let us first examine the fit 
statistics of the diagonal mobility models. As in Chapter 6, we use the 
Likelihood-ratio test and the BIC to detect whether the fits of the various models 
differ significantly. These fit statistics are presented in Table 7.2 and Table 7.3. 
In Model A, representing our weak economic hypothesis, it is assumed that 
there are no differences between upwardly and downwardly mobile people and no 
acculturation effect. On the basis of the negative BIC in each country, we 
conclude that this model gives a reasonable presentation of the data. To examine 
whether this hypothesis can be accepted, we next test the other formulated 
hypotheses. 
The strict economic hypothesis assumes that the voting behaviour of the mobile 
will only be affected by their current class position. This hypothesis is represented 
by Model B. This model uses one degree of freedom less than Model A. 
However, according to the Likelihood-ratio test and the BIC, Model A gives a 
much better representation of our data in most countries. Only in Belgium and 
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142 Effects of Individual Iniergenerational Class Mobility 
Canada is Model В preferable to Model A. Consequently, in general we have to 
reject the strict economic hypothesis in favour of the weak economic hypothesis. 
Model С represents the acculturation hypothesis, which predicts that the older a 
person is, the larger the influence of destination class relative to origin class is on 
voting behaviour. The figures in Table 7.2 show that in nine of the sixteen 
countries, according to the Likelihood-ratio test. Model С results in a significant 
improvement in fit compared with Model A. In four of these nine countries, 
Model С also represents the data better according to the BIC. These countries are 
Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, United States. Furthermore, in three countries, 
i.e. Austria, Germany and Britain, the BIC of Model С differs less than two from 
the BIC of Model A. Thus, in seven countries Model С is to be preferred to 
Model A. In the other countries under investigation, according to the Likelihood-
ratio test and/or the BIC, Model С does not yield a significant improvement in fit 
compared to Model A. Consequently, in general we can not decide between the 
weak economic hypothesis and the acculturation hypothesis. 
Next, the status maximization hypothesis predicts that upwardly 
intergenerationally mobile people orient their voting behaviour relatively more to 
the voting behaviour of their class of destination than is true for downwardly 
mobile persons. This hypothesis is represented by Model D. According to both 
the Likelihood-ratio test and the BIC, Model D does not result in a significant 
improvement in fit either compared to Model С or, for those countries where 
Model С does not fit better than Model A, compared to Model A. Consequently, 
the status maximization hypothesis has to be rejected. 
Finally, the three combinations of the acculturation hypothesis and the status 
maximization hypothesis formulated earlier, are represented by Models E, F and 
G. Tables 7.2 and 7.3 show that, according to the BIC, in none of the countries 
under investigation these three models are to be preferred to the acculturation 
model (Model C) or the weak economic model (Model A). Thus, we have to 
reject the hypothesis that the downwardly mobile and upwardly mobile differ in 
their acculturation patterns. 
To conclude this section we suggest that Model C, representing the 
acculturation hypothesis, gives the best representation of the data in seven 
countries. These countries are Austria, Britain, Denmark, Finland, Germany, the 
Netherlands, and the United States. In the other countries, however, the 
acculturation hypothesis is not corroborated. In these countries - Australia, 
Belgium, Canada, France, Ireland, Italy, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland - Model A 
representing the weak economic hypothesis, is preferable. Consequently, in all 
countries the other hypotheses, i.e. the strict economic hypothesis, the status 
maximization hypothesis, and the combinations of the acculturation and status 
maximization hypothesis, cannot be accepted. 
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Parameter estimates 
Because the model selection did not yield a clear conclusion about whether the 
model representing the weak economic hypothesis or that representing the 
acculturation hypothesis was preferable, we next examine the parameter estimates 
of both models (Model A and Model C) for all countries. The most important are 
the weight-parameter ρ (both in Model A and C) and the acculturation-parameter 
δ (in Model C). These parameters for both models are given in Table 7.4. Models 
A and C, of course, also yield parameter estimates for the covariates religion, 
age, ethnicity and period. However, since reporting the parameters for all 
covariates for all country specific models would require very large tables and 
would not provide information about the effects of class mobility on individual 
class voting, we do not report them here. 
The weight-parameters for Model A, representing the weak economic 
hypothesis, are given in the first main column of Table 7.4. The weak economic 
hypothesis assumes that the voting behaviour of intergenerationally mobile people 
will be between the typical voting behaviour of their class of destination and that 
of their class of origin. This implies that the weight-parameter ρ (indicating the 
relative weight of the destination class) of this model is assumed to be between 
zero and one.10 The estimates of the weight-parameter ρ show that this is the 
case. In all countries, except Canada, the estimated values of the p-parameter are 
between 0.55 and 0.70. Furthermore, the standard errors of these estimates are 
very small. Thus, the parameter estimates support the weak economic hypothesis. 
Because in all countries the value of the p-parameter exceeds 0.50, the weight of 
the destination class is larger than that of the origin class. The only exception is 
the estimated weight-parameter for Canada that has the value 1.484 which is hard 
to interpret. This incomprehensible result is probably due to the fact that the data 
are not well described by the model, since in Canada classes hardly differ in their 
voting behaviour. 
In Table 7.4 the relevant parameters of Model С for all countries are presented. 
This models gives the best representation of our data for seven countries: Austria, 
Britain, Denmark, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, and United States. Model 
С represents the acculturation hypothesis, which assumes that the older 
intergenerationally mobile people are, the closer their voting behaviour will be to 
the typical voting behaviour of their class of destination relative to that of their 
class of origin. Model С therefore includes a weight-parameter p0 and an 
acculturation effect parameter δ, i.e. an interaction between age and the origin and 
destination weights. If the acculturation hypothesis holds (and because - as 
indicated earlier - we coded the continuous age variable as: age - 40), the 
estimate of the p0-parameter has to take a value between zero and one, and the 
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acculturation-parameter estimate has to take a positive value. 
The figures in Table 7.4 give the estimates of the country weight-parameter p 0 
and the acculturation-parameter δ for all countries. The results for all countries -
except Canada - are the following. The weight-parameter estimates are all 
between 0.55 and 0.66. Furthermore, the estimates of the acculturation-parameters 
have positive values for all countries. This indicates that the older the 
intergenerationally mobile get, the more they adopt the voting behaviour of their 
class of destination. In the seven countries for which the acculturation model 
gives the best representation of the data, the acculturation-parameters are 
statistically significant from zero. Furthermore, it should be noted that the 
acculturation-parameter estimates also have positive - although not statistically 
significant - values in all countries where Model С does not give a statistically 
better fit than Model A. This result gives a strong indication that in general the 
acculturation hypothesis is supported. 
Substantially the values of the acculturation-parameter estimates tell an 
interesting story. For example, in the Britain - a country with a relatively strong 
relationship between class and voting behaviour - the weight-parameter p0 is 
0.585 (s.e. 0.031) and the acculturation-parameter δ is 0.004 (s.e. 0.002). These 
results imply that in Britain for mobile persons at the age of 40, the destination 
class has a little more impact than their origin class. Furthermore, the 
acculturation-parameters implies that each year people get older the destination 
class becomes a little more important, i.e. by 0.4 per cent. Apparently, the 
cumulative impact of acculturation over the life-span is substantial. The model 
suggests that, for people aged eighteen, the relative destination and origin weights 
are respectively 0.585 - 22*0.004, or 0.497, and 1 - 0.497, or 0.503. This implies 
that for our youngest respondents the effect of their origin class is almost equal to 
that of their destination class. By the time they have reached sixty five years of 
age (coded 25 on our age variable), the relative destination and origin effects 
become 0.585 + 25*0.004, or 0.685, and 1 - 0.685, or 0.315 respectively. These 
figures indicate that the destination effect is twice the size of the origin effect. 
However, the origin still has a substantial impact on the voting behaviour of those 
aged sixty five and over. 
This pattern for Britain also holds for all other countries, except of course 
Canada. For example, in the Netherlands - a country with a much weaker 
relationship between class and voting behaviour than in Britain - the coefficients 
of the acculturation-parameters indicate that at the age of 18 the relative 
destination weight is 0.405, at the age of 40 it is 0.559, and at the age of 65 the 
destination weight is 0.734. Furthermore, in the United States - a country with a 
very low level of class voting - the destination weight has the value 0.328 at the 
age of 18, 0.548 at the age of 40 and 0.798 at the age of 65. Thus, in all 
146 Effects of Individual Intergenerational Class Mobility 
countries the destination class has less impact than the origin class when the 
intergenerationally mobile class members are young. The older mobile class 
members are, the stronger the relative impact of the destination class is. For 
mobile people older than about 35 years of age, is their destination class is more 
important than their origin class. However, even when mobile people are about 65 
years old, their origin class still has a substantial impact on their voting 
behaviour. 
7.5 Conclusions 
In this chapter, we examined the impact of intergenerational class mobility on 
individual voting behaviour. Four hypotheses concerning the effects of mobility 
on voting behaviour were tested using a research design characteristic for studies 
of the third generation. That is, we used the design of Sobel's diagonal mobility 
models analysing 113 cross-sectional datasets representing sixteen countries over 
the period 1956-1990. 
In all countries we found that the voting behaviour of the intergenerationally 
mobile was between the typical voting behaviour of their class of destination and 
that of their class of origin. In fact, the outcomes of the analyses showed that the 
effect of people's destination class was larger than that of their origin class. 
Furthermore, we found in seven countries - Austria, Britain, Denmark, Finland, 
Germany, the Netherlands, and the United States - that the voting behaviour of 
older intergenerationally mobile people was closer to the typical voting behaviour 
of their class of destination relative to the typical voting behaviour of their class 
of origin, than was the case for the voting behaviour of younger intergeneration-
ally mobile people. For our youngest respondents the effect of class origin was 
almost equal to that of class destination. By the time respondents reached sixty 
five years of age the relative destination effect was two times the size of the 
origin effect, although the latter still had a substantial impact on the voting 
behaviour of this age group. 
The results of our analyses furthermore implied that two hypotheses could not 
be accepted. The first hypothesis assumed that no effects of people's origin class 
exist. This assumption has already been rejected by most earlier studies on 
stratification and politics an its rejection here is thus in line with these studies. 
The other hypothesis stated that upwardly intergenerationally mobile persons 
orient their voting behaviour relatively more to the typical voting behaviour of 
their class of destination, than do downwardly intergenerationally mobile persons. 
The fact that this maximization hypothesis had to be rejected contradicts earlier 
empirical studies from the first generation (for an overview see Janowitz 1970), 
Effects of Individual Intergenerational Class Mobility 147 
but is in line with the more recent empirical results of studies from the third 
generation of stratification and politics (De Graaf & Шее 1990; Weakliem 1992; 
Nieuwbeerta & De Graaf 1993). 
The results discussed in this chapter also have implications for macro-
explanations of variation in levels of class voting. We know that classes in a 
country consist of immobile and mobile members. Furthermore, our analyses have 
shown that mobile class members have a voting behaviour somewhere between 
the typical voting behaviour in their origin class and that in their destination 
class. This implies that in general, differences in voting behaviour between 
mobile class members will be less than that between immobile class members 
from the same classes. Thus, the more classes consist only of mobile members, 
the lower the level of class voting will be. Therefore, in general, we can conclude 
that intergenerational class mobility tends to weaken the "democratic class 
struggle" in a country. 
However, the strength of the effect of intergenerational class mobility on the 
intensity of the class struggle in a society depends on the proportion of 
intergenerationally mobile and immobile members in each class. Thus, it is only 
when taking into account these composition effects that we can investigate 
adequately the extent to which variations in the strengths of the relationship 
between social class and voting behaviour in countries can be explained by 
variations in the patterns of intergenerational class mobility in these countries. We 
do this in Chapter 9 of this study. However, before testing this macro-level 
explanation, we pay attention to other effects of intergenerational class mobility 
on individual voting behaviour, i.e. the so-called "contextual" effects of class 
mobility. 

8 Contextual Effects of Intergenerational 
Class Mobility on Voting Behaviour 
8.1 Introduction1 
When examining the relationship between intergenerational class mobility and 
individual voting behaviour, most researchers have adopted the micro-sociological 
perspective, i.e. they have investigated the effects of individual mobility on the 
voting behaviour of intergenerationally mobile persons (see for example: Barber 
1970; Weakliem 1992; Nieuwbeerta & De Graaf 1992). Indeed, we also adopted 
this perspective in the previous chapter. A series of studies stretching from the 
first to the third generation of research on stratification and politics, however, 
suggests that intergenerational class mobility may also influence people's voting 
behaviour in a more indirect way, i.e. people may change their voting behaviour 
because they perceive intergenerational class mobility in their environment 
(Abramson & Books 1971; Thorburn 1979). It are these "contextual effects" of 
class mobility that we focus on in the present chapter. 
Although, of course, such contextual effects can be assumed to affect the 
voting behaviour of both the intergenerationally mobile and the immobile, we 
restrict our investigations to the immobile class members. We do this, because for 
the immobile the contextual effects can be expected to be stronger than for the 
mobile. The contexts of mobile have changed over their life course and 
consequently they were subject to conflicting contextual effects. However, for 
immobile class members contextual effect are easier to detect. In this chapter we 
thus address the question: What are the contextual effects of intergenerational 
class mobility in a country on the voting behaviour of intergenerationally 
immobile persons? 
The significance of the answer to this question lies not only in the way it helps 
us to understand individual voting behaviour. Contextual effects of class mobility 
might also have implications for understanding the political consequences of 
mobility on the political constellation in a country. It has been customary - as 
discussed in Chapter 1 - to concentrate on the mobile and to suppose that more 
(upward) mobility in a country leads to a lower level of class voting in that 
country. Such arguments generally assume composition effects. For example, if 
more people with manual backgrounds enter the service class, its mean voting 
behaviour will be more left-wing. However, a shift to less class voting might also 
150 Contextual Effects of Intergenerational Class Mobility 
be strengthened by contextual effects. For instance, the influences of the mobile 
members on the immobile might cause a movement towards the left by immobile 
members of the nonmanual classes, and towards the right by immobile members 
of the manual classes. Therefore, before in the next chapter we examine the 
macro-effect of the class mobility patterns of countries on the levels of class 
voting in these countries, we examine the contextual effects of class mobility in 
this chapter. 
The outline of this chapter is as follows. In Section 2 we present our hypoth-
eses. In Section 3, we discuss the research methods. Our hypotheses are tested in 
Section 4. In this chapter's last section, Section 5, we discuss the results. 
8.2 Hypotheses 
Many scholars of the various generations of research on stratification and politics 
have formulated theories and hypotheses about the contextual effects of class 
mobility on voting behaviour (for example: Blau & Duncan 1967: 440; Abramson 
& Books 1971; Thorbum 1979; De Graaf & Ultee 1987). Building on this earlier 
research into the contextual effects of class mobility, we formulate hypotheses 
about the effects of two characteristics of mobility patterns on the voting 
behaviour of immobile class members. These characteristics are the level of 
outflow mobility from a specific class and the level of inflow mobility to a specific 
class. 
To hypothesize on the effects of levels of outflow and inflow mobility in a 
certain class on the voting behaviour of the members of that class, we use - as in 
Chapter 7 - the instrumental and expressive theories of individual voting 
behaviour. According to the instrumental theory, voting behaviour is rational and 
self-interested: people vote according to their interests and therefore vote for the 
party whose policies will bring them the greatest utility now or in the future. In 
the expressive theory, voting is seen as a social act rather than an instrumental 
one. People associate with each other, and these associations are thought to 
provide an arena in which voting behaviour may be influenced. In general, such 
associations are made with people from the same class position, but sometimes -
for example due to class mobility - they are not. 
An hypothesis concerning the effects of the level of inflow mobility to a class 
on the voting behaviour of the stable members of that class, can best be deduced 
from the expressive theory. Because people in general associate with people 
occupying the same class position (Goldthorpe 1986), people's alignments to a 
certain party are usually stimulated by the influences of their class co-members, 
and all influences being in the same direction. However, when classes are 
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heterogeneous - due to the inflow of intergenerationally mobile people - we 
would expect the existing mobile class members to be influenced by the different 
voting behaviour of those entering the class. This is especially the case when the 
influx of newcomers with different political attitudes and behaviours is large (see 
also Lipset 1960). 
The impact of newcomers may be expected to depend not only on the amount 
of inflow to a class, but also on the political character of that inflow. The more 
left-wing the voting behaviour of newly arrived class members, the more will the 
voting behaviour of the stable class members be left-wing. Thus, the effects of 
inflow mobility on the voting behaviour of immobile class members can be 
assumed to be dependent on two factors: the absolute level of inflow mobility to 
a class, and the political character of this inflow. Therefore, the following inflow 
mobility hypothesis can be formulated: 
The higher the level of left-wing inflow mobility to a class, the more likely it is 
that the immobile members of that class will vote for a left-wing political party. 
The effects of the level of outflow mobility from a class on the individual voting 
behaviour of immobile members of that class, can be deduced from the 
instrumental theory. We might expect that people are influenced by seeing others 
move out of their class. If people see many co-class members leaving their class, 
they can be expected to anticipate the possibility of mobility for themselves. 
Consequently, they might adjust their voting behaviour in line with possible 
future interests. It is through this mechanism that the level of outflow mobility 
from a class can be expected to have an effect on the voting behaviour of 
immobile members of that class. 
Again, it should be noted that the effects of outflow mobility on the voting 
behaviour of immobile class members depend upon two factors. The first is the 
absolute level of outflow mobility, i.e. the percentage of class members leaving 
the class of their father. The higher the amount of outflow mobility from a class, 
the greater the likelihood that immobile class members will change their voting 
behaviour. The second factor, the political character of the outflow mobility - i.e. 
the interests and typical voting behaviour of the classes where the mobile flow 
to - can also be assumed to have an impact on the voting behaviour of those who 
are "left behind". The more left-wing the interests of those moving out become, 
the more those who stay in their class will anticipate these new interests and 
consequently vote in a more left-wing way. Summarizing these arguments leads 
us to the following outflow mobility hypothesis: 
The higher the level of left-wing outflow mobility from a class, the more likely 
it is that the immobile members of that class will vote for a left-wing political 
party. 
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The implications of this hypothesis can best be illustrated by an example. For 
instance, immobile unskilled manual workers in a society with a high level of 
outflow from their class, might anticipate their own possible mobility. Because, 
by definition, those moving out go to classes with less left-wing interests, the 
immobile unskilled manual workers may adopt a less left-wing political party 
preference than they would have adopted in a society with little outflow from 
their class. This hypothesis is directly in line with Blau and Duncan's argument 
that "men who see little opportunity for improvement in their own economic 
status or, at least, that of their children, have greater inducements than those 
anticipating advancements in status to organize a union, to raise wages or to vote 
for a party that advocates higher taxes for the wealthy" (1967: 440). 
However, the effect of the amount of outflow mobility from the unskilled 
manual class does not give sufficient information about the direction and the 
extent to which the immobile class members are influenced by level of outflow 
mobility. This depends on the classes to which the mobile members go. For 
example, in a country where most people from the unskilled manual class go to 
the skilled manual class (with its similar interests and voting behaviour), the 
voting behaviour of the immobile members of the unskilled manual class will 
hardly be affected by the level of outflow from their class. Conversely, in a 
country where most of those leaving the unskilled manual class go to the service 
class (which has less to gain from a more egalitarian society and displays, in 
general, a substantially less left-wing voting pattern), it is likely that the voting 
behaviour of the immobile members of the unskilled manual class will change 
substantially. Similarly, for members of the other social classes it can be 
hypothesized that the more they see their class members fall down the social 
ladder, the more they will anticipate their own downward mobility, and thus vote 
in a more left-wing way. 
Before testing the formulated hypotheses, we should first note a conflicting 
argumentation that has also been suggested in the literature. Goldthorpe (1986: 
342), for example, suggested such an hypothesis on the basis of social-
psychological arguments. He argued that the more men of working class origins 
make their way into the service class, the more it would seem reasonable to 
suppose that a large majority of those who remain within the working class will 
"have a recognition of apparent 'openness'". Consequently, among those who - so 
to speak - were "left behind", some degree of discontentment or frustration might 
develop. Then, under the assumption that dissatisfaction and frustration for 
manual class members lead to a more left-wing voting behaviour, it can be 
expected that those who stay behind vote more left-wing than they would have 
done in a situation where only a limited number of people were upwardly mobile 
from their class. However, Goldthorpe himself has already suggested that such a 
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response would not be widespread due to the fact that for those who fail to 
achieve upward mobility, there still remain many alternatives that can serve to 
prevent any widespread sense of grievance. When testing our hypotheses this 
argumentation has to be kept in mind. 
83 Modelling the contextual effects of class mobility 
The main thrust of our contextual hypotheses is that the voting behaviour of 
individual stable members of a particular class in a certain country for a given 
year, can be explained by the inflow and outflow mobility in that class, country 
and year. Therefore, when testing the hypotheses we have to take account of the 
layered structure of our data, i.e. individuals are surveyed within years and within 
classes and countries. An appropriate way to test our hypotheses is to use a multi-
level model containing three different levels: (1) an individual-level; (2) a year-
level and (3) a class/country-level. 
When modelling these effects two remarks are in order. First, the effects of 
inflow and outflow mobility depend both on the amount of inflow and outflow 
mobility and on the political character of that inflow and outflow. However, the 
amount of inflow and outflow mobility per se, do not give an indication of the 
direction in which the immobile class members will change their voting 
behaviour, i.e. whether they will become more right-wing or more left-wing. 
Therefore, in our models we take this into account by including interaction effects 
of the level of inflow and outflow mobility and the political character of that 
inflow and outflow. 
A second consideration when testing the contextual effects of class mobility on 
the individual voting behaviour of intergenerationally immobile class members, is 
that their voting behaviour is not solely affected by differences in rates of inflow 
and outflow mobility, but are more determined by their material circumstances 
and interests. We take this into account in our modelling by allowing each class 
within each nation to have its own "natural" level of left-wing preferences. In this 
way we can test whether rates of outflow and inflow mobility can account for 
variations around this natural level. 
Therefore, to test the hypotheses concerning the effects of levels of inflow and 
outflow mobility in a society on individual voting behaviour we use multi-level 
models that take these considerations into account. We use three models: one that 
tests the inflow mobility hypothesis, one that tests the outflow mobility 
hypothesis, and one that tests both these hypotheses simultaneously. In all three 
models, at the individual-level we estimate the voting behaviour of individual 
immobile class members as follows: 
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^ ( ( π ^ η , ^ / α - π * ! ^ ) ) = β
ΜΑ
 + eldjk (1) 
In this individual-level equation, the dependent variable is the log-odds for the 
immobile members (i) of each class (d) to vote for a left-wing political party 
rather than a right-wing party in each year (j) and country (k). The intercept in 
the individual-level equation, ßMjk, represents the mean log-odds of voting left-
wing rather right-wing for stable class members in each of the distinguished 
classes and countries in each year. This intercept (which can vary from year to 
year, from class to class, and from nation to nation), serves as the dependent 
variable in the year-level equation. 
To test the inflow mobility hypothesis we then use a model (Model A) in 
which the year-level equation is specified as follows: 
ßodjk = ßcwok + ßiooo (Inflowdjk*In-weightdl[) + yM¡k (2) 
Similarly, to test the outflow mobility hypothesis we apply a model (Model B) 
with the following year-level equation: 
Pod* = ßodok + β2οοο (Outflowdjk*Out-weightdk) + yM]k (3) 
In addition, to test the inflow and outflow hypotheses simultaneously, a third 
model (Model C) will be applied, whereby the year-level equation reads as 
follows: 
ßodjk = ßodok + βία» (Inflowdjlt*In-weightdk) + 
β2000 (Outflowdjk*Out-weightdk) + yMjk (4) 
In these equations the variable Inflow^ represents the proportion of class d in 
year j and country к who were intergenerationally mobile (that is, who came from 
non-d origins). The variable Outflowdjk represents the proportion of class d in year 
j and country к who were intergenerationally mobile (that is, who went to non-d 
destinations). The variables In-weighty and Out-weighty stand for the weight 
factors that take into account the political character of the outflow mobility to and 
inflow mobility from a class in a country. 
In all three models, the combined explanatory variables are centred around their 
grand mean in each class and each nation. Therefore, ßMok represents the natural 
left-wing voting behaviour in the different classes in each country. To allow this 
natural level to vary from class to class and from nation to nation, ßo^ is treated 
as random at the class/country-level: 
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PodOk = POOOO + "odok (*) 
To calculate the political character of the inflow and outflow mobility, In-
weighty and Out-weighty we use the average voting behaviour of the stable 
members of the origin classes in our dataset (cf. De Graaf et al. 1995). These 
weights must be kept constant over-time, since allowing them to vary each year 
could introduce circularity into the model. This is because in some years, quite 
independent of levels of mobility, there may be across-the-board increases in 
left-wing voting behaviour affecting the mobile and the stable alike. Weights 
which were allowed to vary each year might thus be correlated with the yearly 
variations in the dependent variable. 
A numerical example may make clearer the procedure for calculating the 
political character of the inflow and outflow mobility. In calculating the political 
character of the inflow mobility to the service class in Britain in 1964, we first 
take the actual proportions of the service class in Britain in 1964 who moved 
from the other six classes. Of these, 20 per cent originated in the unskilled 
manual class. This figure is then weighted by 0.61 (the proportion of the stable 
members of the unskilled manual class who had a left-wing voting behaviour in 
Britain in the combined British dataset - as reported in Table 7.1 in the previous 
chapter). Similarly, the 4 per cent who were mobile from the agricultural worker 
class is weighted by 0.41. The weighted inflow to the service class in Britain in 
1964 thus becomes (20*61 + 28*61 + 4*41 + 7*33 + 11*11 + 4*8)/100, or 34.8. 
The calculation of the left-wing inflow mobility for other classes and countries 
proceeds in an analogous manner. In calculating the left-wing outflow mobility 
we follow the same procedure, except that here we weight by the proportion and 
the voting behaviour of the destination classes. 
8.4 Results 
While questions at the individual-level in principle can be addressed using a 
single dataset from a single country and year, in the case of contextual questions, 
the higher the number of contexts the better. For this reason, we employ our 
individual-level survey dataset containing data from sixteen countries, seven 
classes and many years over the period 1956-1990. Because of our research 
questions, we restrict the analyses to intergenerationally immobile male members 
of the classes aged eighteen years or older, leaving us with a total of 20,619 
respondents. By analysing data on so many contexts and so many individuals we 
aim to give hypotheses on the contextual effects of class mobility a higher chance 
of corroboration in empirical tests, than has been the case in earlier studies. 
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Describing the levels of inflow and outflow mobility 
Before testing the contextual hypothesis about the effects of inflow and outflow 
mobility on the voting behaviour of immobile class members, we first describe 
the levels of outflow and inflow mobility in the countries. In Table 8.1 for all 
countries for the periods 1956-1960, 1961-1970, 1971-1980, and 1981-1990 the 
percentage of outflow mobility is given for each of the seven EGP classes. We 
find that in general the manual classes have higher outflow rates than other 
classes. The service class has the lowest. It should be noted that differences 
between the classes are larger than differences across countries or periods. 
In Table 8.2 the percentage of inflow mobility is given. The farmers form the 
class with the lowest level of inflow mobility. The service and routine nonmanual 
classes have relatively high levels of inflow mobility. This is because these two 
classes have grown substantially during the last decades. For this to have occurred 
members of the other classes had to be recruited. Furthermore, differences from 
country to country in inflow rates are substantial. 
Testing the hypotheses 
We now test the formulated contextual hypotheses. The first hypothesis, the 
outflow mobility hypothesis states that the more "left-wing outflow" from a class 
there is, the more likely it is that stable members of that class will vote for a left-
wing political party. The second hypothesis, the inflow mobility hypothesis, 
implies that the more left-wing inflow mobility to a class there is, the more likely 
it is that stable members of that class will vote left-wing. 
We test these hypotheses in four different ways. To begin with we test the 
hypotheses for all classes simultaneously. Next, we test them for each class 
separately. Subsequently we test the hypotheses focusing on the effects of "pure" 
inflow and outflow mobility, i.e. not controlling for the political character of the 
inflow and the outflow mobility. Fourth, we test the hypotheses examining the 
effects of "extreme" inflow and outflow mobility on the voting behaviour of the 
immobile members of two classes that have very distinct interests, the unskilled 
manual class and the service class. 
Test of hypotheses: all classes simultaneously 
To test the hypotheses for all classes simultaneously, the three multi-level models 
are fitted on 20,619 respondents within 599 years within 107 country/class 
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combinations. Model A tests the inflow mobility hypothesis, by including the 
interaction effect Inflow*In-weight as a contextual explanatory variable. The 
outflow mobility hypothesis is tested by fitting Model B, which includes the 
interaction effect Outflow*Out-weight. In Model С the Inflow*In-weight and the 
Outflow*Out-weight variables are included simultaneously. When the hypotheses 
hold, we expect the parameter estimates for these variables to be positive and 
significantly different from zero. The parameter estimates for the three fitted 
multi-level models are presented in Table 8.3. 
The estimates of the parameters in the multi-level analysis in Models A and C, 
indicating the effect of left-wing inflow mobility are 0.004 and 0.005 
respectively. These estimates are in the expected direction but clearly not 
statistically significant. We therefore can not accept the hypothesis that the more 
left-wing inflow mobility there is to a class, the more likely it is that immobile 
members will have a left-wing voting behaviour. 
In Models В and С estimates of the effects of left-wing outflow mobility take 
the values -0.001 and -0.002 respectively. These are not in the expected direction, 
but are also not statistically significant. Therefore, we can not accept the outflow 
mobility hypothesis that the more left-wing outflow mobility there is from a class, 
the more likely it is that immobile members of that class will have a left-wing 
voting behaviour. 
Test of hypotheses: per class 
It might be, however, that while we must reject the inflow and outflow 
hypotheses for all classes simultaneously, they nevertheless hold for stable 
members of some particular classes. For this reason we fit our models for the 
stable members of each specific class separately. To test our hypotheses for each 
class separately, multi-level models are fitted, each analysing only those 
respondents who currently are members of a specific class. As in the test for all 
classes simultaneously, we fit three models: Model A including the interaction 
effect Inflow*In-weight, Model В including the interaction effect Outflow*Out-
weight, and Model С including both these variables. Again, if the hypotheses 
hold, significant positive parameter estimates are to be expected. In Table 8.4 
only the pertinent parameter estimates of the fitted multi-level models are 
presented. All the other coefficients - the intercept and the random coefficients -
are not reported. 
The results of these tests are largely negative. The figures in Table 8.4 indicate 
that none of the estimated parameters are statistically significant. Furthermore, ten 
out of the twenty-eight estimated parameters have a negative value, i.e. these 
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effects are in the unexpected direction. This means that even when testing the 
hypotheses for all classes separately, both the inflow and outflow hypotheses have 
to be rejected. 
Test of hypotheses: effects of "pure" inflow and outflow mobility 
Before drawing conclusions with respect to the inflow and outflow hypotheses, an 
extra test is in order. It might be argued that the inclusion of interaction effects 
between the amount of inflow and outflow mobility and the political character of 
that mobility obscures the main effect of the level of inflow and outflow mobility. 
Therefore, as a check we do our analyses including only the pure mobility level 
variables in models А, В and C. This results in models D, E and F, where the In-
weight and Out-weight variables are left out. 
When making predictions about the effect of the pure levels of inflow and 
outflow on the voting behaviour of immobile members of specific classes, 
assumptions must be made about the political character of that inflow and 
outflow. For some classes it is easy to come up with predictions, because the 
assumptions are straightforward. For example, it can be assumed that all people 
who move out of the skilled and unskilled manual classes go to classes with more 
right-wing interests and political culture than are found among the stable 
members of the manual classes. Thus, for members of the unskilled and skilled 
manual classes, it can be expected that the more outflow from their class there is, 
the more right-wing they will be. Furthermore, it can be assumed that those who 
move into the manual classes also have more right-wing voting behaviour than 
the stable members of these classes. Therefore, it can be expected that the more 
inflow mobility there is to the manual classes, the less likely the immobile 
members of these classes will be to vote for a left-wing party. 
In addition, for members of the farming and petty bourgeoisie classes it can be 
assumed that most outflow goes to more left-wing classes, while most inflow 
comes from more left-wing classes. In this way it can be predicted that the more 
inflow mobility to these classes, the more likely members of these classes are to 
vote left-wing. For the other classes - the service class, the routine nonmanual 
class and the agricultural labourers - making predictions about the effects of the 
amount of inflow and outflow mobility is less straightforward. The political 
character of that mobility depends too much on the patterns of intergenerational 
mobility in a country in a certain year to be able to predict the contextual effects 
of inflow and outflow mobility for these classes. 
To test our predictions about the effects of pure inflow and outflow mobility on 
the voting behaviour of stable class members, we follow the same procedure as 
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before. For each class separately, three multi-level models are fitted, each 
analysing only those respondents who are members of a specific class. Model D 
includes the Inflow variable, model E the Outflow variable, and model F includes 
both these variables. In Table 8.5 the pertinent parameter estimates are presented. 
Again the results of these tests are negative. None of the estimated parameters 
representing the effects of levels of inflow and outflow differ significantly from 
zero. Thus, in none of our analyses so far in this chapter, did we find a single 
indication of a contextual effect of inflow and outflow mobility in a country on 
the voting behaviour of immobile class members. This gives us strong grounds on 
which to reject both hypotheses outright. 
Tests of hypotheses: effects of "extreme" inflow and outflow mobility 
Although the results presented above seem convincing, we would like to perform 
one further analysis. When the scholars of the first generation hinted at the 
existence of contextual effects of class mobility, they had no detailed class 
scheme available or even in mind. Their claims about the existence of contextual 
effects referred mainly to simple ideas of inflow and outflow mobility from the 
highest to the lowest classes (see for example: Abramson & Books 1971, and 
Parkin 1971) To do justice to these claims, we therefore do a last test where we 
focus on the effects of inflow and outflow mobility on the voting behaviour of 
members of two classes that are "extreme" with respect to their interests, the 
service class and the unskilled manual class. We carry out separate analyses for 
both of these classes, and focus on the effects of inflow and outflow mobility 
from one of these classes to the other. Of course, the idea behind these analyses 
is that, if contextual effects do exist, these can be expected to be detected most 
easily when investigating the effects of this "extreme" inflow and outflow 
mobility. 
On the basis of our above formulated hypotheses and earlier studies on this 
topic, we can expect the level of inflow mobility from the unskilled manual class 
into the service class to have a significant effect on the voting behaviour of 
immobile class members of the service class. The more former members of the 
unskilled manual class enter the service class, the more the stable members of the 
service class will be influenced by them, and consequently the more they will 
vote for a left-wing rather than a right-wing political party. Similarly, we expect 
the level of inflow mobility from the service class into the unskilled manual class 
to have a substantial impact on the voting behaviour of the stable members of the 
unskilled manual class. The more service class members move into the manual 
class, the more the members of that manual class can be expected to vote for a 
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right-wing party. 
In addition, we can formulate hypotheses concerning the effects of levels of 
outflow mobility. If stable members of the service class see many of their class 
members "fall" to the unskilled manual class, it can be expected that the stable 
service class members anticipate their own downward mobility and thus become 
more likely to vote for a left-wing party. Thus, the more outflow mobility from 
the service class into the unskilled manual class, the more the stable members 
will vote for a left-wing party. Again, an analogous idea can be applied to the 
voting behaviour of the stable members of the unskilled manual class. In this 
case, it can be expected that the more people from the unskilled manual class 
climb to the service class, the more those who remain in the unskilled manual 
class will anticipate their own climb, and the more they will vote right-wing. 
To test the hypotheses of "extreme" inflow and outflow mobility, we first do a 
separate analysis on data from stable members of the service class. We use the 
same models and data as earlier in this chapter, but as our explanatory Inflow 
variable we take of the total number of people currently in the service class the 
percentage that arrived into the service class from the unskilled manual class. 
Furthermore, we take the percentage of people who moved into the unskilled 
manual class, based on the total number of people that were originally members 
of the service class, as the Outflow variable. Again we fit three models, one 
including as an explanatory variable only the Inflow variable, a second only the 
Outflow variable, and a third both variables. The results of fitting these models to 
our data, however, show statistically insignificant parameter estimates for these 
explanatory variables. The parameter of the Inflow variable has the value of -
0.001 (s.e. 0.014) when it is solely included, and 0.002 (s.e. 0.014) when it is 
simultaneously included. In addition, the Outflow parameters yield the value -
0.012 (s.e. 0.019) and -0.013 (s.e. 0.020), respectively. 
A separate analysis, using the same model and data, but now concerning the 
voting behaviour of the stable members of the unskilled manual class also yields 
statistically insignificant parameter estimates. As our Inflow variable we take the 
percentage of the total number of people currently in the skilled manual class, 
that arrived into the skilled manual class from the service class. As our Outflow 
variable we take the percentage of people who moved into the service class, 
based on the total number of people who were originally members of the 
unskilled manual class. The parameter estimate of the Inflow variable has the 
value 0.002 (s.e. 0.012) when it is solely included, and -0.002 (s.e. 0.014) when it 
is simultaneously included. The Outflow parameter estimates yield the values -
0.003 (s.e. 0.024) and 0.011 (s.e. 0.022) respectively. 
Thus, also doing these analyses on "extreme" inflow and outflow mobility, we 
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do not find any corroboration of the hypotheses concerning the contextual effects 
of inflow and outflow class mobility on the voting behaviour of immobile class 
members. 
8.5 Conclusions 
In studies of the first until the third generation of research on stratification and 
politics many scholars have suggested that intergenerational class mobility has 
contextual effects on the voting behaviour of stable class members. However, 
such arguments have been made without the support of empirical evidence. In this 
chapter we used the literature to formulate two hypotheses about the contextual 
effects of class mobility on the voting behaviour of intergenerationally immobile 
class members. These hypotheses pertain to the effects of both inflow mobility 
and outflow mobility. We aimed to make progress on earlier studies of research 
on stratification and politics by giving the hypotheses the highest possible chance 
to be corroborated. First, we tested these hypotheses by analysing survey data 
from a very large number of contexts, i.e. data of seven classes from sixteen 
countries over the period 1956 to 1990. Second, we used multi-level models 
which are especially designed to investigate contextual effects. Despite these 
efforts the results were negative. The analyses showed no significant contextual 
effect of either the level of intergenerational inflow or the level of outflow class 
mobility in a country on the voting behaviour of intergenerationally immobile 
persons. These negative results are remarkable when regarding the large number 
of studies that have suggested the contextual effects of intergenerational class 
mobility on politics. 
An explanation for these negative results might be that there is a difference 
between perceived and actual levels of mobility in a class. The perceived level of 
mobility may largely be influenced by local examples that do not necessarily 
represent the national mobility pattern. This is an important issue, since we might 
expect class members' perceptions of potential mobility to have a larger influence 
on their political party preferences. Another explanation, linked to the first, might 
be that perceived mobility chances may not be based upon long range mobility. In 
our analyses we only investigate inter-class mobility. However, people also 
change in social positions within classes, for example people change in their 
income position. Thus, it might be that if class members think about their chances 
of becoming upwardly or downwardly mobile, they think more in terms of intra-
class mobility than inter-class mobility. If this is the case, even our detailed EGP 
class is still to crude, because it does not allow us to pick up the contextual 
effects of intra-class income mobility. Concluding, a rephrasing of the hypotheses 
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in terms of the contextual effects of local short-range mobility on individual 
voting behaviour, seems worthwhile. 
Contextual effects of class mobility have often been implicitly or explicitly 
assumed when discussing the macro-level political consequences of intergenera-
tional class mobility. In this chapter we followed the research strategy that before 
focusing on the macro-level effects of class mobility, the micro-level assumptions 
concerning the individual or contextual effects of class mobility on individual 
voting behaviour were empirically tested. The consequence of this strategy and 
the negative results in this chapter is that in the next chapter where we examine 
the extent to which variations in the levels of class voting of countries can be 
explained by varying patterns of class mobility of these countries, we do not have 
to reckon with contextual effects of class mobility. 

9 Macro-Effects of Intergenerational 
Class Mobility on Class Voting 
9.1 Introduction1 
In this chapter we want to address the final research question of this study. It 
concerns the macro-effects of intergenerational class mobility on levels of class 
voting in a country. The importance of class mobility for a country's level of 
class voting has already been touched upon by Marx. Of course, when Marx tried 
to explain the absence of a class struggle in the United States, the right to vote 
was restricted to persons of certain classes in the United States. Nevertheless, 
Marx (1926 [1852]: 33) argued that in the United States "classes are not yet 
fixed, but in continual flux, with a persistent interchange of their elements". He 
thus assumed that high rates of class mobility within a country would undermine 
class formation. Sorokin has also argued that class mobility facilitates atomization 
and diffusion of solidarity and antagonisms between its inhabitants (1959 [1927]: 
538). Perhaps the clearest statement of the importance of mobility for a country's 
class voting is found in Sombart's attempt to account for the absence of socialism 
in the United States. Sombart in effect suggested that although the United States 
has a lower level of class struggle than Britain, this is largely due to extreme 
mobility. He argues that if the mobility pattern of the United States showed as 
little flux as that in Britain, then the intensity of class struggle in the United 
States would be as high as that of Britain (Sombart 1976 [1906]). 
Ideas on the effects of intergenerational mobility on a country's level of class 
voting also have been widespread in the first generation of research on 
stratification and politics. For example, Campbell et al. (1960), Lipset & 
Zetterberg (1956) and Alford (1963) initially suggested that lower levels of class 
voting might be associated with higher levels of class mobility. However, since 
leading intergenerational mobility research at that time indicated that the overall 
pattern of class mobility was much the same in the industrial societies of various 
Western nations (Lipset & Bendix 1959), these scholars had to reject this 
hypothesis. More recent mobility research, however, does show substantial 
differences between countries in the percentages of people moving from one class 
to another compared to their parents, i.e. countries differ in their absolute patterns 
of mobility (Jones 1969; Hazelrigg 1974; Ganzeboom et al. 1989; Erikson & 
Goldthorpe 1992). 
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Ideas on the effects of class mobility on class voting have been advanced not 
only to account for differences between countries in levels of class voting, but 
also to explain the declining importance of class within many contemporary 
societies. Increasing rates of class mobility have, it is claimed, tended to weaken 
the cohesion of classes and have been one of the factors in class dealignment 
(Lipset 1960; Clark & Lipset 1991; Hout et al. 1994). Thus, as already discussed 
in Chapter 4, several scholars have suggested that variation in intergenerational 
class mobility patterns might help to explain both cross-national and over-time 
variation in levels of class voting (Alford 1963; Campbell et al. 1960; Lipset 
1983; De Graaf & Ultee 1987; Dahrendorf 1959; Abramson 1972). 
Tests of the thesis that variation in intergenerational mobility rates might result 
in variation in levels of class voting, have predominantly been done by scholars 
of the first generation of research on stratification and politics. In these studies 
the rates of intergenerational manual/nonmanual class mobility in countries and 
the levels of class voting in these countries were compared, mainly by visual 
inspection of tables. In the second and third generation, tests of the class mobility 
explanation for variation in class voting had a low priority on the research 
agenda. This, despite the fact that the availability of detailed measurement 
procedures, a large amount of high quality data, and appropriate techniques of 
analysis provided the third generation with a good opportunity to test this 
explanation. 
In this chapter we pay attention to the macro-level effects of intergenerational 
class mobility on class voting, by addressing the following research questions: To 
what extent can differences across democratic industrialized countries in levels of 
class voting be explained by cross-country differences in patterns of intergene-
rational class mobility? And further: To what extent can changes over-time in 
levels of class voting within these countries be explained by changes within these 
countries in patterns of intergenerational class mobility? 
When we address these questions, we follow our suggestions in Chapter 4 that 
it is essential to take into account the macro-micro-macro link between 
intergenerational class mobility and class voting. We assume that the link between 
the mobility patterns in countries and their levels of class voting is an indirect 
one. First, auxiliary assumptions at the micro-level are necessary. These concern 
the voting behaviour of the various types of individual mobile and immobile class 
members. Second, assumptions linking the micro- and the macro-level are 
required. These assumptions concern the number of people in a country that can 
be classified according to their current and former class, i.e. the mobility pattern, 
and how this pattern differs between countries and across periods. When taking 
both these micro-level and micro-macro-level assumptions into account, we obtain 
a macro-prediction on the relationship between the patterns of intergenerational 
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class mobility in countries and the levels of class voting in these countries. 
Furthermore, when addressing the research questions in this chapter, some of 
the improvements of third generation studies are used. First, we apply a detailed 
class scheme, i.e. the seven class version of the EGP class scheme. Second, we 
use a large and qualitatively good dataset. When investigating the macro-effects 
of class mobility on class voting, we analyse the individual dataset used in the 
earlier chapters, pertaining to individual respondents from sixteen countries from 
various years in the period 1956-1990. In the present chapter the analyses are 
restricted to male respondents, aged eighteen years or older who had a valid score 
on their voting behaviour and on their origin and destination class. This leaves us 
with a total of 62,946 respondents. Third, when analysing the macro-level effects 
of class mobility on class voting, and to deal with the macro-micro-macro link 
between the patterns of class mobility in countries and the levels of class voting 
in these countries, we use the method of counterfactual analysis. We explain this 
method later in this chapter. This method has been applied before in studies of 
social stratification (Blau & Duncan 1967; Erikson 1990; Erikson & Goldthorpe 
1992). In fact, in this chapter we suggest an improvement on this method, i.e. we 
analyse the outcomes of counterfactual simulations, using models that provide us 
with parameters directly answering our research questions. 
In Section 2 we go into the macro-micro-macro link between intergenerational 
class mobility and class voting. Furthermore, we illustrate the method of 
counterfactual analysis that we apply to deal with that link, by presenting an 
example for two countries. In Section 3 we discuss how we test the hypotheses 
concerning the macro-effect of class mobility by modelling the outcomes of our 
counterfactual analysis. Section 4 examines the extent to which differences in 
class voting between countries can be explained by differences in mobility 
patterns in these countries, and the extent to which changes in class voting within 
countries can be explained by changes in mobility patterns within these countries. 
The results are discussed in Section 5. 
9.2 Macro-micro-macro link 
Our macro-level question is essentially about the link between a country's 
mobility pattern and its level of class voting. The most obvious way to examine 
this link would be to use a method that relates these two macro-variables directly. 
For example, we could examine whether a high mobility rate in a country is 
related to a lower level of class voting. However, in this chapter we do not deal 
with the relationship between class mobility and class voting by simply linking 
two macro-level variables. In fact, we have already done this in Chapter 4. In that 
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chapter we argued that the macro link is more complex than appears at first sight. 
We noticed that the relationship at the macro-level is the result of a micro-level 
relationship between a person's class position and his voting behaviour, and a 
macro-micro bridge-assumption that states how many persons are mobile between 
the specific classes, i.e. the patterns of intergenerational mobility of a country. 
To be able to deal with the complex relationship between a country's mobility 
pattern and its level of class voting, we apply the same strategy as in Chapter 5 
and examine this relationship by means of some simulations, i.e. we apply the 
method of counterfactual analysis (see also: Blau and Duncan 1967: 159; Heath et 
al. 1985: 36; Erikson 1990; Erikson & Goldthorpe 1992: 210). In doing so, we 
answer three questions. The first is: How large are the observed differences in 
class voting between countries? The second is: What would the difference in class 
voting between these countries be, assuming each had the same mobility pattern? 
And the third is: To what extent would the differences in class voting between 
these countries in this counterfactual situation be smaller than the observed 
differences in class voting between these countries? Our responses to these 
questions clearly provide answers to the main question addressed in the present 
chapter. When the predicted differences in class voting under the counterfactual 
assumption that countries have the same mobility pattern, are smaller than the 
observed differences in class voting, we can conclude that mobility explains at 
least to some extent differences in class voting. Or in other words: the smaller the 
predicted differences in class voting between the countries, when each country is 
assumed to have the same mobility pattern, the more the observed differences can 
be explained by differences in mobility patterns. Thus, the method of 
counterfactual analysis enables us to obtain an answer to our research question, 
and is capable of dealing with the macro-micro-macro link between a country's 
class mobility pattern and its level of class voting. 
Our application of the method of counterfactual analysis can best be illustrated 
with an example. Sticking to Sombart's suggestion of comparing the United 
States and Britain, in this example we investigate the extent to which the 
observed differences in class voting between Britain and the United States over 
the period 1961-1970, can be explained by differences in the mobility patterns 
between these countries. In Table 9.1 for the United States and in Table 9.2 for 
Britain, the observed voting and mobility patterns of these countries are presented 
(for the seven origin and destination EGP classes). The voting figures (L) 
represent the probability for each class member of voting for a left-wing political 
party rather than a right-wing party. 
The mobility patterns given comprise two components. As a first component 
the inflow mobility rates (I) in each of the destination classes are given. These are 
the percentages of people who come from each specific origin class into that 
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particular destination class. As a second component the percentages that represent 
the class distribution of the EGP destination classes are given. 
On the basis of voting patteras and inflow mobility rates given in Tables 9.1 
and 9.2, the voting behaviour of each EGP class can be calculated. The voting 
behaviour of an entire class is, of course, a weighted average of the voting 
behaviour of the various class members who originated from different origin 
classes. Thus, from the figures in the first two columns in Table 9.2, we can 
calculate that of the whole unskilled manual class in Britain in the period 1961-
1970, (68*40 + 68*31 + 69*8 + 53*3 + 58*7 + 42*7 + 58*4)/100, or 65 per 
cent, voted for a left-wing party. The percentages of left-wing voters of all total 
destination classes are presented in the total rows of Tables 9.1 and 9.2.2 
Using these percentages of left-wing voters - as discussed in Chapters 2 and 6 -
log-odds-ratios measuring the differences in voting behaviour between the EGP 
classes can be calculated. For example, the log-odds-ratio measuring the 
difference in voting behaviour between the most left-wing class and the most 
right-wing class in Britain - the unskilled manual class and the farmers - has the 
value log((65/(100-65))/(14/(100-14))), or 2.43. Log-odds-ratios calculated for the 
differences in voting behaviour between the unskilled manual class and all other 
EGP classes in Britain and the United States are given in the bottom rows of 
Tables 9.1 and 9.2.3 
We now can examine the observed differences in levels of EGP class voting 
between the countries. As discussed in Chapters 2 and 6, on the basis of the log-
odds-ratios presented in Tables 9.1 and 9.2, a kappa index as a measure of the 
observed level of EGP class voting can be calculated. The kappa index - the 
standard deviation of the seven log-odds-ratios measuring the differences in 
voting behaviour between the seven EGP classes - amounts to 0.99 for Britain 
and 0.20 for the United States. Thus, the observed differences in EGP class 
voting between Britain and the United States, measured by the kappa index, 
amounts to (0.99 - 0.20), or 0.79. 
Additional to differences in EGP class voting, we can also examine the 
observed difference in manual/nonmanual class voting between Britain and the 
United States. On the basis of the mobility and voting patterns shown in Tables 
9.1 and 9.2, it is possible to calculate measures of manual/nonmanual class voting 
for Britain and the United States. As discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, we use the 
Thomsen index as a measure of manual/nonmanual class voting in a country. This 
Thomsen index is the natural logarithm of an odds-ratio, where that odds-ratio is 
the odds for manual workers of voting left-wing rather than right-wing, divided 
by the odds for nonmanual workers of doing the same. Thus, to calculate the 
Thomsen index, first the chances of current members of the manual and the 
nonmanual classes voting for left-wing rather than right-wing political parties 
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have to be calculated. For members of the manual class this is the weighted 
average of the voting behaviour of the unskilled, skilled and agricultural manual 
workers. In Britain this amounts to (65*0.26 + 68*0.32 + 56*0.02)/(0.26 + 0.32 + 
0.02), or 66 per cent. For members of the nonmanual class the chance of voting 
for a left-wing party is the weighted average of the chance to vote for members 
of the service class, the routine nonmanual class, the petty bourgeoisie, and the 
fanners. For Britain this is 27 per cent. Thus, in Britain for the period 1961-1970 
the Thomsen index takes the value log((66/100-66)/(27/100-27)), or 1.67.4 
Corresponding calculations for the United States give a Thomsen index of 0.32. 
Consequently, the observed difference in manual/nonmanual class voting between 
Britain and the United States, when measured by the Thomsen index, amounts to 
(1.67 - 0.32), or 1.35. 
It should be noted that the difference in mobility patterns between the two 
countries - as defined in this example - comprises two components. The first 
component is formed by the inflow mobility rates in each EGP destination class. 
The second component is formed by the percentages that give the distribution of 
the destination classes. These percentages, of course, also represent the 
composition of the manual and the nonmanual classes. Therefore, differences in 
levels of manual/nonmanual class voting between two countries can be due to 
differences in both components of the mobility patterns. Differences between 
countries in EGP class voting can only be due to different inflow rates, since 
levels of EGP class voting are insensitive to variations in the composition of the 
manual and nonmanual classes. 
To investigate the extent to which observed differences in class voting, i.e. in 
both EGP class voting and manual/nonmanual class voting, between Britain and 
the United States can be explained by differences in their mobility patterns, we 
need two more steps. In the first step, we investigate what the differences would 
be in the counterfactual situation where these countries are assumed to have the 
same mobility pattern. In the second step, a comparison of these two differences 
gives an indication of the extent to which the observed differences in class voting 
between these countries are due to different mobility patterns. 
We start by the first step, by asking what the difference in the level of class 
voting between Britain and the United States would be in the counterfactual 
situation. That is, we investigate what the differences in class voting would be if 
the United States had the same mobility pattern as Britain. In doing so, we touch 
upon Sombart's question of what would happen to socialism in the United States 
if the country had the same mobility pattern as Britain. Thus, we have to create a 
counterfactual situation where the voting pattern in the United States is as 
observed but the mobility pattern is as in Britain. This situation is presented in 
Table 9.3. The Thomsen index measuring the level of manual/nonmanual class 
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voting in this counterfactual situation has the value 0.38. This means that where 
both countries are assumed to have the same mobility pattern, i.e. that of Britain, 
the difference in Thomsen index between these countries amounts to (1.67 -
0.38), or 1.29. 
As a second step, these results enable us to answer the question of whether the 
differences in class voting between Britain and the United States outlined above 
is smaller than the observed difference in class voting between these countries. In 
fact, we find that the difference between these countries in the counterfactual 
situation is (1.35 - 1.29)/(1.35 * 100), or four per cent smaller than the observed 
difference in Thomsen indices between these countries. In other words, only 
around four per cent of the difference in levels of manual/nonmanual class voting 
between Britain and the United States in the period 1961-1970 can be explained 
by differences in the mobility patterns between these two countries. 
Furthermore, in the counterfactual situation given in Table 9.3, the kappa index 
has the value 0.34. The difference between the kappa indices of Britain and the 
United States in the counterfactual situation is therefore (0.99 - 0.34), or 0.65. 
This means that the difference in the kappa indices between the countries in the 
situation where these have the same mobility pattern is (0.79 - 0.65)/(0.79 * 100), 
or eighteen per cent smaller than the difference in the kappa indices of these two 
countries in the observed situation. Thus, in this case about eighteen per cent of 
the observed differences in EGP class voting can be explained by differences in 
mobility patterns between the two countries. 
Of course, when investigating what the difference in class voting between 
Britain and the United States would be if both countries had the same mobility 
pattern, we could also have assumed that both countries had the mobility pattern 
of the United States, instead of that of Britain. Therefore, we also pay attention in 
two additional steps, to that counterfactual situation. In this situation the Thomsen 
index has the value 1.58. Thus, the differences in Thomsen indices between the 
countries under the assumption that these have the mobility pattern of the United 
States, amounts to (1.58 - 0.32), or 1.26, which is about (1.35 - 1.26)/1.35, or 
seven per cent smaller than the observed differences in kappa indices between the 
two countries. Furthermore, in the counterfactual situation where both countries 
are assumed to have the mobility patterns of the United States, the kappa index 
has the value 0.93. Thus the difference in kappa indices between Britain and the 
United States when both these countries have the mobility partem of the United 
States, is (0.93 - 0.20), or 0.73, which is (0.79-0.73)/0.79, or eight per cent 
smaller than the observed difference in the kappa index between these two 
countries. Thus, we can conclude that around seven per cent of the difference in 
manual/nonmanual class voting between Britain and the United States in the 
period 1961-1970 and around eight per cent of the differences in EGP class 
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voting can be explained by differences in mobility patterns between the two 
countries. Whether these conclusions also apply when more countries are included 
in the analysis remains to be seen when we analyse our entire dataset. 
9 3 Modelling the macro-effects of class mobility 
Before we analyse our entire dataset to address our research questions, we explain 
how we model the results of our counterfactual analyses and thus obtain answers 
pertinent to our research questions. 
The way we answer our research questions can be illustrated using the results 
of the above example for Britain and the United States. The results are 
summarized in Table 9.4. The entries in the main diagonal of Table 9.4 are the 
observed levels of class voting in Britain and the United States. The entries in the 
off-diagonal cells show the levels of class voting in the counterfactual situations. 
As discussed above, the differences in the observed class voting between Britain 
and the United States (CLVbri - C L V ^ has the value 1.35 for the Thomsen 
index, and 0.79 for the kappa index. The differences in class voting between 
Britain and the United States in the counterfactual situation where these countries 
Table 9.4. Summary of modelling macro-effects of class mobility 
Voting Pattern 
Mobility pattern 
Thomsen index kappa index 
Britain United Britain United States 
States 
Britain 1.67 1.58 0.99 0.93 
United States 
Summary Measures: 
CLVW - CLV^ 
CLVM - CLV w W 
*~l- * W.un " ^~L"un 
Snstfri 
^Ьгі.им 
0.38 0.32 
1.67 - 0.32 = 1.35 
1.67 - 0.38 = 1.29 
1.58 - 0.32 = 1.26 
(1.35-1.29)/1.35 = 0.04 
(1.35-1.26)/1.35 = 0.07 
0.34 0.20 
0.99 - 0.20 = 0.79 
0.99 - 0.34 = 0.65 
0.93 - 0.20 = 0.73 
(0.79-0.65У0.79 = 0.18 
(0.79-0.73V0.79 = 0.08 
S-parameter 0.06 0.13 
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have the mobility pattern of Britain (CLVbri - CLVUHibn), has the value 1.29 for 
the Thomsen index, and 0.65 for the kappa index. Subsequently, we calculate the 
extent to which the differences in levels of class voting in the counterfactual 
situation is smaller than the observed difference: 
S,,»,« = «CLVbri - CLVuJ-(CLVbri - CLVusa,M)) / (CLVbri - CLVUJ (1) 
This formula yields for the Thomsen index the conclusion that the difference is 
four per cent smaller than observed. For the kappa index it yields that it is 
eighteen per cent smaller than observed. In other words, four per cent of the 
differences in manual/nonmanual class voting between Britain and the United 
States can be explained by differences in the mobility patterns between these two 
countries, while the figure for EGP class voting is about eighteen per cent. 
The second counterfactual situation, in which both countries were assumed to 
have the mobility pattern of the United States, yields somewhat different but still 
comparable results. Here, the differences in class voting between these countries 
is: 
S*«. = ((CLVbri - C I A U - t C L V ^ . CLVUJ) / ( (Χν Μ - CLVUJ (2) 
According to the Thomsen indices the difference in class voting between these 
countries is seven per cent smaller than the observed difference; and according to 
the kappa indices it is eight per cent smaller than the observed difference. Thus, 
on the basis of this analysis, we can conclude that seven per cent of the 
difference in manual/nonmanual class voting and eight per cent of difference in 
the EGP class voting can be explained by differences in mobility patterns 
between the Britain and the United States. 
In general then, for two countries к and 1, the proportion to which differences 
in class voting between these countries - under the (counterfactual) assumption 
that these countries have the same mobility pattern (S
u
) - deviate from the 
differences in observed levels of class voting between these countries, can be 
represented by the following general equation: 
Skl = ((CLVk - CLV!)-(CLVk - CLVJ) / (CLVk - CLV,) (3) 
After reordering, this equation can be rewritten as follows: 
CLVU = SU*CLV, + (1-8и)*СХ к (4) 
where the CLVk-parameters represent the observed class voting in country k, and 
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the CLV
r
parameters represent the observed class voting in country 1. 
We can of course do our counterfactual analyses simultaneously for more than 
two countries. However, when doing so, many Su-parameters are obtained. For 
two countries we already get 2 Skl-parameters, but for 3 countries we get 6, and 
for 4 countries we end up with 12 Skl-parameters. In general, when investigating 
differences for a number of η countries, this results in (n2 - n) Su-parameters. All 
these Su-parameters provide an indication of the extent to which variation in class 
voting between countries or periods can be explained by variation in patterns of 
mobility between these countries or periods. 
In order to avoid ending up with many Su-parameters, and since our hypothesis 
does not say anything about varying influences between countries, we apply in 
this chapter a model that enables us to summarize the conclusions into a single 
parameter. We therefore assume the S^-parameter to be the same for all 
counterfactual situations. Thus, we estimate the parameters of the following 
model on the outcomes of the counterfactual analyses:3 
CLVU = S*CLVk + (1-S)*CLV, (5) 
We call the summary measure "S" the "S-parameter" as a tribute to Sombart 
(1976 [1906]), who was one of the first to explicitly state hypotheses on the 
macro-effects of intergenerational class mobility. When estimating the parameters 
of equation (5), the S-parameter is allowed to take any value. If the S-parameter 
takes a value between zero and one, than the predicted differences in class voting 
between the countries, under the assumption that these countries have the same 
mobility pattern, are smaller than the observed differences. It should be noted that 
if the S-parameter takes a value smaller than zero or larger than one, then the 
predicted differences are larger than the observed differences. In this way, the S-
parameter gives a direct answer to our question: to what extent can differences in 
class voting be explained by differences in mobility patterns between these 
countries? The larger the S-parameter - if it has a value between zero and one -
the more the differences in class voting can be explained by different mobility 
patterns. 
In this chapter we use the above model to answer our research question, i.e. to 
examine the extent to which differences across countries and periods in levels of 
class voting can be explained by differences across countries and periods in 
patterns of class mobility. To do this, we first compute outcomes from 
counterfactual analyses for the countries. Subsequently, these outcomes, i.e. 
entries in a table like Table 9.4, are used as cases to estimate the parameters of 
the model. For example, when estimating the S-parameter on the four entries in 
Table 9.4 it takes the value 0.06 for the Thomsen indices and 0.13 for the kappa 
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indices. Thus, by applying this model, we have the advantage of a single S-
parameter summarizing all the above calculations. 
9.4 Results 
Explaining differences between countries 
Let us start by addressing the question: To what extent can differences between 
countries in levels of class voting be explained by differences in their patterns of 
intergenerational class mobility? To do this, we divide our data into three periods: 
1961-1970, 1971-1980, and 1981-1990. In the first period we have data from 
seven countries, in the second period from fourteen, and in the last period from 
twelve countries. 
When analysing the data for these periods, we focus on the obtained S-
parameters. However, before presenting these S-parameters we can illustrate our 
method using the data for countries in the first period, i.e. 1961-1970. In this 
period data from seven countries are available. Each of the seven countries in this 
period has a specific mobility pattern and a specific voting pattern. Thus, if the 
figures for mobility patterns are systematically combined with the figures for the 
voting patterns, we get seven by seven, or 49 voting/mobility combinations. 
Seven of these show the observed voting and mobility patterns in the countries 
and periods under investigation, while the remaining 42 are for the counterfactual 
situations. Thomsen indices, calculated from these matrices as measures of the 
levels of manual/nonmanual class voting, are reported in Table 9.5. 
The entries in the main diagonal cells of that table show the observed Thomsen 
indices, which differ considerably across countries. The highest Thomsen index is 
observed for Norway (1.84) and the smallest for the United States (0.32). The 
variation in observed Thomsen indices can be summarized by the standard 
deviation calculated over these observed indices. This has the value 0.45. The off-
diagonal entries in Table 9.5 show Thomsen indices representing levels of class 
voting in the counterfactual situations. In general, Thomsen indices in the 
counterfactual situations are more similar to that of the country the voting pattern 
is taken from, than to that of the country the mobility pattern is taken from. 
Moreover, we find that standard deviations summarizing the variation in class 
voting in the counterfactual situations where the countries have the same mobility 
pattern - given underneath Table 9.5 - are about the same size as, or even larger 
than, the standard deviations for the observed differences in class voting (0.45). 
These results indicate that differences in class voting between the seven countries 
in the period 1961-1970, are not, or at most are to a very small extent, due to 
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Table 9.6. S-parameters indicating the extent to which variation in class mobility 
patterns explains between-country variation in levels of class voting 
1961-1970 
1971-1980 
1981-1990 
Thomsen index 
S-parameter 
0.03 
0.16* 
0.00 
s.e 
0.13 
0.02 
0.04 
kappa index 
S-parameter 
-0.03 
0.06* 
-0.05 
s.e 
0.12 
0.02 
0.05 
N. of 
cases 
49 
196 
144 
Note: * ρ < 0.05. 
cross-country differences in mobility patterns. 
To get a direct answer to our question of to what extent cross-country 
differences in mobility patterns account for differences in manual/nonmanual class 
voting between countries, we focus on the S-parameter estimates obtained from 
analysing the entries of tables like Table 9.5.6 These estimates are presented in 
Table 9.6. In this table the standard errors of the parameter estimates are also 
given. However, we are reluctant to interpret the standard errors to examine 
whether this value differs significantly from zero, because the models are not 
applied to randomly collected data but to counterfactual situations. We find that 
for the period 1961-1970 the S-parameter has the value 0.03. This indicates that 
on average the difference in the Thomsen indices between the countries assumed 
to have the same mobility pattern, is three per cent smaller than the difference 
between the observed Thomsen indices of these countries. Or in other words, for 
the period 1961-70, about three per cent of the differences in class voting 
between the countries can be explained by differences in mobility patterns. 
A similar conclusion results from our analyses of data from the other two 
periods. These are also presented in Table 9.6. For the period 1971-1980 the S-
parameter takes the value 0.16, while for 1981-1990 it has the value 0.00. Thus in 
these periods sixteen and zero per cent respectively of the differences in 
manual/nonmanual class voting can be explained by differences in mobility 
patterns between the countries. Summarizing these results, on average over the 
three periods, about six per cent of the differences across democratic 
industrialized countries in manual/nonmanual class voting, as measured by 
Thomsen indices, can be explained by differences in the intergenerational 
mobility patterns between these countries. 
However, as discussed above, when examining the effects of different mobility 
patterns on levels of manual/nonmanual class voting, two effects are combined. 
The first concerns the effect of differences in the composition of the manual and 
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nonmanual classes between countries. We already paid attention to these effects 
in Chapter 5. The other is the effect we are specifically interested in the present 
chapter, i.e. the effect of differences in mobility patterns between countries. 
Therefore, to get a better idea of the effects of differences in mobility patterns on 
levels of class voting, we examine the effects on levels of EGP class voting. 
When examining levels of EGP class voting, we control for variation in the 
composition of the manual and nonmanual class. 
When investigating the extent to which differences in EGP class voting 
between countries can be explained by differences in mobility patterns between 
the countries, we follow the same strategy as above, but now apply it to kappa 
indices, instead of Thomsen indices. The pertinent S-parameters are presented in 
the second main column of Table 9.6. For the period 1961-1970 the S-parameter 
is -0.03, for 1971-1980 it is 0.06, and for the period 1981-1990 it has the value -
0.05. Consequently, over all three periods, on average the S-parameter has the 
value -0.01. Negative parameters imply that on average differences in class voting 
between countries in the counterfactual situations are even larger than the 
observed cross-country differences in class voting. Thus, on the basis of these 
results, it can be concluded that observed differences across democratic 
industrialized countries in levels of EGP class voting, when measured by kappa 
indices, can not be explained at all by differences in the patterns of 
intergenerational class mobility across these countries. 
The fact that differences in EGP class voting can not be explained by 
differences in patterns of mobility, has implications for the interpretation of 
results concerning the effects of class mobility on levels of manual/nonmanual 
class voting. We found that differences between countries in intergenerational 
mobility patterns to some extent are responsible for differences in 
manual/nonmanual class voting between these countries. However, these 
differences in mobility patterns concern the combined differences in two 
components of mobility patterns: the inflow mobility rates and the composition of 
the manual and nonmanual classes. The fact that our analyses show no effects of 
class mobility on EGP class voting, therefore, leads us to the conclusion that the 
effect of class mobility on manual/nonmanual class voting is only due to 
differences in the class composition of the manual and nonmanual class, and not 
to differences in inflow mobility rates. This deduction is supported by the 
conclusion of Chapter 5, which holds that differences in class composition 
between countries to some extent explain differences in manual/nonmanual class 
voting between these countries. Consequently, we conclude that differences across 
democratic industrialized countries in manual/nonmanual class voting can not be 
explained by differences in the intergenerational mobility patterns between these 
countries. 
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Explaining changes within countries 
The results of our analyses so far thus suggest that differences in mobility 
patterns do not explain differences in class voting between countries. However, it 
might be that changes over-time in class voting within countries can be explained, 
to some extent at least, by changes in the patterns of intergeneratìonal class 
mobility in these countries. To examine whether this is the case, we adopt the 
same strategy used in our investigation of the between-country differences. The 
only difference is that now we distinguish periods within each country, instead of 
countries within each period. To avoid ending up with many empty cells and to 
do away with possible errors in datasets from a single year, we do not distinguish 
between years within countries, but only between five-year periods, beginning in 
1961. Our dataset allows us to analyse data from only ten countries, because for 
the other countries no data from more than two periods are available. 
Before discussing the estimates of the S-parameters, we illustrate the method by 
using data from a single country. Since Britain is a country in which a strong 
decline in class voting has occurred over the last decades, we use it as an 
example. To examine the extent to which changes in class voting can be 
explained by changes in patterns of intergeneratìonal class mobility in Britain, we 
systematically combine figures for mobility patterns with the figures for the 
voting patterns. The computed Thomsen indices, as measures of the levels of 
manual/nonmanual class voting are reported in Table 9.7. 
The entries in the main diagonal cells of Table 9.7 show the observed Thomsen 
indices in Britain for each of the periods. These indicate a clear decline in class 
voting from 1.82 in the first period, to 1.35 in the last period. This decline in 
class voting is in line with our findings in Chapter 3, where we investigated over-
time changes in manual/nonmanual class voting on a year-to-year basis. The 
entries in the off-diagonal cells show Thomsen indices representing levels of class 
voting in the counterfactual situations. We find that these counterfactual Thomsen 
indices have values that are more like those in the period the voting pattern is 
taken from, than those in the period the mobility pattern is taken from. 
Furthermore, the standard deviations summarizing the variation in class voting 
in the counterfactual situation where the periods have the same mobility pattern -
given below Table 9.7 - are either the same as, or even larger than, the standard 
deviation for the observed changes in class voting (0.19). Thus, it is unlikely that 
changes in the patterns of mobility explain changes in manual/nonmanual class 
voting in Britain over the decades. 
In addition, when applying our method of analysis to the entries of Table 9.7 
that give the observed and counterfactual levels of class voting, this yields an S-
parameter with the value -0.12. A negative S-parameter means that in general the 
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Table 9.7. Levels of class voting (measured by Thomsen index) in observed and 
counter/actual periods in Britain, 1961-1990 
Mobility Pattern 
Voting pattern 
1961-65 
1966-70 
1971-75 
1976-80 
1981-85 
1986-90 
1961-65 
1.82 
1.56 
1.44 
1.31 
1.48 
1.21 
1966-70 
1.89 
1.60 
1.53 
1.31 
1.51 
1.24 
1971-75 
1.81 
1.64 
1.50 
1.37 
1.50 
1.31 
1976-80 
1.82 
1.66 
1.53 
1.28 
1.50 
1.32 
1981-85 
1.83 
1.61 
1.49 
1.28 
1.51 
1.33 
1986-90 
1.83 
1.71 
1.55 
1.35 
1.49 
1.35 
Mean 1.47 1.51 1.52 1.52 1.51 1.55 
Std. deviation 0.21 0.23 0.18 0.20 0.20 0.19 
difference between periods assuming the same mobility pattern for these periods 
are even larger, than the observed differences in class voting between these 
periods. Thus, we are led to conclude that in Britain changes in manual-
/nonmanual class voting over the periods considered cannot be attributed to 
changes in the mobility patterns over these periods. 
Next, we examine the extent to which over-time changes in levels of class 
voting can be explained by over-time changes in intergenerational class mobility 
in all our countries under investigation. The effects of intergenerational class 
mobility on class voting in a country are investigated by means of S-parameters. 
Since it is only possible to examine trends when data for more than two periods 
are available, in Table 9.8 we report the estimated S-parameters for the ten 
countries from which we have data for at least two five-year periods. 
We find that with respect to the levels of manual/nonmanual class voting, 
measured by Thomsen indices, in five countries the S-parameters have a negative 
value. These five countries are Britain, Denmark, Germany, Italy, and Norway. 
The negative S-parameters imply that in these countries the changes in class 
voting between the periods in the counterfactual situation are even larger than the 
observed changes in class voting over the same periods. Furthermore, in the 
remaining five countries the S-parameters have positive values. Austria and 
Sweden have the largest values (both: 0.36). In the United States and the 
Netherlands the S-parameters have the smallest positive value: 0.05 and 0.02 
respectively. Furthermore, over all ten countries the average of the S-parameters 
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Table 9.8. S-parameters indicating the extent to which variation in class mobility 
patterns explains over-time variation in levels of class voting 
Australia 
Austria 
Britain 
Denmark 
Germany 
Italy 
Netherlands 
Norway 
Sweden 
United States 
Note: * ρ < 0.05. 
Thomsen index 
S-parameter 
0.18* 
0.36 
-0.12* 
-0.03 
-0.18 
-0.65 
0.02 
-0.05 
0.36* 
0.05* 
s.e 
0.04 
0.15 
0.04 
0.07 
0.18 
0.52 
0.12 
0.10 
0.13 
0.02 
kappa index 
S-parameter 
0.03 
0.75 
0.20 
0.28* 
0.08 
-0.02 
-0.13 
-0.23 
-1.40* 
-0.49 
s.e 
0.10 
0.44 
0.31 
0.11 
0.05 
0.19 
0.17 
0.22 
0.19 
0.29 
N. of 
cases 
36 
9 
36 
4 
25 
9 
25 
25 
4 
36 
has the value -0.01. Thus, we can conclude that in general changes over-time in 
levels of manual/nonmanual class voting within democratic industrialized 
countries cannot be explained by changes in the intergenerational mobility 
patterns within these countries. Taking into account that - as we concluded in 
Chapter 5 - variations in class compositions are able to explain about a fifth of 
the over-time variations in the levels of manual/nonmanual class voting within 
countries, our findings imply that effects of changes in the composition of the 
manual and nonmanual classes are surpassed by counter-acting effects of changes 
over-time in the inflow mobility rates of the EGP classes within these countries. 
A similar story emerges from an examination of the S-parameters for the 
levels of EGP class voting, as measured by kappa indices. The pertinent S-
parameters are reported in the second main column of Table 9.8. Here we again 
find negative S-parameters for Norway and Italy. In addition negative parameters 
are found for the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United States. For Sweden we 
even find a S-parameter of -1.40. This value is probably due to the fact that the 
estimation of the S-parameter is based only on a comparison of two periods, and 
thus on only four cases in this analysis. For the countries where we find a 
positive S-parameter, these parameters differ largely in size. They range from 
0.75 for Austria, to 0.28 in Denmark, to 0.08 in Germany and 0.03 in Australia. 
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However, the average value of the S-parameters over the ten countries is -0.09. 
Thus, these findings reinforce our conclusion that in general the observed changes 
in class voting across the periods studied in the democratic industrialized 
countries are to a large extent unrelated to changing class mobility patterns in 
these countries. 
9.5 Conclusions 
In this chapter we investigated whether macro-effects of intergeneratìonal class 
mobility on levels of class voting in countries could be found. The existence of 
such effects had been suggested in many studies of the first generation of 
research on stratification and politics. In fact, these effects had been already 
explicitly touched upon by Sombart, in his attempt to explain why there was no 
socialism in the United States. In studies of the first generation, the effects of 
class mobility were only tested by tentative comparisons of rates of mobility of 
countries and their levels of class voting. Furthermore, they were not tested when 
using detailed class schemes, and taking into account the complicated relationship 
between mobility patterns and levels of class voting. 
In the present chapter we aimed to improve upon these earlier tests. We did so 
by investigating the macro-effects of class voting on a large individual-level 
dataset for sixteen countries over the postwar period. Furthermore, we did our 
analyses focusing on both the levels of manual/nonmanual class voting and the 
levels of EGP class voting. In addition, we applied a method of counterfactual 
analysis that enabled us to take the complex macro-micro-macro link between the 
mobility patterns of countries and their levels of class voting into account. 
Moreover, we used models of the third generation to analyse the outcomes of the 
counterfactual analysis and to get single measures of the extent to which variation 
in class voting can be explained by variation in patterns of intergeneratìonal class 
mobility. 
However, despite the large amount of literature on the macro-effects of 
mobility on levels of class voting, and the elaborate way we investigated these 
effects, we had to conclude that differences across democratic industrialized 
countries in levels of class voting could not at all be explained by cross-country 
differences in patterns of intergeneratìonal class mobility. We did find some 
effect of differences in mobility patterns on variations in manual/nonmanual class 
voting. However, the results of our analyses indicated that these were due to 
differences in the composition of the manual and nonmanual classes between the 
countries, and not to differences in the rates of inflow mobility between the 
countries. Our analyses also showed that changes over-time in levels of class 
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voting within these countries could not be explained by changes within these 
countries in patterns of intergenerational class mobility. This conclusion was 
obtained for both manual/nonmanual class voting and for EGP class voting. 
10 Summary and Discussion 
10.1 Summary 
In almost all industrialized countries where people have the right to vote at 
general elections, people's social position - in particular their class - is important 
in determining their party choice. Since those in the lower classes are more likely 
to vote for a left-wing party than are those in the higher classes, it can be said 
that in every country a so-called "democratic class struggle" takes place. 
The present study focused on the relationship between class and voting 
behaviour in democratic industrialized countries. It did so, by addressing three 
sorts of questions which, although they had been addressed in earlier studies, had 
not yet been adequately answered. First, descriptive questions concerning the 
levels of class voting in Western industrialized countries over the postwar period 
are addressed. Second, it examined questions of various explanations for between-
country and over-time variations in class voting. Third, this study concentrated on 
questions about the effects of intergenerational class mobility on individual voting 
behaviour. 
When addressing these questions, this study builts on a long history of research 
on social stratification and politics. As discussed in Chapter 1, the history of this 
research area can be divided into three generations. Over these three generations 
considerable progress has been made with respect to the articulation of research 
questions, measurement procedures, data collection and methods of analyses. In 
studies of the first generation - starting in the 1950s and ending in the 1970s -
relatively vague research questions were addressed by examining cross-tabulations 
based upon a limited number of datasets and using simple class measures. In 
studies of the second generation - beginning in the 1960s - more precise questions 
were addressed analysing more survey data with more adequate linear regression 
techniques. Studies of the third generation - that started in the 1980s - have dealt 
with more precise research questions, using detailed and standardized class 
measures, large scale comparable datasets, and non-linear research techniques. 
However, this third generation is only still in its infancy and has yet to Uve up to 
expectations. The present study, by addressing classical questions on the relation-
ship between class and voting behaviour, by applying up-to-date measurement 
procedures and methods of analysis, and by analysing large datasets, aims to live 
up to some of these expectations. 
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Data and operationalizations 
The data analysed in this study come from two datasets. The first dataset consists 
of aggregated data from twenty Western industrialized democratic countries - i.e. 
from all Western European countries, Australia, Canada, and the United States -
over the period 1945-1990. This dataset includes both data on levels of class 
voting in the countries, and data on various social and political characteristics of 
these countries. The second dataset contains data on individuals from 113 national 
representative surveys held in sixteen out of the twenty countries - leaving 
Greece, Luxembourg, Portugal and Spain aside - in the period 1956-1990. The 
use of both these large datasets allowed us to come up with reliable answers and 
lessened the chance to not accepting hypotheses, while these hypotheses in reality 
hold. Furthermore, these data allowed for relatively strong tests by doing 
multivariate analysis. 
The measurement procedures for people's class position used in this study are 
diverse. First, we applied the traditional manual/nonmanual class scheme. In other 
analyses we applied a more detailed class scheme, i.e. the class scheme developed 
by Erikson, Goldthorpe, and Portocarrero, the so-called "EGP" class scheme. 
According to this EGP class scheme, unskilled, skilled and agricultural manual 
workers are distinguished within the manual class, and service class workers, 
routine nonmanual workers, petty bourgeoisie and fanners within the nonmanual 
class. To measure the strength of the relationship between class and voting 
behaviour, i.e. the level of class voting, we used log-odds-ratios. 
Description of levels of class voting 
From the very beginning of research on class and voting behaviour, studies have 
shown that the strength of the relationship between class and voting behaviour 
differed between countries. In addition, these studies have shown that the strength 
of that relationship declined over the postwar period in most of these countries. 
These conclusions were especially drawn in studies of the first generation of 
social stratification and politics. In these studies levels of class voting were 
measured on the basis of so-called "Alford indices", that only distinguish between 
manual and nonmanual classes and measure absolute differences in voting 
behaviour. 
However, in studies of the third generation doubts were raised about the 
conclusions of these first generation studies. It was claimed that differences 
detected, when using measures of absolute class voting like the Alford index, 
might not (solely) be due to differences in the strength of the relationship 
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between class and voting behaviour, but also to differences in the general 
popularity of the political parties. Furthermore, it was argued that differences 
between countries or periods detected when using the manual/nonmanual class 
scheme, might to some extent be due to differences in the composition of the 
manual and nonmanual classes between countries or periods, and not (only) to 
differences in the strength of the relationship between class and voting behaviour. 
Consequently, in third generation studies it was argued that when using a measure 
of relative class voting and distinguishing between more detailed classes, descrip-
tions of levels of class voting might lead to different conclusions about between-
country and over-time differences in class voting. 
In the present study we tested the tenability of these arguments. In Chapter 3 
we described the levels of class voting using measures of relative class voting 
that distinguish between manual and nonmanual classes - i.e. Thomsen indices. 
Thus, we examined what we called the levels of relative manual/nonmanual class 
voting. In Chapter 6 we also described the levels of relative class voting, but in 
that chapter we distinguished classes according to the more detailed EGP class 
scheme, and therefore talked about the levels of relative EGP class voting. 
The analyses for both manual/nonmanual class voting and EGP class voting 
yielded basically the same conclusions. They indicated that substantial differences 
in levels of relative class voting existed between democratic industrialized 
countries in the postwar period. Of all countries under investigation, the Scandi-
navian countries and Britain had the highest levels of class voting, and the 
United States and Canada the lowest. In addition, our analyses showed that in 
many of the countries substantial declines in levels of relative class voting 
occurred in the postwar period. The declines were largest in the Scandinavian 
countries, followed by Germany and Britain. Moreover, we found no evidence of 
substantial declines in class voting in Canada, Ireland, Luxembourg, Switzerland 
and the Netherlands. This despite the fact that for these countries data over a 
considerable time period were available. 
In addition, analyses showed, when describing between-country differences and 
over-time changes in class voting, that the various measures of class voting 
yielded the same conclusions with respect to the ranking of the countries accord-
ing to their levels of class voting, and according to the speed of declines of class 
voting. These results, however, do not imply that the claims of the scholars of the 
third generation were wrong. Our findings, as we discuss later in more detail, 
showed that some of the between-country and over-time variations in man-
ual/nonmanual class voting were due to variations in the composition of the 
manual and nonmanual classes, and not only to variations in the strength of the 
relationship between class and voting behaviour. 
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Explanations of variation in class voting 
In this study three explanations for the between-country and over-time variations 
in class voting were tested. The first explanation - that involves indirectly the 
above discussed descriptions of class voting - concerns the effects of the composi-
tion of manual and nonmanual classes on class voting. This explanation was 
suggested by scholars of the third generation, but was never directly tested. It 
supposes that between-country and over-time variation in class voting, when 
measured by the manual/nonmanual class scheme, to some extent can be 
explained by differences between these countries and changes within these 
countries in the composition of the manual and nonmanual classes. We tested this 
explanation in Chapter 5 analysing our individual-level dataset containing data 
from sixteen countries. When doing so, we presumed that within the manual and 
the nonmanual classes a distinction could be made between sub-classes. These 
sub-classes are defined according to the class scheme developed by Erikson, 
Goldthorpe and Portocarrero (the EGP class scheme). 
The test of this explanation revealed that about a quarter of the differences 
across democratic industrialized countries, when measured by the manual-
/nonmanual class distinction, could be explained by differences in the composition 
of the manual and nonmanual classes between these countries. Furthermore, 
around one fifth of the changes within democratic industrialized countries in 
manual/nonmanual class voting, could be explained by changes in the composi-
tion of the manual and nonmanual classes within these countries. These results 
thus imply that variations in manual/nonmanual class voting were not entirely due 
to variation in the strength of the relationship between class and voting behaviour. 
On the other hand, these results imply that at least three quarters of between-
country and over-time variations in manual/nonmanual class voting were due to 
variation in the actual voting behaviour of the EGP sub-classes between the 
countries and periods. This thus explains why both our descriptive analyses for 
manual/nonmanual and EGP class voting, i.e. controlling for variation in the 
composition of the manual and nonmanual class, basically yielded the same 
results. 
The second explanation of differences and trends in class voting that we investi-
gated, concerns the effects of social and political characteristics of countries on 
manual/nonmanual class voting. In studies that predominantly appeared in the 
first and second generation of research on stratification and politics, it was 
suggested that differences across democratic industrialized countries and changes 
within these countries in levels of manual/nonmanual class voting could to some 
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extent be explained by between-country and over-time variations in the social and 
political characteristics of countries. However, these explanations were 
predominantly vaguely formulated, and have not been subjected to strong 
empirical tests by analysing large numbers of data with multivariate techniques. 
Therefore, in Chapter 4, we improved upon the earlier studies and formulated 
seven precise hypotheses explaining levels of manual/nonmanual class voting. 
Subsequently, these hypotheses were tested using our aggregated country dataset 
containing information on class voting and social and political country character-
istics for twenty countries for various years in the postwar period. 
These tests resulted in somewhat different conclusions. With respect to 
between-country variations in class voting, the tests revealed that differences in 
the levels of manual/nonmanual class voting between democratic industrialized 
countries can to some extent be explained by differences in religious and ethnic 
diversity among the inhabitants in these countries, and by cross-country differ-
ences in the extent of trade union membership: The higher the religious and 
ethnic diversity among the inhabitants of a country and the lower the union 
density in a country, the lower the level of class voting. No effects on cross-
country differences in class voting were found with respect to a country's income 
differences, the size of the manual class, the general standard of living, and 
whether class was an issue in politics. Furthermore, an unexpected effect was 
found of the amount of intergenerational class mobility: the higher the percentage 
of mobile persons in a country, the higher the level of class voting in that 
country. 
With respect to developments over-time in manual/nonmanual class voting, our 
tests indicated that changes in class voting within the democratic industrialized 
countries to some extent can be explained by changes in the standard of living of 
the inhabitants in these countries. The higher the standard of living of a country's 
inhabitants, the lower the level of class voting. Furthermore, changes in a 
country's level of class voting can be explained by changes in the proportion of 
inhabitants that were members of a trade union in that country. A growth in 
union density in a country leads to a decline in the level of class voting. This 
unexpected finding is especially the case in countries where a general rise in 
union density was accompanied by a rise in the numbers of nonmanual class 
members becoming union members. 
A third account of between-country and over-time variations in levels of class 
voting concerns the macro-effects of intergenerational class mobility on class 
voting. When examining the effects of social and political characteristics of 
countries on class voting we already focused on the effects of intergenerational 
class mobility. However, after having done that we suggested that it would be 
198 Summary and Discussion 
worthwhile to investigate these effects again, this time taking into account the 
micro-level assumptions concerning the individual voting behaviour of mobile and 
immobile class members. The macro-level explanation tested Chapter 9 invokes 
cross-country differences and developments in patterns of intergenerational class 
mobility as explanatory factors for variations in class voting. This explanation has 
a long tradition in studies on stratification and politics. For example, it was 
already touched upon in the classic study of Sombart, where he tried to explain 
why there was no socialism in the United States, and it has also been raised in 
many more recent studies. However, no serious tests had been done to test this 
explanation over the long history of research in this area. We examined these 
effects of class mobility using our individual level dataset on twenty countries 
over the period 1956-1990. To take into account the micro-assumptions necessary 
to relate a country's mobility pattern with its level of class voting, we applied a 
method of counterfactual analysis. 
However, despite the large amount of literature on the macro-effects of 
mobility on class voting, and the elaborate way we investigated these effects, the 
conclusion was that differences across democratic industrialized countries and 
changes within these countries in levels of class voting, could not at all be 
explained by cross-country differences or over-time changes in the patterns of 
intergenerational class mobility of these countries. This conclusion was obtained 
both for levels of manual/nonmanual class voting, and for levels of EGP class 
voting. 
Effects of class mobility on individual voting behaviour 
Before we tested the macro-level explanation of variations in class voting 
between countries and periods by variations in intergenerational class mobility 
patterns, some micro-level assumptions were tested. These assumptions concerned 
the effects of intergenerational class mobility on individual voting behaviour. The 
effects of class mobility on individual voting behaviour are twofold: effects of 
individual class mobility and contextual effects of class mobility. 
The effects of individual intergenerational class mobility on voting behaviour 
were examined in Chapter 7. These effects had been investigated earlier. How-
ever, in the studies of the first and second generation this was predominantly 
done by examining percentage figures in cross-tabulations based on relatively 
small datasets, or by applying substantially inappropriate linear regression models 
on a limited number of datasets. In this study we were able to use more appropri-
ate models, so-called "diagonal mobility" models. Furthermore, we analysed our 
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individual dataset containing data from 113 cross-sectional surveys representing 
sixteen countries over the period 1956-1990. We tested the tenability of four 
specific hypotheses on the effects of individual intergenerational class mobility on 
the voting behaviour of mobile persons. 
We found that in all countries that the voting behaviour of the intergeneration-
ally mobile persons is somewhere between the typical voting behaviour of their 
class of destination and that of their class of origin, which confirmed our weak 
economic hypothesis. The outcomes of the analyses showed that for all countries 
the effect of destination class was larger than the effect of origin class. Further-
more, we found that in seven countries - Austria, Britain, Denmark, Finhnd, 
Germany, the Netherlands, and the United States - the voting behaviour of older 
intergenerationally mobile people is closer to the typical voting behaviour of their 
class of destination relative to the typical voting behaviour of their class of 
origin, than is the voting behaviour of younger intergenerationally mobile people. 
This supported our acculturation hypothesis. The parameter estimates obtained in 
our analyses showed that for our youngest respondents the effect of class origin 
was almost equal to the effect of their class destination. By the time respondents 
had reached sixty five years of age the relative destination effect was two times 
the size of the origin effect. The latter thus still had a substantial impact on the 
voting behaviour of this age group. 
The acceptance of these two hypotheses implied that the two other tested 
hypotheses, i.e. the strict economic hypothesis and the status maximization 
hypothesis, had to be rejected. The strict economic hypothesis states that the 
voting behaviour of the intergenerationally mobility persons is identical to the 
typical voting behaviour of their class of destination. The status maximization 
hypothesis, holds that upwardly intergenerationally mobile persons orient their 
voting behaviour relatively more to the typical voting behaviour of their class of 
destination, than do downwardly intergenerationally mobile persons. 
The contextual effects of intergenerational class mobility on the voting behaviour 
of immobile class members were investigated in Chapter 8. Hypotheses on these 
contextual effects had already been raised several times, especially in the first 
generation. These hypotheses concerned the effects of levels of inflow and levels 
of outflow mobility in a class. On the basis of this literature we formulated two 
testable hypotheses. The first was: the higher the level of left-wing inflow 
mobility to a class, the more likely it is that the voting behaviour of immobile 
members of that class will vote for a left-wing party. The second was: the higher 
the level of left-wing outflow mobility from a class, the more likely it is that the 
voting behaviour of immobile members of that class will vote for a left-wing 
party. To test these hypotheses it was necessary to have data on many "contexts", 
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i.e. on many classes, countries and periods. In this study we therefore tested the 
hypotheses by analysing our individual dataset containing data from seven classes 
in sixteen countries and over a long period and thus from many contexts. In 
addition, we used a method of analysis that is especially designed to investigate 
contextual effects, multi-level models. Despite these efforts, the results were 
negative. The analyses showed no significant contextual effects of either the level 
of intergenerational inflow- or the level of outflow class mobility in a country on 
the voting behaviour of intergenerationally immobile persons. 
10.2 Discussion 
Having summarized the main findings of this study, we now discuss the implica-
tions of these findings. Doing so, we first go back to the theoretical premises of 
this study. Second, we discuss the research design we applied, reviewing the 
employed measurement procedures, the data analysed and the methods of analyses 
utilized. Third, we discuss some research questions that deserve attention in future 
research. 
THEORETICAL PREMISES 
In this study we started by addressing questions at the macro-level, i.e. questions 
concerning the levels of class voting in a country at any given point in time. 
Nevertheless, after we did some explanatory analyses (in Chapter 5), we sug-
gested that we should also include assumptions at the individual-level in our 
theory. Therefore, in later chapters we paid specific attention to individual-level 
assumptions (e.g., in Chapters 7 and 8), and we integrated these in macro-level 
analyses (e.g., in Chapter 9). It could be asked then, whether it was perceptive to 
start at the macro-level in this study. One could argue that this indeed was a good 
strategy for two reasons. The first reason is that macro-level phenomena are of 
interest in themselves. We regard it as a relevant question to find out why in 
some countries some factors have more impact on people's behaviour than in 
other countries. In fact, the study of these macro phenomena has been the main 
reason for the very existence of sociology and political science. The second 
reason why we think addressing macro-level questions is relevant, is that a 
repetition of answers to micro questions, almost inevitably leads to macro ques-
tions. For example, when in Norway election after election the effect of class on 
individual voting behaviour is shown, an over-time comparison of these effects 
shows that this effect decreased over-time. This then leads to the macro-level 
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question why the effect of class on voting behaviour in Norway decreased. 
Another feature of this study is its particular perspective. When explaining 
between-country and over-time variations in levels of class voting, we remained 
as close as possible within the class perspective. That is, when explaining 
differences in levels of class voting, we mainly focused on explanations concern-
ing the class position of individuals. These explanations almost without exception 
implied that if the class positions of individuals were more adequately defined, 
then no differences in class voting between countries and no changes over-time 
would exist. We began by proposing the use of more detailed classes, then we 
argued that people's class positions should be defined not only in relation to 
current class, but also to origin class. 
Having stayed firmly within this class perspective we now ask ourselves 
whether this was a successful choice and whether future studies on this topic 
should also adopt this perspective. Three answers to these questions come up. 
First, we found that variation in levels of manual/nonmanual class voting indeed 
to some extent could be explained by variations in the composition of these 
classes. This suggests that by using an even more detailed class scheme we might 
be able to explain more of the variation in class voting. 
A second answer is that, although in this study some class-based explanations 
were not corroborated, this does not mean that the entire class perspective has to 
be rejected. It still offers various possibilities for explaining between-country and 
over-time variations in class voting. For example, more attention should be paid 
to the explanatory power of the rise of so-called "new classes", the class position 
of women, and the effects of mixed class marriages. Only if these possibilities 
within the class perspective turn out to be ineffective at explaining variations in 
class voting, should the class perspective be abandoned. 
However, the third reason why the class perspective is likely to remain 
important is because of the lack of full-blooming alternative approaches for 
explaining variations in class voting. For example, a perspective - such as 
Inglehart's theory on post-materialism - implying that people more and more vote 
on the basis of issues instead of their class interests, seems to overlook that class 
interests always had a central position on the agenda in daily politics. Further-
more, a perspective presupposing that political institutions influence electoral 
outcomes seem to have a limited scope for explaining variations in class voting. 
There are several reasons for this. To begin with, it is not clear that this perspec-
tive is supposed to apply to the relationship between class and voting behaviour 
at all. Second, there are difficulties in specifying the exact nature of the relation-
ship between institutions and electoral outcomes. It is complex to derive from this 
perspective whether a certain institution makes for a stronger or weaker relation-
ship between class and vote. Third, it is acknowledged that political institutions 
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are conditioned by social structures. In conclusion, we would like to maintain that 
any perspective explaining electoral outcomes, if it is successful, should not just 
postulate the existence of the major and smaller political parties, but should seek 
to explain their existence as resulting from the votes cast by individuals. Thus, we 
regard it a useful strategy to continue research within a perspective that does that, 
i.e. the class perspective. 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
The present study builds on a long history of research on social stratification and 
politics. We claim that by using up-to-date data, applying current measurement 
procedures and employing contemporary research methods we have been able to 
address more precise questions and to come up with more adequate answers than 
in earlier studies. Now we have finished our examinations in this study, it is time 
to evaluate the applied research design, and to think of possibilities where (more) 
progress can be made in future studies. 
Measurement procedures 
With respect to measurement procedures, one of the ways we aimed to make 
progress in this study was by using a detailed class scheme. We used the EGP 
class scheme in addition to the manual/nonmanual class scheme that has tradi-
tionally been used in studies on stratification and politics. Despite the fact that the 
EGP class scheme proved useful, future studies might consider some improve-
ments. A first adjustment that might be considered concerns the number of classes 
that are distinguished. In the class scheme, some classes are relatively large in 
numbers and members seem quite heterogeneous in their interests. This especially 
concerns the service class. This class has been shown in some countries to 
comprise about one third of the population. Furthermore, Inglehart (1990) and 
Kriesi (1989) have suggested that within the service class there is a substantial 
group that could be labelled the "cultural and social" specialists. This sub-class is 
characteristic for the post-industrial society, and has relatively left-wing voting 
patterns rather than the right-wing voting behaviour characteristic of members of 
the service class. In addition, a distinction can be made between service class 
members employed in the public sector and those employed in the private sector. 
Members of the public sector sub-class of the service class can be expected to be 
relatively more in favour of left-wing political parties, since their employment 
conditions depend on the policy implemented by the government and left-wing 
Summary and Discussion 203 
parties are more in favour of a large public sector than right-wing parties. Those 
employed in the private sector can be expected to be relatively more in favour of 
right-wing political patties, since their employment conditions are influenced by 
the chances private firms get from the government to make profit. 
Another recommendable adjustment to the operationalization of class concerns 
the class position of women. In this study we excluded women from our analyses, 
since it was theoretically unclear how the social positions of especially wives 
should be defined. According to the current literature they could not be assigned 
solely on the basis of their husbands' occupations or solely on the basis of their 
own occupations. However, for this study, we were unable to find adequate more 
complex operationalizations to take account of the interactions between husbands' 
and wives' occupations. In future research such operationalizations have to be 
developed. Furthermore, examinations of the relationship between the class 
position of women and their voting behaviour in democratic industrialized 
countries over the post war periods are worthwhile. 
When operationalizing people's voting behaviour, we followed a tradition in 
comparative research on the relationship between class and voting behaviour. We 
left aside those respondents who did not vote, and we dichotomized the political 
parties people could vote for into left-wing and right-wing. We argued that this 
captured the most relevant distinctions. 
However, in future studies it would be interesting to distinguish between all the 
separate political parties that run in a country's elections. This would enable us to 
find out whether substantial changes in the voting patterns of social classes have 
occurred within left-wing or ring-wing political blocks. For example, it might be 
that in the Netherlands - a country where we did not find a systematic decline in 
class voting - the manual workers are just as likely to vote for left-wing parties as 
before, but are less apt to vote for extreme left-wing parties, choosing instead 
more moderate left-wing parties. Evans et al. (1991) and Heath et al. (1985, 
1995) have already applied more detailed party classifications when investigating 
trends in Britain, and Hout et al. (1994) have done likewise for the United States. 
For trend analyses in other countries and for cross-nationally comparable studies 
in the future these examples deserve to be followed. Furthermore, distinguishing 
between all parties that run in a country's election allows for tests of hypotheses 
stating that changes in the behaviour of the political parties are to some extent 
responsible for changes in voting behaviour of classes. 
A further recommendation for future research is the inclusion of a category 
"non-voters". Hout et al. (1994) did this in their trend analyses for the United 
States. This strategy is useful, since members of manual classes are in general 
less apt to vote at elections than are members of nonmanual classes. Thus, it 
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might be that when analysing only respondents who vote, the effect of people's 
class on their voting behaviour is underestimated. Furthermore, variations in 
class-based non-voting, might explain variations in levels of class voting as 
examined in the present study. For example, the declines in levels of class voting 
found in this study might have been caused by the fact that the left-wing manual 
workers stopped voting at all. We thus regard research that includes analyses of 
non-voting in the examinations of class voting as a worthwhile development. 
Data 
We would also like to comment on the data used in this and future studies on 
class voting. To address the descriptive questions on the extent which countries 
differed in their levels of class voting and to what extent there was a decline in 
these levels in the countries, we used data from a large number of surveys that 
were held in many countries and over numerous years. When addressing our 
descriptive questions, these countries and years then became the cases in the 
analyses. In this way we avoided a traditional problem in comparative and trends 
studies, i.e. the "small N problem". However, despite our data collection efforts, 
we occasionally still ended up with a small number of cases. This resulted in 
some analyses depending on only a few cases, and consequently outliers having a 
large influence. An obvious suggestion for future research therefore is to collect 
and analyse more surveys from more countries (e.g., eastern European countries) 
and years (e.g., after 1990). However, although we do not claim to have fully 
reached the limits of this strategy, we think we already included most of the 
publicly available datasets containing detailed measures of respondent's origin 
and destination class and voting behaviour, especially for the period before 1980. 
Therefore, the small N problem probably cannot be solved by collecting more 
data, but has to be solved by paying specific attention to the robustness of the 
results and the effects of possible outliers on these results. Thus, more explorative 
research in this area, as well as the use of methods of analysis that are designed 
to deal with the effects of outliers, seems worthwhile. 
Another suggestion concerns the quality of the data. In this study we used data 
from high quality surveys. Furthermore, we explicitly checked for outliers with 
respect to the class and voting distributions. However, the datasets still differ in 
the way respondents' current and former classes or occupations were coded. In 
some surveys detailed codes were available, while in others more crude measures 
were included. Furthermore, surveys differed in their sampling procedures. These 
differences in the characteristics of the studies had an unknown impact on the 
outcomes of the analyses. Therefore, we suggest that future research should pay 
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explicit attention to the effects of these characteristics of survey data. This can be 
done by specific studies of the effects of survey characteristics on class measures, 
voting measures, and measures of strength of the relationship between class and 
voting behaviour. It can also be done by including data-quality variables as 
control variables in descriptive and explanatory analyses of class voting (See for 
example: Ganzeboom et al. 1989). 
Methods of analyses 
In this study we employed methods of analyses that were available to studies of 
the third generation of research on stratification and politics. These methods are 
equipped to analyse large scale datasets and use log-odds-ratios as a measure of 
class voting. They were successful in getting adequate answers to our research 
questions in this study. However, we would also like to suggest some other 
methods for future research. 
First, when describing and explaining levels of class voting between countries 
and periods - as discussed above - we had to deal with the "small N problem". 
This problem raises questions on the robustness of our results, i.e. the outliers 
might have had a large impact. For future research it is therefore worthwhile to 
pay specific attention to the impact of these outliers on results of analyses. When 
doing so techniques that are specially developed to examine the effect of outlying 
cases in analyses on a small number of cases, like bootstrapping and jackknifing, 
can be applied. 
Second, we would like to focus on the methods we used to test the explana-
tions of varying levels of class voting at the macro-level, while including 
individual-level assumptions. In this study, when testing the class composition 
explanations and the class mobility analyses, we used the so-called "method of 
counterfactual analysis". This had been useful in earlier studies and was effective 
in the present study when doing comparative analyses. Even more, we claimed to 
have improved on this method by analysing its outcomes with non-linear models 
as discussed in Chapter 9. However, we still feel that it would be relevant to 
formalise the method of counterfactual analysis and the use of these models. It is 
a potentially important method for cross-national and over-time analysis, and 
needs theoretical and technical support. 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Finally we discuss some research questions to be addressed in future research. We 
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pay attention to the same three types of questions that were central in this study: 
descriptive questions on levels of class voting, explanatory questions on class 
voting, and questions about the effects of intergenerational class mobility on 
individual voting behaviour. 
Descriptive questions 
In this study we claim to have made progress by addressing descriptive questions 
concerning relative levels of class voting and concerning many countries over 
such a long period. Furthermore, we addressed our descriptive questions on 
relative class voting while distinguishing between more than two classes. How-
ever, we did not fully use the possibilities offered by the detailed class scheme. 
We dealt with a question that pertains only to the overall levels of class voting in 
countries. We thus did not examine the voting behaviour of these detailed classes 
separately, nor did we investigate the specific trends in the voting behaviour of 
these different classes. Such class specific trends are of interest, since - as for 
example supposed for Britain by Heath et al. (1991) - some classes might have 
started to vote less according to their class interest, while others might have kept 
the same voting pattern or even started to vote more according to their class 
interests. These separate class specific trends cannot always fully be detected 
when investigating the overall levels of class voting. The class dealignment in one 
class might be surpassed by the class realignment in another class. Therefore, in 
future studies the focus should not be restricted to overall levels of class voting, 
but should also be on class-specific voting behaviour. In this way, more detailed 
research questions can be addressed, such as: To what extent have the service 
class and the skilled manual class become more similar in their voting behaviour 
in the Western industrialized over the postwar period? 
Another more precise descriptive research questions has been suggested by 
Hout et al. (1994). When describing the trend in class voting in the United States, 
they did not only do it in a straightforward way, but they also described the 
effects of class on people's voting behaviour controlling for the effects of various 
other characteristics of these people, like their religion, age, and region of 
residence. They called the outcomes of the controlled and the uncontrolled 
analyses the net and the gross level of class voting respectively. We consider it 
worthwhile to investigate the net levels of class voting in future studies. There-
fore, we suggest that future studies should address questions like: To what extent 
were there differences between countries and declines over-time in net and gross 
class voting in Western industrialized countries in the postwar period? Further-
more, questions on class-specific net class voting should be addressed. These 
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include: To what extent has the voting behaviour of members of the service class 
and the skilled manual worker class become more similar in the Western indus-
trialized in the postwar period, when controlling for their origin class, religion, 
union membership? 
Explanations of variation in class voting 
When we addressed questions pertaining to explanations of variation in class 
voting at the macro-level, many of the formulated hypotheses were rejected. We 
claimed then to rephrase the hypotheses, by including individual-level assump-
tions in the theory. To continue in this line of reasoning, we now suggest 
rephrasing the explanatory question for future research by taking the individual-
level into account. Therefore, future research would benefit from implementing 
the sociological idea that the immobile are the core members of classes. Thus, 
when focusing on the effects of social and political characteristics of countries on 
class voting, the focus should be solely on the (class) voting of immobile class 
members. Another suggestion for rephrasing the explanatory research questions -
also in line with the above suggestions - is by focusing on net class voting, i.e. 
controlling for relevant non-class characteristics. Thus, possible research questions 
might be: To what extent would differences across democratic industrialized 
countries and changes within these countries in the levels of relative net class 
voting among immobile class members, be explained by differences between 
these countries and changes within these countries in their social and political 
characteristics? Addressing such questions requires large individual-level datasets 
containing information about many characteristics of individual respondents, 
measured in a comparable way between countries and over-time. It will be a giant 
but worthwhile task to assemble and analyse such datasets in future studies. 
Another challenge for future studies is to find out why in this study we found 
no effects of variation in intergenerational class mobility between countries on 
levels of class voting in these countries. We expected that differences between 
countries and changes over-time in the patterns of intergenerational class mobility, 
would to some extent explain between-country and over-time variations in levels 
of class voting. This expectation was based upon the assumption that there was 
substantial variation in the patterns of class mobility between countries and over-
time. We made this assumption on the basis of results of many studies into 
absolute rates of intergenerational class mobility. Furthermore, it was based upon 
the assumption that mobile class members had a different voting behaviour 
compared to immobile class members in these countries. These assumptions were 
built upon the findings in Chapter 7 of the present study. However, although to 
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our knowledge these assumptions seem to be correct, in Chapter 9 we found that 
variation in intergenerational class mobility over countries and periods did not 
explain any variation in levels of class voting between the countries and periods. 
Therefore, future research has to show which of our assumptions have to be 
adjusted. It might, for example, be that countries differ in their mobility patterns 
in many ways, but that effects of these various sorts of differences cancel each 
other out when it concerns the levels of overall class voting. Furthermore, it 
might be that the acculturation of the mobile to the political climate in their new 
class takes less time in some countries than in others. Which of the assumptions 
needs to be revised, remains to be investigated in future research. 
Effects of intergenerational class mobility on voting behaviour 
When we examined the effects of intergenerational class mobility on individual 
voting behaviour, we found for some countries that the older intergenerationally 
mobile persons are, the more they obtain the voting behaviour of their new 
destination class. To explain this finding, we assumed a process of acculturation, 
i.e. new class members are assumed to be influenced by their new personal 
networks which consist of members of their destination class. However, when 
investigating this, we had to rely on cross-sectional data, i.e. data that did not 
include information about the history of these persons, or on their personal 
network. Thus, we could not address research questions like: at what age did 
mobile persons become members of their new class? How did their individual 
career look like? In what stage of their career did they have what kind of 
members in their personal network? To get a good picture of the acculturation 
process, addressing such questions is vital and deserves attention. 
We realize that investigating the effects of class mobility does offer more 
insight at the individual-level, but probably does not illuminate the relationship 
between class and voting behaviour at the country-level. Investigations that 
differentiate between various types of mobile persons might illuminate the voting 
behaviour of these specific groups, but these groups are too small to end up with 
significantly better predictions about the levels of class voting at the country-
level. However, considering the importance of people's class position in determin-
ing their party choice in Western industrialized countries even in current days, it 
is worth putting such micro-level questions on the agenda of research on social 
stratification and politics. 
Appendix A 
Data Sources: Aggregated Data 
Class Voting Data 
Class voting data were collected from two types of sources: tables published in 
various articles and books, and tables calculated with data from representative 
surveys published on tape. The sources of the survey data are presented in Appendix 
B. The tables published in articles and books come from the following sources: 
Australia: Alford (1963); Baxter et al. (1991); McAllister (personal 
communication 1992); Rose (1974). 
Austria: Rose & Urwin (1969); Crewe & Denver (1985); Lijphart (1971); 
Lane & Ersson (1991). 
Belgium: Frognier (1975); Lijphart (1971); Rose (1980). 
Britain: Alford (1963); Heath et al. (1985, 1991); NORC (1948); Rose & 
McAllister (1986). 
Canada: Alford (1963); Rose (1974); Rose (1980). 
Denmark: Andersen (1984); Lane & Ersson (1991); Rose (1980); Sainsbury 
(1990). 
Finland: Allardt & Littunen (1964); Allardt & Wesolowski (1978); Berglund 
(1988); Matheson (1979); Rose & Urwin (1969); Rose (1974). 
France: Converse & Pierce (1986); Dalton (1988); Dalton et al. (1984); 
MacRae (1967). 
Germany: Dalton (1988); Forschungsgruppe Wahlen (1990); De Jong (1956); 
Lijphart (1971); Rose & Urwin (1969). 
Ireland: Crewe & Denver (1985); Laver et al. (1987); Rose (1974). 
Italy: Allum (1979); Crewe & Denver (1985); Lijphart (1971); Lipset 
(1983); Rose (1974); Von Beyme (1985); Rose & Urwin (1969). 
Netherlands: Lijphart (1968). 
Norway: Listhaug (1989); Valen (personal communication 1992). 
Portugal: Lane & Ersson (1991). 
Spain: Günther et al. (1986); Rose (1980). 
Sweden: Holmberg (1991); Stephens (1981). 
Switserland: Kerr (1987); Lane & Ersson (1991); Rose (1980). 
United States: Alford (1963); Abramson et al. (1990). 
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Union density 
As a measure of union density, we used so-called "gross density rates", the number 
of union members divided by the size of the labour force, without correcting for 
union members drawing a pension. Union density data were collected from the 
following sources: Kjelberg (1983): Australia 1945-1980 (officiell serie, totalt); 
Belgium, 1947, 1950, 1957-1980 (lontagare, (1)); United States, 1945-1976 (NBER, 
totalt). Visser (1989) (gross density rates). Visser (1992) (table 1: aggregate union 
density rates (employed + unemployed + retired (see notes)) column 1988/89: Aus-
tralia, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, England, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, 
Sweden, Switzerland; column 1980 and 1988/89: United States; column 1970, 1980 
and 1988/89: Luxembourg, Canada, Finland, Ireland. Visser (1991): Greece (1977, 
1985), Luxembourg (1975, 1981), Portugal (1969, 1975, 1980, 1985), Spain (1976, 
1981, 1985). Korpi, 1983: Canada: 1946-1960. Lane et al. 1991: Finland: 1950, 
1955, 1960, 1965, 1975. 
Income differences 
We found no data for income differences between the social classes of our 20 
countries. As an approximation we followed tradition (Lane & Ersson 1991) and 
used measures for a country's overall income distribution. We chose the income 
share of the highest 20 % as a measure for the income differences in a country. 
Sources for such income difference data are quite diverse and comparability in the 
course of time is limited. In general there is a shift from data for individuals to data 
for households. Methodological studies of income distribution data (Menard 1986, 
Hoover 1989, Mahler 1989) advise against combining data from different sources. 
We settled for data from the World Bank (1978-1991). These series commence 
around 1970. We did away with missing values for the period 1945-1970 by 
assuming stability in income differences within countries (the Pearson correlation 
between the mean values for countries in the period 1971-1980 and those in the 
period 1981-1990 is 0.48, a measure somewhat too low for proper interpolation) and 
substituting the mean value of a country for 1971-1980. No data were available for 
Austria, Greece and Luxembourg. 
Standard of living 
As an indicator of the general standard of living, we took a country's per capita 
gross domestic product (GDP) in constant dollars and 1985 international prices. Our 
source was Summers & Heston (1991), covering the 1950-1988 period. In those 
cases where information was needed for a country during the period 1945-1949, we 
took its value for 1950. For a country in 1989 and 1990 we took its value for 1988. 
In the analyses we divided GDP per capita measures by 1000, yielding more 
manageable parameters. 
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Intergenerational Social Mobility 
For data on a country's mobility pattern we used an updated version of the file 
reported in Ganzeboom et al. (1989). We calculated the percentage mobile men for 
each two by two table cross classifying a male's present occupation 
(manual/nonmanual) with the occupation of his father. Only males between 18 and 
64 years were considered. Since data were not available on a year-to-year basis, we 
went on to calculate the mean for every country for each of the periods 1945-1960, 
1961-1970, 1971-1980 and 1981-1990. If no data for a particular country were 
available in the first and the last period, the value of the adjacent period was taken. 
If no data were available for the two periods in between, if possible the mean of the 
adjacent periods was taken. This reduced the number of missing values, but for 
Greece, Luxembourg and Portugal the missing values are still present in our data set. 
Ethnic-linguistic and Religious Heterogeneity 
As to ethnic-linguistic and religious heterogeneity, our measure is the fragmentation 
index as computed by Rae & Taylor (1970). The fragmentation index refers to the 
probability that two randomly sampled people will belong to different groups. The 
higher this index, the more heterogeneous a country. We took data for the period 
1945-1970 from Taylor & Hudson (1972). For the period 1971-1990 we used Barrett 
(1982). 
Class as a Political Issue 
Measures for the prominence of class as a political issue were taken from Lane & 
Ersson (1991: 291). To create these scores, they apparently used their knowledge of 
countries' political histories. The higher the score on this predictor, the more 
prominent class as an issue. Measures for the prominence of class as a political issue 
were available for the periods 1945-1964 and 1965-1989. For 1990 we used the 
1965-1989 data. In Lane & Ersson, data for Australia, Canada, Luxembourg and the 
USA are missing. Based on our own knowledge of the political histories of these 
countries, we ourselves gave these countries in the distinguished periods scores on 
this variable. To obtain better interpretable parameters, in the analyses we did not 
use Lane & Ersson's 1 to 5 scoring, but recoded ranging from 0 to 4. 
Percentage Manual Workers 
The tables we used for computing the level of class voting also yielded the 
percentage of manual occupations held by persons belonging to the labour force. 
Summary statistics for the explanatory variables at the country level are shown in 
Table A. 1. 
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Appendix В 
Data Sources: Survey Data 
For this study we analysed a large collection of relevant population sample data 
from sixteen countries on different points in time. These datasets have been 
extracted and collected in one large combine file. This "International Stratifica­
tion, Mobility and Politics File" consist of a set of extracts from 113 datasets that 
contain information on intergenerational occupational mobility (father's and 
respondent's occupation) and politics (voting behaviour). In this file these vari­
ables, together with some elementary demographics, are available in comparable 
and standardized codes. For detailed information on this file, we refer to Nieuw-
beerta & Ganzeboom (1995). In this appendix we confine ourselves by giving 
references to the original files. The names of the files are acronyms: the first 
three letters represent the country, the first two figures the year the survey took 
place. The reference numbers refer to the numbers in the catalogues of the data-
archivs where the files were stored. These archives are Usted at the end of this 
appendix. 
File 
AUS65 
AUS67 
AUS73 
AUS79 
AUS84 
AUS85Í 
AUS86Í 
AUS87e 
AUS87Í 
AUS90e 
AUT74p 
AUT85Í 
AUT88Í 
AUT89Í 
BEL75 
BRI64e 
BRI66e 
BRI70e 
BRI74e 
BRI79e 
BRI83e 
Reference 
SSDA : 7 
ICPSR: 7282 
SSDA : 9 
SSDA : 9 
SSDA : 423 
ICPSR: 8909 
ICPSR: 9205 
SSDA : 445 
ICPSR: 9383 
SSDA : 570 
ICPSR: 7777 
ICPSR: 8909 
ZA : 1700 
ZA : 1840 
ESRC : 1577 
ICPSR: 7250 
ICPSR: 7250 
ICPSR: 7004 
ICPSR: 7870 
ICPSR: 8196 
ICPSR: 8409 
FUe 
BRI85Ì 
BRI86Ì 
BRI87e 
BRI87Ì 
BRI88Ì 
BRI89Ì 
BRI90Í 
CAN84e 
DEN71e 
DEN72S 
DEN75e 
DEN77e 
DEN79e 
DEN81e 
FIN72S 
FIN75p 
FRA78e 
GER69e 
GER69f 
Reference 
ICPSR: 8909 
ICPSR: 9205 
NYM : ENG87e 
ICPSR: 9383 
ZA : 1700 
ZA : 1840 
ZA : 1950 
ICPSR: 8544 
ICPSR: 8946 
DDA : 081 
ICPSR: 8946 
ICPSR: 8946 
ICPSR: 8946 
ICPSR: 8946 
DDA : 081 
ICPSR: 7777 
ESRC : 1987 
ICPSR: 7108 
ICPSR: 7098 
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File 
GER75p 
GER76Z 
GER77Z 
GER78C 
GER78X 
GER79x 
GER79Z 
GER80a 
GER80C 
GER80p 
GER80Z 
GER82a 
GER84a 
GER86a 
GER87Ì 
GER88a 
GER90a 
IRE89Ì 
ПШ90І 
ITA68C 
ITA75p 
ΓΓΑ85 
NET70 
NET71 
NET72e 
NET74p 
NET76 
NET77e 
NET771 
NET79p 
NET81C 
NET82e 
NET85S 
NET86e 
NET87 
NET89m 
NET90S 
Reference 
ICPSR: 7777 
ZA 
ZA 
ZA 
ZA 
ZA 
ZA 
ZA 
ZA 
ZA 
ZA 
ZA 
ZA 
ZA 
1233 
1233 
1233 
1233 
1233 
1233 
1795 
1233 
1188 
1233 
1795 
1795 
1795 
ICPSR: 9383 
ZA : 1795 
ZA : 1800 
ZA : 1840 
ZA : 1950 
ICPSR: 7953 
ICPSR: 7777 
NYM :ITA85 
ICPSR: 7261 
ICPSR: 7768 
STEIN: P0353 
ICPSR: 7777 
STEIN: P0653 
STEIN: P0354 
STEIN: P0328 
ZA : 1188 
STEIN: P0350 
STEIN: P0633 
STEIN: P1012 
STEIN: P0866 
NYM : NET87 
NYM : NET89m 
STED i:P1100 
FUe 
NOR65e 
NOR72S 
NOR77e 
NOR81e 
NOR85e 
NOR89e 
NOR90e 
SWE72S 
SWE90 
SWI72 
SWI76p 
USA56e 
USA58e 
USA60e 
USA64e 
USA66e 
USA68e 
USA70e 
USA72g 
USA73g 
USA74g 
USA74p 
USA75g 
USA76g 
USA77g 
USA78g 
USA80g 
USA82g 
USA83g 
USA84g 
USA85g 
USA86g 
USA87g 
USA88g 
USA89g 
USA90g 
Reference 
ICPSR: 7256 
DD A : 081 
NSD :NOR77e 
NSD :NOR81e 
NSD : NOR85e 
NSD : NOR89e 
NSD :NOR90e 
DDA : OSI 
NYM :SWE90 
ICPSR: 7342 
ICPSR: 7777 
ICPSR: 7214 
ICPSR: 7215 
ICPSR: 7216 
ICPSR: 7235 
ICPSR: 7259 
ICPSR: 7281 
ICPSR: 7298 
ICPSR: 9505 
ICPSR: 9505 
ICPSR: 9505 
ICPSR: 7777 
ICPSR: 9505 
ICPSR: 9505 
ICPSR: 9505 
ICPSR: 9505 
ICPSR: 9505 
ICPSR: 9505 
ICPSR: 9505 
ICPSR: 9505 
ICPSR: 9505 
ICPSR: 9505 
ICPSR: 9505 
ICPSR: 9505 
ICPSR: 9505 
ICPSR: 9505 
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-Standard Demographie (Zeitreihe), Germany 1976-1980. 
ZA: 1700 International Social Science Program (ISSP), International Social Science 
Program: Family and Changing Sex Roles, 1988. 
ZA: 1795 Allerbeck, K.R., M.R. Lepsius, K.U. Mayer, W. Müller, K.-D. Opp, F.U. 
Pappi, E.K. Schreuch, and R. Ziegler, Allgemeine Bevolkerungsumfrage der 
Sozialwissenschaften Allbus Kumulierter Datensatz, 1980-1988. 
ZA: 1800 ZUMA (Zentrum fuer Umfragen, Methoden, und Analysen, German Social 
Survey (Allbus), 1990. 
ZA: 1840 International Social Science Program (ISSP), International Social Science 
Program: Work Orientations, 1989. 
ZA: 1950 International Social Science Program (ISSP), International Social Science 
Program: Role of Government II, 1990. 
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Data Archives 
DDA Danish Data Archive, Odense, Denmark. 
ESRC ESRC Data Archive, Essex, United Kingdom. 
ICPSR Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research, Ann Arbor 
(MI), USA. 
NSD Norwegian Social Science Data Service, Bergen, Norway. 
NYM Department of Sociology, University of Nijmegen, Nijmegen, The Nether-
lands. 
SSDA Social Science Data Archive, Canberra, Australia. 
STEIN Steinmetz Archive, Amsterdam, The Netherlands. 
ZA Zentral Archive, Köln, Germany. 

Notes 
2 Data and operationalizations 
1. Lijphart does not qualify Spain, Portugal and Greece under the criterion of a long-term 
and uninterrupted democracy, but claims that these countries have been democratic since 
the mid-1970s and are generally judged to be stable and consolidated democracies. 
2. With respect to the published data, we had to accept the way respondents were divided 
into manual and nonmanual class members in these sources. 
3. These concern the following datasets: 
• Denmark 1976: Danish Social Welfare study 1976 (DDA 0070); 
• France 1958: G. Dupeux, French Election Study 1958 (ICPSR 7278); 
• Italy 1972: S.H. Barnes, G. Sani, Italian Mass Election Survey 1972 (ICPSR 7954); 
• Italy 1990: International Social Science Program (ISSP): Role of Government Π 
1990 (ZA 1950); 
• Norway 1969: S. Rokkan, H. Valen, Norwegian Election Study 1969 (NSD NOR69); 
• Switzerland 1987: International Social Science Program (ISSP), Social Inequality 
1987 (ICPSR 9383). 
4. The codes between bracket are based on Mackie & Rose (1991). The first two digits 
refer to the country-chapter; the last two digits refer to the specific political party. For 
information about political parties we also used Day & Degenhardt (1980) and Lane et 
al. (1991). 
5. Large proprietors are included in the service class, where they might appear as a rather 
anomalous element. However, large proprietors are few in number. Furthermore, large 
proprietors are not the capitalist elite or captains of industry, but are more like salaried 
managers (Erikson & Goldthorpe 1992: 40). 
6. The log-odds-ratio can be seen as the multiplicative equivalent of the Alford index. The 
Alford index equals the estimated β, coefficient of a linear regression: 
Left = β0 + β, Manual class (1) 
where Left is coded (1) when voting for a left party and (0) when voting for other 
parties, and Manual class is coded as (1) for manual class workers and (0) for non-
manual class workers. The value of the log-odds-ratio equals the value of the estimated 
β, coefficient for an analogous logistic regression: 
log((7t*Left)/(l - JC*Left)) = β0 + β, Manual class (2) 
7. We would like to thank John Goldthorpe for providing us with these tables. 
3 Description of manual/nonmanual class voting 
1. Part of this chapter is based upon a paper - in collaboration with Wout Ultee - presented 
at the Annual Meeting of the European Consortium of Political Research in Limerick, 
1992, and at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association in 
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Chicago, 1992 (revised version). 
2. To take into account the susceptibility of the Thomsen index to sampling error (see also 
note 2, Chapter 4), we also estimated for each country separately the parameters of the 
following logistic multi-level model: 
log((7t*Left,jk)/(l - π * Ι ^ ) ) = 
ßo,k + ßijk Manual class1Jt + e,Jk (3) 
ßo,k = ßook + %t (4) 
ßook = ßooo + θ«* (5) 
ßuk = ßuk + β2ιι Year of Survey + Y,Jk (6) 
ßuk = Pm + Yllk (7) 
where i stands for the individual respondent, j for the year of observation and к for the 
country. The results of these analyses yielded similar conclusions to the simple linear 
regression analyses for which results are presented in the text and in Table 3.3 and 3.4. 
The multi-level analyses were conducted using the ML3 computer program (Prasser et 
al. 1991). For more information on the advantages of multi-level models over traditional 
techniques we refer to Chapter 4. 
3. Moreover, the correlation between the Alford index and the Thomsen index, leaving out 
the cases where the percentage of left-wing party supporters is lower than 25 per cent -
mainly the Irish cases - turned out to be 0.99. 
4 Effects of social and political characteristics of countries on 
manual/nonmanual class voting 
1. This chapter is an adaptation of a paper - in collaboration with Wout Ultee - presented 
at the Annual Meeting of the European Consortium of Political Research in Limerick, 
1992; and at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association in 
Chicago, 1992 (revised version). A translated version of this chapter is published in the 
Sociologische Gids (Nieuwbeerta & Ultee 1995). 
2. In our dataset there is no variation in the percentage mobile within Switzerland and no 
variation in the union density within Portugal. Therefore, for Table 4.2 and Table 4.4 
the pertinent correlations and trend parameters could not be calculated. 
3. The standard deviation of the Thomsen index, i.e. the natural logarithm of the odds-
ratio, is given by: (l/x
n
 + l/x12 + 1/Xji + I/X22)"2. where xM to x22 represent the number 
of respondents in the four cells of a two-by-two table (Fienberg 1980: 18). 
4. We thus explain variation in the levels of class voting between years within countries. It 
is also possible to explain variation between countries within years. The latter way of 
modelling seems less natural to us. 
5. To do this, we specified the following equations at the year-level and at the country-
level: 
ßo,k= ßook + Yo,k (4) 
ßook= ßooo + оок (5) 
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6. The various predictors outlined are not too strongly correlated. The highest correlation 
(0.65) is that between mobility and standard of living. The highest correlation but one is 
that between the percentage of the population in manual jobs and the standard of living: 
this equals -0.55. Such negligible multicollinearity allows for a multivariate test of our 
hypotheses. The two highest correlations between the independent variables that are 
centred around their country means (used in the year-level equation in the multi-level 
analysis), are that between the percentage of mobility and the standard of living (0.78) 
and that between the centred percentage in manual jobs and standard of living (-0.58). 
7. Analyses were conducted using the ML3 computer program. In ML3, all equations are 
estimated simultaneously, producing maximum-likelihood estimates of the coefficients 
(for a more detailed account, see Prosser et al. 1991). 
8. To test whether the bivariate results can be replicated when using the multi-level model, 
we fitted eleven multi-level models like the one described, but including in each model 
only one of the listed explanatory variables. The coefficients for the uncontrolled 
bivariate effects of the explanatory variables can be compared with the zero-order 
correlations reported in Tables 4.1 and 4.2. The estimated coefficients from the bivariate 
multi-level model make clear that all variables judged significant in the simple zero-
order correlational analysis are significant when the data are modelled by a multi-level 
model. In addition, none of the variables that were not significant are then significant in 
the multi-level model. Thus, the bivariate multi-level model results replicate those 
obtained from calculating the zero-order correlations. This outcome is not all that 
obvious; whereas the coefficients in Tables 4.1 and 4.2 do not take into account the 
number of individuals observed for one year-country Thomsen index, the coefficients in 
the bi-variate model do so. 
9. We also estimated a model including only variables at the country level and a model 
including only variables at the year level. The estimated coefficients were very similar 
to the model presented in the text. Therefore, the conclusions drawn were the same. 
10. In the model presented in the text, no covariance terms between the constant and the 
variable manual were included. To check whether the inclusion of covariance terms 
would yield different conclusions for our hypotheses tests, we estimated a model 
containing these covariance terms. The conclusions obtained from the parameter 
estimates of this model, however, are the same as in the "no-covariance model". 
11. In our dataset used for the multi-level analyses (N=287), the correlations of 'Year' with 
the variables centred around their country means are: standard of living (0.87), percen-
tage manual workers (-0.60), percentage mobile (0.72), and union density (0.22). 
12. In some countries, the limited number of cases generated some strange trend parameters 
for the explanatory variables. Therefore, we also calculated the correlations between the 
trend parameters, while weighting for the number of cases in each country. These 
correlations were: class voting with standard of living -0.35 (p=0.07), percentage manual 
workers 0.00 (p=0.50), percentage mobile -0.04 (p=0.44), and union density -0.46 
(p=0.02). Thus, these yielded the same conclusions. 
13. We will return to this in the final chapter. 
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S Effects of composition of manual and nonmanual classes on 
manual/nonmanual class voting 
1. Part of this chapter is based upon a paper - in collaboration with Nan Dirk de Graaf -
presented at the World Congress of Sociology of the International Sociological Associ­
ation in Bielefeld, 1994. A revised version of this chapter (Nieuwbeerta & De Graaf 
1996) will appear in a book titled "The End of Class Politics?" edited by G. Evans. 
2. These scholars' arguments primarily concern trends in the levels of class voting across 
countries. However, since these arguments also have consequences for explaining 
differences across countries in the levels of class voting, we have generalized their main 
points. 
3. For a recent discussion of rational choice theory and class voting see Weakliem & 
Heath (1994a) and Mills (1994). 
4. In Table 5.3, we collapsed surveys within certain periods. The trends in Table 5.4 are 
estimated on the basis of the separate year tables. For this reason, the obtained trend 
figures of Table 5.4 do not necessarily match the patterns in Table 5.3. The trends 
reported in Table 5.4 give more accurate information on whether trends occurred in the 
composition of the manual and nonmanual class, than does the information in Table 5.3. 
5. An example may make this procedure clearer. If we would have calculated the Thomsen 
index for Australia in the period 1961-1970 - assuming constant voting behaviour for 
the EGP classes across countries and time - we would have used the average voting 
behaviour from the bottom row in Table 5.2 and the class distribution from the first row 
in Table 5.3. Then calculations would have shown that - under this assumption - in the 
manual class (56.9 *38.4 + 55.3*56.2 + 43.4*5.3)/100, or 55.2 per cent voted for a left-
wing party, and in the nonmanual class (40.6*21.5 + 32.6*48.8 + 29.8*8.7 +18.3*20.9)-
/100, or 31.1 per cent. This would have resulted in a Thomsen index (for column B) of 
log(((55.2/(100-55.2))/((31.1/(100-31.1))), or 1.02. However, in the analyses reported in 
column В in Table 5.5 we used data on the class distribution per year instead of per 
decade, but the procedure is the same. 
6. All unstandardized effect parameter estimates differ significantly from zero at the 0.05 
level. 
7. In all countries, but in Australia and Italy, the unstandardized effects differ significantly 
from zero at the 0.05 level. In Austria the estimated effect of "Thomsen index: Vote 
constant" is insignificant. In Italy both effect estimates are insignificant. 
6 Description of EGP class voting 
1. This chapter is a revised version of a paper presented at the Bi-annual Meeting of the 
Dutch Sociological Association, Amsterdam, 1994. 
2. For Belgium and Denmark the reference category is formed by a mixture of unskilled 
manual class workers and agricultural labourers. 
3. One could argue that our detailed class scheme also enables us to distinguish between 
class specific processes of dealignment or realignment. For example, it is possible that 
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the distances between the service class and the skilled manual class become smaller, 
while at the same time the distances between the service class and the fanners grow. In 
this study, however, we focus on the overall change in levels of class voting and leave 
the class specific dealignment and realignment processes for future research (see also 
Chapter 10). 
4. In order to fit the models we used GLIM and the GLIM macros as developed by Robert 
Erikson. We thank him for making available these macros, and John Hendrickx and 
Clive Payne for helping to adjust the macros to our data. 
5. It is, of course, interesting to investigate the existence of certain clusters of countries 
with strong and less strong trends. However, we regard it informative to compare the 
levels and trends in EGP class voting in all the countries with the levels and trends in 
manual/nonmanual class voting. Furthermore, to determine which country belongs to 
which cluster would require the comparison of a very large number of nested models. 
The large amount of computer time it takes to estimate the parameters of a single 
model, i.e. about 24 hours CPU time, therefore was another reason we did no go into 
this kind of analysis. 
6. The ßo,k parameters are not presented in this table, because they are of limited interest 
since our concern is with class differences in voting behaviour and not with the absolute 
popularity of left-wing parties. 
7. Thus, indirectly these results for Finland and Ireland confirm our research strategy of 
analysing many datasets for the countries under investigation. 
8. The Pearson correlation between the entries in the first and the second main column is 
0.98 (N=11, p=0.000). 
9. The Pearson correlation between the entries of Tables 3.3 and 3.4 is 0.68 (N=11, 
p=0.011). 
7 Effects of individual lntergenerational class mobility on voting behaviour 
1. Part of this chapter is based upon an article published in the American Journal of 
Sociology on the effects of class mobility on political preferences in four countries (De 
Graaf, Nieuwbeerta & Heath 1995). 
2. Evidence on the existence of such countermobility is given by - among others - Girod 
(1971) and Goldthorpe (1980). 
3. Ideally, we would have liked to have tested the hypothesis "The voting behaviour of 
mobile people that have been a long time in their class of destination will be closer to 
the typical voting behaviour of this class relative to that of their class of origin, than 
will the voting behaviour of mobile people who have been a short period in their class 
of destination". However, no information on respondent's mobility careers was available 
in our data. Nevertheless, knowing that most intergenerational class mobility takes place 
at a relatively early stage of the occupational career with little occurring between the 
broad classes which we have identified after the age of 35 (Goldthorpe 1980: 69-71), 
the hypothesis formulated in the text forms a suitable alternative. 
4. We would like to add that this hypothesis is not just the prediction that voting behav-
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iour will be a weighted average between origin and destination. The literature on social 
mobility and political preference often suggests that voting behaviour is not just a 
weighted average between class of origin and class of destination, but that due to the 
'shock of mobility' (comparable to the often-assumed status inconsistency effect) 
mobility has an extra independent effect. Turner (1992) labelled this the effect of 
mobility per se. The literature elaborating on such a mobility hypotheses, however, is 
rather vague and lacks precision. This can be illustrated by the recent work of Kellcy 
(1992) which states that mobile persons "may not be fully at home, nor fully excepted, 
in either class. This might lead to alienation and anomie, and perhaps to disenchantment 
with the social order and support for radical change. Or it might lead to extremism of 
the Left or the Right, according to the historical circumstance Thus there are 
many reasons to think that there is something more to social mobility than merely class 
of origin and present class position, that there is something to the experience of mobility 
per se." (1992: 32; italics ours). We feel that our status maximization hypothesis is a 
more specific hypothesis on mobility effects. 
5. For a comparison of diagonal models with the conventional ones see Hendrickx et al. 
(1993). For an application of these models in the case of a multinomial dependent 
variable see Nieuwbeerta & Wittebrood (1995). 
6. These models are also known as diagonal reference models (De Graaf & Ganzeboom 
1990; De Graaf 1991; Clifford & Heath 1993). 
7. Sobel's original model was designed for ordinal dependent variables. Because we have 
to deal with a binomial dependent variable (left-wing versus right-wing) we fitted 
instead of Sobel's original model a logistic version of that model. 
8. We assumed the restriction that O S p i 1. The parameter p, however, does not have this 
restriction in the estimating procedure. In order to get the best fit of the data in the 
iterative procedure ρ might go higher than one or lower than zero. The diagonal 
reference models do not offer the appropriate design when ρ does not fit in the 0-1 
interval. However, this only arose for Canada, as the figures in Table 7.4 show. 
9. We also fitted a dummy variable for each year instead of for each period. Using a 
dummy for each year, however, results in a large number of parameters. Since the 
reduction of these parameters by applying five year periods did not change our results 
significantly we preferred to apply these periods. 
10. See note 8. 
8 Contextual effects of intergenerational class mobility 
on voting behaviour 
1. This chapter is an adaptation of a paper presented at the World Congress of Sociology 
in Bielefeld, 1994. Part of this chapter is also based upon an article published in the 
American Journal of Sociology on the effects of class mobility on political preferences 
in four countries (De Graaf, Nieuwbeerta & Heath 1995). 
2. The multi-level analyses were conducted using the ML3 computer program (Presser et 
al. 1991). 
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9 Macro-effects of intergeneratíonal class mobility on class voting 
1. This chapter was presented at a colloquium at the Department of Sociology of the 
University in Nijmegen, 1994. 
2. Note that the presented voting figures in Tables 9.1, 9.2 and 9.3 should be the same as 
the corresponding figures in Tables 5.2 and 6.1. It is only due to rounding errors 
resulting from the calculations that some are not. 
3. See note 2. 
4. The Thomsen and kappa index for the presented (and rounded) log-odds-ratios yield 
slightly different values. However, we prefer to present the figures based on the 
unrounded log-odds-ratios. 
5. Note that this equation is similar to the parametrization of the diagonal mobility models 
as developed by Sobel (1981, 1985), and as applied in Chapter 7. 
6. Although we regard analysing the outcomes of the counterfactual analyses with the 
model discussed as substantively more appropriate, following Erikson (1990) we also 
analysed the outcomes of the counterfactual analyses by a simple analysis of variance. 
The results of these later analyses confirmed the conclusions drawn in this chapter. Only 
a very small percentage - if any - of variance in class voting was accounted for by 
variation in mobility patterns. For example, analysis of variance applied to the entries of 
Tables 9.5 and 9.7 yield that variation between the mobility patterns accounts for 
respectively 8 and 2 per cent of the total variation, and variation between the voting 
patterns accounts for 58 and 96 percent (leaving 35 and 2 percent of the variation to 
interaction). 
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Samenvatting 
In bijna alle industriële landen waar burgers het recht hebben te stemmen bij 
verkiezingen, is hun sociale positie - in het bijzonder hun klasse - een belangrijke 
determinant van hun stemgedrag. Omdat mensen in de lagere sociale klassen meer 
geneigd zijn op een linkse politieke partij te stemmen dan mensen in de hogere 
klassen, kan gesproken worden van een "democratische klassenstrijd". 
De onderhavige studie richt zich op deze democratische klassenstrijd door drie 
soorten vragen te beantwoorden naar de relatie tussen klasse en stemgedrag in 
twintig democratische industriële landen. Deze vragen zijn - hoewel diverse malen 
eerder gesteld - tot dusverre niet adequaat beantwoord. Allereerst zijn beschrij-
vingsvragen gesteld naar de sterkte van de relatie tussen klasse en stemgedrag in 
Westerse industriële landen in de naoorlogse periode. Ten tweede zijn verkla-
ringsvragen gesteld om de verschillen tussen landen en de ontwikkelingen in die 
landen in deze sterkte te verklaren. Ten derde concentreert deze studie zich op 
vragen naar de effecten van intergenerationele klasse mobiliteit op individueel 
stemgedrag. 
Bij het beantwoorden van deze drie soorten vragen is voortgebouwd op een 
lange geschiedenis van onderzoek naar sociale stratificatie en politiek. Deze 
geschiedenis kan worden verdeeld in drie generaties. Gedurende deze generaties is 
aanzienlijke vooruitgang geboekt in de formulering van onderzoeksvragen, de 
toegepaste meetprocedures, de dataverzameling en de analysemethoden. In studies 
van de eerste generatie zijn relatief vage onderzoeksvragen beantwoord door 
tabellen te analyseren die gebaseerd waren op een beperkte hoeveelheid gegevens 
en op eenvoudige klasse indelingen. In studies van de tweede generatie zijn pre-
ciezere vragen gesteld en werden antwoorden veelal verkregen door gegevens te 
analyseren met lineaire regressie technieken. Studies van de derde generatie 
stelden nog preciezere onderzoeksvragen en beantwoorden deze aan de hand van 
gedetailleerde en gestandaardiseerde klassen schema's, gegevens van grootschali-
ge (internationaal) vergelijkbare onderzoeken en niet-lineaire onderzoektechnie-
ken. Om in onderhavige studie voort te bouwen op deze ontwikkelingen, zijn 
klassieke vragen die in alle drie generaties zijn gesteld, precies geformuleerd en is 
gebruik gemaakt van gedetailleerde meetprocedures, geavanceerde analysetech-
nieken en dataverzamelingen die voornamelijk uit de derde generatie voortkomen. 
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Data en operationalisering 
De gegevens die geanalyseerd zijn in deze studie komen van twee dataverzame-
lingen. De eerste dataverzameling bestaat uit gegevens van twintig Westerse 
industriële democratische landen - alle West-Europese landen, Australië, Canada 
en de Verenigde Staten van Amerika - in de periode 1945-1990. Deze dataset 
bevat gegevens over de verschillen in stemgedrag tussen arbeiders en niet-
arbeiders en gegevens over de sociale en politieke situatie in die landen. De 
tweede dataverzameling bevat gegevens van individuen uit 113 nationaal repre-
sentatieve studies die zijn gehouden in zestien van de genoemde twintig landen in 
de periode 1956-1990. Voor Griekenland, Luxemburg, Portugal en Spanje zijn 
geen individuele gegevens opgenomen. Het gebruik van beide grote dataverza-
melingen in deze studie geeft de mogelijkheid betrouwbare antwoorden te 
verkrijgen op de gestelde onderzoeksvragen en reduceert de kans om hypothesen 
te verwerpen die in werkelijkheid juist zijn. 
Om de klassepositie van mensen te meten zijn twee procedures gebruikt. 
Allereerst is het traditionele arbeider versus niet-arbeider onderscheid gehanteerd. 
Daarnaast is een klasse schema gebruikt dat is ontwikkeld door Erikson, Gold-
thorpe en Portocarero, het zogenaamde "EGP" klasse schema. Dit EGP schema is 
gedetailleerder en onderscheidt zeven klassen. Binnen de arbeiders wordt een 
onderscheid gemaakt tussen ongeschoolde, geschoolde en agrarische arbeiders. 
Binnen de niet-arbeiders worden de service klasse managers, routine hoofdar-
beiders, kleine zelfstandigen en boeren onderscheiden. 
Om de sterkte van de relatie tussen klasse en stemgedrag te meten zijn diverse 
maten gehanteerd. Allereerst is de traditionele maat voor de sterkte van deze 
relatie, de Alford index, gebruikt. Deze index geeft het absolute verschil aan 
tussen het percentage arbeiders dat stemt op een linkse politieke partij en het 
percentage niet-arbeiders dat stemt op een linkse partij. Daarnaast is een maat 
voor het relatieve verschil in stemgedrag gebruikt, namelijk de log-odds-ratio. 
Deze log-odds-ratio, die Thomsen index is genoemd, is de natuurlijke logaritme 
van de ratio van de odds voor arbeiders om op een linkse dan wel rechtse partij 
te stemmen en de overeenkomstige odds voor niet-arbeiders. Verder zijn maten 
gehanteerd voor de sterkte van de relatie tussen klasse en stemgedrag wanneer 
meerdere sociale klassen worden onderscheiden. 
Beschrijving van de sterkte van de relatie 
tussen klasse en stemgedrag 
Sinds het begin van onderzoek naar de relatie tussen klasse en stemgedrag hebben 
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studies laten zien dat de sterkte van deze relatie verschilt tussen landen. Daarnaast 
hebben diverse onderzoeken laten zien dat de sterkte van deze relatie in de meeste 
landen is afgenomen sinds de tweede wereldoorlog. Deze conclusies komen met 
name uit studies van de eerste generatie, waarin de Alford index is gebruikt om 
de sterkte van de relatie tussen klasse en stemgedrag te meten. Later zijn echter 
twijfels geuit over deze conclusies. In studies van de derde generatie is gesteld 
dat de gevonden verschillen in Alford indices niet alleen veroorzaakt kunnen zijn 
door verschillen in de sterkte van de relatie tussen klasse en stemgedrag, maar 
ook door verschillen in de algemene populariteit van politieke partijen. Daarnaast 
zouden verschillen in Alford indices veroorzaakt kunnen worden door verschillen 
in de compositie van de arbeidersklasse en de met-arbeidersklasse. Onderzoekers 
van de derde generatie veronderstelden daarom dat beschrijvingen van de sterkte 
van het verband tussen klasse en stemgedrag tot andere conclusies zouden kunnen 
leiden, wanneer maten worden gebruikt die relatieve verschillen in stemgedrag 
tussen meerdere klassen vaststellen. 
In de onderhavige studie is de houdbaarheid van deze veronderstelling onder-
zocht Hiervoor is de sterkte van het verband tussen klasse en stemgedrag 
beschreven met de Alford index, de Thomsen index en met maten die het verschil 
in stemgedrag tussen EGP klassen samenvatten. Deze verschillende analyses 
leveren gelijke conclusies op. Er bestaan belangrijke verschillen in de sterkte van 
de relatie tussen klasse en stemgedrag tussen democratische industriële landen in 
de naoorlogse periode. Van alle onderzochte landen is in de Scandinavische 
landen en in Brittannië het sterkste verband aanwezig, en in de Verenigde Staten 
en in Canada het zwakste. Verder is in een groot aantal landen de sterkte van het 
verband tussen klasse en stemgedrag afgenomen in de naoorlogse periode. De 
afname is het grootst in de Scandinavische landen, gevolgd door Duitsland en 
Brittannië. In Canada, Ierland, Luxemburg, Nederland en Zweden heeft geen 
systematische substantiële afname in de sterkte van het verband tussen klasse en 
stemgedrag plaatsgevonden. Het feit dat de verschillende analyses dezelfde 
conclusies opleveren, houdt - zoals we later nog zullen aangeven - echter niet in 
dat de veronderstellingen van de onderzoekers van de derde generatie onjuist 
waren. 
Verklaringen voor verschillen in de sterkte van het verband tussen 
klasse en stemgedrag 
In deze studie zijn drie verklaringen onderzocht voor de variatie tussen landen en 
tussen tijdstippen in de sterkte van het verband tussen klasse en stemgedrag. De 
eerste verklaring, die direct te maken heeft met de hierboven genoemde beschrij-
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vingen van de sterkte van dit verband, heeft betrekking op de samenstelling van 
de arbeiders- en de niet-arbeidersklasse in een land op een bepaald tijdstip. Deze 
compositie verklaring veronderstelt dat verschillen tussen landen en tijdstippen in 
de mate waarin de arbeiders en de niet-arbeidersklasse in stemgedrag van elkaar 
verschillen, (in zekere mate) verklaard kunnen worden door verschillen tussen 
deze landen en tijdstippen in de compositie van de arbeiders- en de niet-arbei-
dersklasse. Deze verklaring is diverse malen gesuggereerd door onderzoekers van 
de derde generatie, maar nooit direct getoetst. Om deze verklaring te toetsen is in 
deze studie gebruik gemaakt van de gegevens van de individuele dataset. Hierbij 
is verondersteld dat binnen de arbeiders- en niet-arbeidersklasse relevante sub-
klassen op basis van het EGP klasse schema kunnen worden onderscheiden. 
De toetsing van deze compositie verklaring heeft uitgewezen dat ongeveer een 
kwart van de verschillen tussen democratische industriële landen in de mate 
waarin arbeiders en niet-arbeiders verschillen in stemgedrag, verklaard kunnen 
worden door verschillen tussen die landen in de samenstelling van de arbeiders en 
niet-arbeidersklasse. Daarnaast kan ongeveer een vijfde van de veranderingen 
binnen deze landen in de mate waarin de arbeiders en niet-arbeiders verschillen in 
stemgedrag worden verklaard door veranderingen in de compositie van de 
arbeiders en niet-arbeidersklasse. Deze resultaten betekenen een bevestiging van 
de compositie verklaring, maar laten tevens zien dat het grootste deel van de 
verschillen tussen landen en perioden in de mate waarin arbeiders en niet-
arbeiders verschillen in stemgedrag, worden veroorzaakt door (echte) verschillen 
in het stemgedrag van de klassen. 
De tweede verklaring voor verschillen tussen landen en veranderingen binnen die 
landen in de sterkte van het verband tussen klasse en stemgedrag, betreft de 
effecten van sociale en politieke kenmerken van landen. Hypothesen over de 
effecten van deze landen kenmerken zijn zowel in studies van de eerste als van de 
derde generatie diverse malen gesuggereerd, maar zijn echter veelal vaag gefor-
muleerd en niet onderworpen aan sterke empirische toetsingen. In onderhavige 
studie zijn daarom verschillende hypothesen geformuleerd en getoetst met 
gegevens van de landen dataset. 
De toetsingen van de hypothesen resulteren in enigszins verschillende conclu-
sies voor verschillen tussen landen en ontwikkelingen binnen landen in de sterkte 
van het verband tussen klasse en stemgedrag. De verschillen tussen landen blijken 
in zekere mate verklaard te kunnen worden door verschillen in religieuze en 
etnische diversiteit tussen de landen en door verschillen in vakbondsdichtheid 
tussen de landen: des te kleiner de religieuze en etnische diversiteit en des te 
groter de vakbondsdichtheid in een land, des te sterker is de relatie tussen klasse 
en stemgedrag in dat land. Verschillen tussen landen in inkomensongelijkheid, de 
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relatieve omvang van de arbeidersklasse, de algemene levensstandaard en de mate 
waarin klasse-tegenstellingen in de politiek aanwezig zijn, blijken geen rol te 
spelen. Wel is een effect - in onverwachte richting - gevonden van de mate van 
intergenerationele mobiliteit: des te groter het percentage intergenerationeel 
mobiele personen in een land, des te sterker is het verband tussen klasse en 
stemgedrag in dat land. 
De veranderingen binnen landen in de sterkte van het verband tussen klasse en 
stemgedrag kunnen in zekere mate worden verklaard door veranderingen in de 
algemene levensstandaard: des te hoger de levensstandaard in een land wordt, des 
te zwakker wordt het verband tussen klasse en stemgedrag. Daarnaast bleek een 
(sterkere) toename in het percentage vakbondsleden in een land te leiden tot een 
(sterkere) afname in de sterkte van het verband tussen klasse en stemgedrag in dat 
land. Dit wordt voornamelijk veroorzaakt doordat in sommige landen een algeme-
ne toename in vakbondslidmaatschap gepaard gaat met een relatief sterke toename 
in het percentage vakbondsleden onder niet-arbeiders. 
Een derde verklaring voor verschillen tussen landen en perioden in de sterkte van 
het verband tussen klasse en stemgedrag betreft de zogenaamde macro-effecten 
van intergenerationele klasse mobiliteit. Deze verklaring heeft een lange traditie in 
studies naar stratificatie en politiek. Sombart wees er bijvoorbeeld al op in zijn 
klassieke studie naar het ontbreken van het socialisme in de Verenigde Staten. 
Omdat in eerdere studies niet voldoende gedetailleerde en internationaal vergelijk-
bare gegevens over mobiliteit en stemgedrag van klassen beschikbaar waren, zijn 
tot dusverre geen serieuze toetsingen van deze verklaring verricht. Met behulp 
van de individuele dataset, die gegevens bevat van individuen in zestien landen 
voor de periode 1956-1990, is in onderhavige studie deze verklaring getoetst. 
Ondanks het grote aantal studies waarin gesuggereerd is dat er een macro-
effect van intergenerationele mobiliteit bestaat op de sterkte van het verband 
tussen klasse en stemgedrag in een land, blijkt echter dat verschillen tussen 
landen en perioden in de sterkte van dat verband niet kunnen worden verklaard 
door verschillen in patronen van intergenerationele klasse mobiliteit tussen die 
landen en perioden. Dit blijkt zowel het geval wanneer onderscheid wordt 
gemaakt tussen arbeiders en niet-arbeiders, als wanneer zeven EGP klassen 
worden onderscheiden. 
Effecten van klasse mobiliteit op individueel stemgedrag 
Behalve dat in deze studie de macro-effecten van intergenerationele mobiliteitspa-
tronen op de sterkte van het verband tussen klasse en stemgedrag in een land zijn 
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onderzocht, zijn ook de effecten van intergenerationele klasse mobiliteit op indivi-
dueel stemgedrag nagegaan. 
Allereerst zijn de effecten onderzocht van individuele intergenerationele klasse 
mobiliteit op het stemgedrag van intergenerationeel mobiele individuen. Deze 
effecten zijn al in studies van de eerste en tweede generatie onderzocht, maar in 
deze studies is dit voornamelijk gedaan door het bekijken van percentages in 
tabellen die gebaseerd waren op een klein aantal respondenten of door het 
toepassen van inhoudelijk ongeschikte lineaire regressie modellen. In de onderha-
vige studie zijn de effecten van mobiliteit op individueel stemgedrag onderzocht 
op een wijze die karakteristiek is voor studies van de derde generatie. De 
houdbaarheid van verschillende hypothesen is onderzocht door met met-lineaire 
modellen gegevens te analyseren van de individuele dataset. 
Uit deze analyses blijkt dat in alle landen - behalve Canada - het stemgedrag 
van de intergenerationeel mobiele personen zich bevindt tussen het kenmerkende 
stemgedrag van hun bestemmingsklasse en dat van hun oorspronkelijke klasse. De 
uitkomsten van de analyses laten verder zien dat in deze landen het effect van de 
bestemmingsklasse groter is dan het effect van de oorsprong klasse. Daarnaast 
blijkt in zeven landen - Brittannië, Denemarken, Duitsland, Finland, Nederland, 
Oostenrijk en de Verenigde Staten - het stemgedrag van oudere intergenerationeel 
mobiele personen dichter bij het kenmerkende stemgedrag van hun bestemmings-
klasse te liggen, dan dat van jongere intergenerationeel mobiele personen. Voor 
intergenerationeel mobiele personen van 18 jaar is het effect van de oorspronkelij-
ke klasse ongeveer even groot als het effect van de bestemmingsklasse. Voor 
mobiele personen van 65 jaar is het effect van de bestemmingsklasse daarentegen 
twee maal zo groot als dat van de oorspronkelijke klasse. Voor de oudere res-
pondenten blijft hun oorspronkelijke klasse echter een substantieel effect behou-
den op hun stemgedrag. De analyses wijzen verder uit dat personen die opwaarts 
mobiel zijn zich niet meer richten op het kenmerkende stemgedrag van hun 
bestemmingsklasse, dan personen die neerwaarts intergenerationeel mobiel zijn. 
Naast de effecten van individuele intergenerationele klasse mobiliteit zijn in deze 
studie ook contextuele effecten van mobiliteit op individueel stemgedrag onder-
zocht. Met name in studies van de eerste generatie zijn hypothesen over deze 
contextuele effecten veelvuldig geformuleerd. Op basis hiervan zijn in onderhavi-
ge studie twee hypothesen opgesteld. De eerste luidt: Des te groter de mate van 
instroom in een klasse uit linkse klassen, des te groter is de kans dat immobiele 
personen in die klasse stemmen op een linkse politieke partij. De tweede hypothe-
se luidt: Des te groter de mate van uitstroom in een klasse naar linkse klassen, 
des te groter is de kans dat immobiele personen in die klasse stemmen op een 
linkse politieke partij. Om deze hypothesen te toetsen zijn gegevens van de 
Summary in Dutch 245 
individuele dataset geanalyseerd. Hierdoor was informatie beschikbaar over een 
groot aantal individuen in zeven klassen in zestien landen en in verscheidene 
jaren, en dus in vele contexten. Bij het analyseren van deze gegevens zijn echter 
geen significante contextuele effecten gevonden van de mate van intergeneratio-
nele klasse mobiliteit op het stemgedrag van de intergenerationeel immobiele 
personen in de diverse sociale klassen. 
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